The phenomenon of the case law and publication of the case law reports has been present in our legal culture at least since the 13th century, as well as in some other European countries. Court decisions in writing occurred through several types of documents and sources. We can trace the case law documents in the public royal records ("the plates"), the law books and the first constitutional codifications of law. There is even particular group of the law collections which we can actually name as the original case law reports. The case law reports were designed even before this period of time. Unfortunately, no such original law reports survived up to the present day. We can strongly state the sustainable tradition of typical case law collections in the Czech legal culture since the medieval times. The very first case law reports in modern sense of meaning came in late 1850`s. But the periodicals case law reports in the Czech language eventually appeared with the year of 1918 when the Czech state was restored. Creating the case law reports and its headnotes falls within the process of court decisions publication. The courts, which constitute the top of the judicial pyramid, operate with their special individual instruments on their case law publication. The official law reports have been established...

O presente trabalho questiona o papel da legislação na realização judicial do direito. Para responder a essa questão, empreende-se uma tese conceitual sobre a dinâmica jurídica, que pretende superar a tradicional dicotomia entre a legislação e a função judicial concebida pela doutrina clássica da separação dos poderes. De acordo com a argumentação desenvolvida aqui, o judiciário julga não somente fatos dos casos, mas também as próprias escolhas legislativas, de modo que já não é possível defender que a função judicial consiste em mera declaração da lei nos casos particulares ou ainda em subsunção lógica das lides que lhe são submetidas às normas previamente postas pelo processo legislativo. Assim, a realização judicial do direito não pode ser anteriormente determinada, uma vez que não está condicionada pelo conteúdo legislado. Contudo, os conteúdos da lei transmitem algum sentido para os cidadãos e, por isso, criam expectativas. Confirmar ou não essas expectativas é uma questão relacionada com a justificação e a legitimidade dos Estados racionais modernos, que estabelecem com os cidadãos uma relação de dominação legal-racional. Desse modo, a questão do papel da legislação (direito positivo passado) na realização do direito atual é posta em termos de legitimidade. Se, de um lado, constatamos que não é possível pretender controlar a discricionariedade judicial dentro dos próprios limites do direito, de outro lado defendemos que é legítimo pretender submeter o direito positivo à crítica e ao controle democrático. Isso porque interessa a todos os cidadãos que as decisões judiciais possam ser justificadas de modo razoável, graças a uma argumentação cuja força e a pertinência se reconheçam amplamente na sociedade. A partir dessa perspectiva, propomos um redimensionamento do argumento legal na prática jurídica e passamos a analisar as diversas implicações da questão central posta neste trabalho na realização judicial do direito. / This work questions the function of statutory law in the judicial realization of law. To answer this question, we undertake a conceptual thesis on legal dynamics, which aims to overcome the traditional dichotomy between the statutory law and the judicial function designed by the classical doctrine of separation of powers. According to the arguments put forward here, judges judge not only the facts of the cases, but also the legislative choices, so that it is no longer possible to argue that judicial function is a mere declaration of the statutory law in individual cases. Thus, the judicial realization of law cannot be previously determined, since it is not strictly conditioned by the legislated content. However, the statutory law content communicates meanings to citizens and therefore it creates expectations. To confirm or not to confirm these expectations is something related to justification and legitimacy of modern rational States, which hold a legal-rational domination relationship with citizens. Thus, the question of the function of statutory law is put here in terms of legitimacy. On the one hand, we find that we cannot intend to control judicial discretion within the proper limits of the law, on the other hand we argue that it is suitable to intend to submit the positive law to public critics and democratic control. All citizens seem to expect that judicial decisions can be justified in a reasonable manner, thanks to arguments whose strength and relevance are widely accepted in society. From this perspective, we propose a redefinition of the use of legal argument in legal practice and then we start to examine the various implications of the central question posed in this work in the judicial realization of the law.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Eduardo Canizella Junior.pdf: 606329 bytes, checksum: bad7c39e72a3bd8cd22a5bc309b8a9e5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-18 / This work serves the purpose of analyzing the concept of legal principle as a kind of standard, its special mode of application to the specific case (weighting) the limits of this mode of application and the theories of legal argumentation arising from the realization of these limits. Each of these topics is developed on grounds of the work of one of the leading exponents of post-positivism, Robert Alexy / O presente trabalho tem por finalidade analisar o conceito de princípio jurídico como espécie de norma, seu especial modo de aplicação ao caso concreto (a ponderação), os limites desse modo de aplicação e as teorias de argumentação jurídica que decorrem da constatação desses limites. Cada um desses tópicos é desenvolvido com fundamento na obra de um dos principais expoentes do pós-positivismo, Robert Alexy

O presente trabalho questiona o papel da legislação na realização judicial do direito. Para responder a essa questão, empreende-se uma tese conceitual sobre a dinâmica jurídica, que pretende superar a tradicional dicotomia entre a legislação e a função judicial concebida pela doutrina clássica da separação dos poderes. De acordo com a argumentação desenvolvida aqui, o judiciário julga não somente fatos dos casos, mas também as próprias escolhas legislativas, de modo que já não é possível defender que a função judicial consiste em mera declaração da lei nos casos particulares ou ainda em subsunção lógica das lides que lhe são submetidas às normas previamente postas pelo processo legislativo. Assim, a realização judicial do direito não pode ser anteriormente determinada, uma vez que não está condicionada pelo conteúdo legislado. Contudo, os conteúdos da lei transmitem algum sentido para os cidadãos e, por isso, criam expectativas. Confirmar ou não essas expectativas é uma questão relacionada com a justificação e a legitimidade dos Estados racionais modernos, que estabelecem com os cidadãos uma relação de dominação legal-racional. Desse modo, a questão do papel da legislação (direito positivo passado) na realização do direito atual é posta em termos de legitimidade. Se, de um lado, constatamos que não é possível pretender controlar a discricionariedade judicial dentro dos próprios limites do direito, de outro lado defendemos que é legítimo pretender submeter o direito positivo à crítica e ao controle democrático. Isso porque interessa a todos os cidadãos que as decisões judiciais possam ser justificadas de modo razoável, graças a uma argumentação cuja força e a pertinência se reconheçam amplamente na sociedade. A partir dessa perspectiva, propomos um redimensionamento do argumento legal na prática jurídica e passamos a analisar as diversas implicações da questão central posta neste trabalho na realização judicial do direito. / This work questions the function of statutory law in the judicial realization of law. To answer this question, we undertake a conceptual thesis on legal dynamics, which aims to overcome the traditional dichotomy between the statutory law and the judicial function designed by the classical doctrine of separation of powers. According to the arguments put forward here, judges judge not only the facts of the cases, but also the legislative choices, so that it is no longer possible to argue that judicial function is a mere declaration of the statutory law in individual cases. Thus, the judicial realization of law cannot be previously determined, since it is not strictly conditioned by the legislated content. However, the statutory law content communicates meanings to citizens and therefore it creates expectations. To confirm or not to confirm these expectations is something related to justification and legitimacy of modern rational States, which hold a legal-rational domination relationship with citizens. Thus, the question of the function of statutory law is put here in terms of legitimacy. On the one hand, we find that we cannot intend to control judicial discretion within the proper limits of the law, on the other hand we argue that it is suitable to intend to submit the positive law to public critics and democratic control. All citizens seem to expect that judicial decisions can be justified in a reasonable manner, thanks to arguments whose strength and relevance are widely accepted in society. From this perspective, we propose a redefinition of the use of legal argument in legal practice and then we start to examine the various implications of the central question posed in this work in the judicial realization of the law.

207 f. / Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2013-07-26T22:09:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MARCOS DE AGUIAR VILLAS-BÔAS.pdf: 983210 bytes, checksum: 450fcef94d38b64e3ac540bcceaa0773 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura(anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2013-07-26T22:10:26Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 MARCOS DE AGUIAR VILLAS-BÔAS.pdf: 983210 bytes, checksum: 450fcef94d38b64e3ac540bcceaa0773 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-07-26T22:10:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MARCOS DE AGUIAR VILLAS-BÔAS.pdf: 983210 bytes, checksum: 450fcef94d38b64e3ac540bcceaa0773 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / A Ciência do Direito vem passando por muitas mudanças nos últimos anos. Os estudos avançaram bastante, formando novos movimentos e teorias, que devem guiar a pesquisa jurídica nos próximos anos. A aproximação entre o direito e os sujeitos, os fatos e os valores é cada vez maior. O enfraquecimento do positivismo jurídico impõe uma revisão dos temas estudados sob o seu enfoque, o que também ocorre no direito tributário. O in dubio pro contribuinte é uma das matérias que merecem uma nova análise, ainda mais se considerarmos a crescente preocupação do jurista com a efetividade dos direitos fundamentais do cidadão. A partir das noções pós-positivistas que têm influenciado a ciência do direito, como a tópica, a argumentação jurídica e a teoria dos princípios, cumpre investigar se o in dubio pro contribuinte pode receber uma outra roupagem, funcionando como um princípio constitucional que busca dar máxima eficácia aos direitos fundamentais do contribuinte frente aos excessos do poder estatal e que pode ser desdobrado ainda em outras categorias normativas: regra e postulado. O in dubio pro contribuinte, como um princípio constitucional, influenciaria a construção das demais normas do sistema tributário brasileiro, impediria a construção de normas que não conferissem máxima efetividade aos direitos fundamentais e determinaria a aplicação de um postulado que imporia, nos casos difíceis tributários, um aumento da argumentação para a limitação desses direitos. / Salvador

This paper aims to explore the functions of the theory of legal argumentation (TLA) on Constitutional States and will especially focus on the political and self-reflective functions of the TLA within the framework of a neo-constitutionalistic legal theory. The first part of the paper includes a definition of the TAL and an analysis of its main functions. At the end of the paper the author provides the bases for the development of a neoconstitutionalistic legal theory. / Este trabajo pretende explorar las funciones de la teoría de la argumentación jurídica (TAJ) en los Estados constitucionales y se concentrará en subrayar las funciones políticas y autorreflexivas de la TAJ en el marco de una teoría del Derecho neoconstitucionalista. La primera parte incluye una definición de la TAJ y un examen de sus funciones generales. En la parte final, el autor ofrece un programa para el desarrollo de una teoría neoconstitucionalista.

L’enjeu de la présente recherche est d’examiner la gestion du désaccord entre magistrats dans une Cour d’Appel brésilienne, tout en procédant à l’identification de la stase (du conflit) entre eux, dans les moments de définition du juste montant (le « suum cuique tribuere »), souvent désigné par l’expression pretium doloris ou « prix de la douleur ». On s’intéresse moins au côté technique et strictement juridique des affaires de dommages et intérêts et plutôt à l’analyse argumentative/rhétorique des interactions enregistrées en audio. Après des réflexions à propos de quelques théories de l’argumentation (Aristote, Ducrot, Grize, Toulmin et autres), de l’argumentation juridique (Atienza, Perelman, Cornu et autres), des interactions verbales (Goffman, Kerbrat-Orecchioni, Traverso et autres) et des émotions en contexte d’interaction argumentative (Plantin), ce travail offre quatre chapitres analytiques où, parmi des analyses descriptives, on examine de près la façon que les magistrats/interactants allient la raison (la lettre de la loi) au côté émotionnel, au moment de qualifier une affaire en tant que « dommage », concept flou, ouvert à maintes possibilités d’interprétation juridique, selon les juristes brésiliens (Reis, Cahali et autres). On procède à un inventaire des critères, parfois très originaux, qui font toute la richesse du moment des délibérés connu sous le terme de quantum debeatur (ou, si l’on préfère, l’ad quantum). De cette façon, on constate que les magistrats peuvent même utiliser des « nonlegalist factors », ajoutant aux arguments techniques juridiques quelques valeurs, qui supposent une appréciation subjective des affaires en cours de jugement. Dans ces analyses, on montre encore comment l’hétéro-attribution d’une émotion acquiert une valeur argumentative, sans que cela disqualifie les jugements en appel pour autant. On examine aussi les procédés d’atténuation du désaccord exprimés par les magistrats, tout en mettant en relief la dimension stratégique de l’adoucissement conversationnel, car, comme on peut le constater, les attitudes des magistrats lors des délibérés manifestent une dimension rhétorique, dans les moments de définition du pretium doloris. De cette façon, en considérant la richesse et diversité des formules de politesse (par exemple, l’expression data venia), des réparateurs (excuses et justifications), des modalisateurs, entre autres procédés identifiés par la pragmatique des interactions, on découvre plusieurs façons très efficaces de gérer le conflit, employées par les magistrats lorsqu'ils prennent en charge le rôle actanciel d’opposant lors des délibérés. On repère aussi quelques stratégies argumentatives utilisées exclusivement en contexte d’interaction, comme l’accord dissonant, ce qui nous permet de pointer la “colonisation argumentative” du discours d’un magistrat par l’autre. L’identification de ce que nous avons nommé renverseur (dispositif qui permet aux magistrats de retourner à 180° une décision) nous aide aussi à comprendre comment les avis des magistrats peuvent s’affronter irrévocablement, donnant place à des stases irréversibles.On montre aussi, à partir de quelques études de cas, comment fonctionne l’assimilation argumentative en tant que phénomène interactif-argumentatif qui émerge dans les moments de stase réversible entre les magistrats, faisant s'écrouler les barrières argumentatives entre les interactants, avant que l’un d’entre eux ne manifeste un changement de disposition vis-à-vis de la décision à prendre. On présente enfin un type d’argument très caractéristique du corpus TRIBUNAL (le corpus dont on dispose pour cette recherche) : l’argument de l’expérience vécue, lequel apparaît dans les séquences examinées et qui donnent une valeur argumentative et rhétorique non négligeable aux votes des magistrats. / This thesis aims to describe the mechanisms of disagreement management among judges in a court of Brazil. The source of the analyzes will be some discussions between judges, audio recorded, always in Second Instance. The focus of the research is the moment of (re)definition of the value of compensation (or the so-called « price of pain » / pretium doloris) to be paid in cases of moral damage. Thus, after plunging in texts related to theories of argumentation (Aristotle, Ducrot, Grize, Toulmin among others), to strictly legal argumentation (Atienza, Perelman, Cornu among others), to the theories of verbal interaction (Goffman, Kerbrat-Orecchioni, Traverso among others) and also the theories related to the study of emotions in the context of argumentative interaction (Plantin), this research presents four analytical parts in which, through meticulously descriptive work, we propose to examine the way that judges, when to judge controversial cases, combine reason and emotion to their justifications. Thus, we proceed to an inventory of the criteria used by judges, some very original, and that make particularly interesting the moment of defining the quantum debeatur (or, if you prefer, the ad quantum). As we will see, the magistrates will also use non-legal criteria (« nonlegalist factors »), in this endeavor, at the time of integrating to the strictly legal arguments some arguments related to their own personal experiences, without, thereby, disqualifying the handed down verdicts. In fact, and as we will note, the time of definition of pretium doloris is still quite controversial, according to Brazilian jurists (Reis, Cahali among others).We also examine the mechanisms of attenuating disagreements, used by magistrates in times of conflict (stase), always trying to unveil the strategic and rhetoric sides of such attitudes. Thus, taking into account the richness and diversity of the so called « formulas of politeness », in in the use of expressions such as data venia or in the use of modalizers, among others, we discover the unique and effective ways that magistrates find to deal with conflict of opinions among them, during deliberations. Thus, we will highlight the strategy of « dissonant agreement » observed in some sessions and that, as we show, indicates a kind of « argumentative colonization » of speeches given by the judges. We also highlight an important mechanism used in times of conflict, to which we gave the name of argumentative inverter. Such a device allows a magistrate invert in 180º the decision of the Magistrate of First Instance, for example, in addition to helping us understand how the irreversible disagreement (stase irréversible) ranks among the expert judges.The analyzes also show, from case studies, how the argumentative assimilation works, an argumentative-interactional phenomenon that emerges in times of reversible conflict (stase réversible) among judges. Such manifestation will allow us to check how a judge can convince / persuade another in moments of controversy and disagreement between them. Finally, we show how the argument from personal experience works, a typical agument of the COURT corpus (the name of the corpus we adopted), widely used by judges and which gives a rhetorical touch to the more technical arguments, in moments of deliberations; particularly in the moment of qualification of an action as illegal.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – supervised by the European Court of Human rights (ECtHR) – coexists with other normative (human rights) instruments that have been created at the national, regional, and international level, both by State and non-State actors. The ECHR represents one legal piece of this normative ‘jungle’, characterized by legal ‘fragmentation’. Whereas a lot is said about the negative aspects of this diverse world, this doctoral thesis aims to focus on its positive sides. To support its interpretation and application of the ECHR, the Strasbourg Court makes reference to a diverse range of instruments other than the ECHR, which we call external instruments. The Grand Chamber-case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey of 12 November 2008 provides a rare overview of the characteristics of this ‘referencing practice’. In this judgment, the Court included a separate heading to specifically explain its interpretative use of international law, discussing the legal basis as well as the type of instruments that it considers relevant. Two major conclusions follow from the Court’s explanations: firstly, it puts external referencing in the light of some rules on interpretation provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (particularly in Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT); secondly, it stresses that soft and non-ratified external instruments might equally offer support for (evolutively) interpreting the ECHR. These statements are controversial; the Court has been criticized for misinterpreting the rules of the VCLT, for not well justifying its references as well as for exceeding its powers by incoherently relying on (non-binding) external materials for interpretative purposes.The case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey left many questions open in respect of the importation of external instruments. There is some confusion about the functions and the weight of (non-binding) external instruments in legal reasoning. In addition, the justificatory arguments developed in this case lack precision and persuasiveness. Addressing these gaps, this study firstly offers an elaborate ‘mapping’ of the usage of external instruments by the ECtHR. For that purpose, all references in each Grand Chamber-case since Demir and Baykara v. Turkey of 12 November 2008 (until the end of 2015) have been analyzed and categorized. Secondly, this work develops arguments to better justify the Court’s practice of using external instruments. Both from a legality and a users’ perspective, this thesis demonstrates how external referencing may (under certain conditions) be a valid method to give meaning to the provisions in the ECHR. The ‘mapping’ of the referencing practice demonstrates that, to support the interpretation and application of the Convention in the ‘law’-section of the decision, external instruments have been invoked by the Grand Chamber in almost 70 percent of the examined cases. This interpretative technique covers a wide variety of instruments, diverging according to their origin as well as to their scope ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione loci. The legal status of the instruments constitutes an additional root of diversity; the ECtHR imports legal instruments that have been ratified by the Member States, instruments that have not been ratified by some of the Member States and/or by the respondent State, soft instruments created by politically (non-)representative bodies, and finally, case law developed by other (quasi-)judicial bodies. The Grand Chamber references these instruments for different purposes: to dismiss their content, to establish interpretative rules, to support the interpretation of notions and requirements of the Convention, to enable the creation of harmony between the Convention and external legal requirements, or to consider a State’s freedom of manoeuvre when applying the ECHR. An example of a contested – but rather rare – usage of external instruments consists of comparing a mixture of binding and non-binding instruments in order to progressively evolve (and change) the Court’s case law. Overall, however, the Grand Chamber adopts a rather traditional approach to its interpretative ‘sources’, not according to non-binding instruments an independent decisive weight.In the Grand Chamber cases issued after Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, the Court did not undertake efforts to further justify and explain its referencing practice. In our view, two provisions might nonetheless operate as valuable vehicles to enhance the legality of some references. It concerns, more particularly, Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT, inciting the Court to take into account external applicable norms, and Article 53 ECHR, offering a ‘safeguard’ for human rights. Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT is regularly used by the Court in connection to the method of ‘harmonious interpretation’, accommodating the obligations of the ECHR with external obligations (that risk to conflict with the Convention). We agree that Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT – covering a principle of ‘systemic integration’ – offers a legal basis for a coordinative integration of external applicable requirements. Some caution is nonetheless required; the creation of convergence between the ECHR and external legal domains should not supersede the aim of effective and progressive human rights protection. Therefore, when a conflict arises between the ECHR and an external provision, this should be clearly acknowledged instead of being artificially ignored under a pretext of ‘harmonisation’ and ‘anti-fragmentation’. Subsequently, the conflict should be solved by means of ‘hierarchical integration’ (giving precedence to human rights law) rather than by ‘coordinative integration’.Although the Court references Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT to support harmonious interpretation between the ECHR and external instruments outside the human rights domain, this case law study demonstrates that it does generally not cite this provision in respect of references to human rights catalogues other than the ECHR. For that reason, a criticism claiming that the Court misuses Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT to expand the ECHR on the basis of external higher human rights provisions, largely misses ground. This does not mean, however, that Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT has no relevance in respect of the importation of other human rights catalogues. Although this does not accord with the Court’s general practice, we are of the opinion that Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT mandates the Court to integrate (higher) protection standards applicable in all Member States of the Council of Europe. In other words, the ideal of ‘systemic integration’ is not only relevant in relation to the landscape of (general) international law, but should also permeate the domain of human rights law. As a harmonizing principle, it is supposed to encourage the Court to take account of ratified external human rights catalogues, including their authoritative interpretation by external monitoring bodies. Article 53 ECHR supports this argument too. This provision offers a human rights safeguard ensuring peaceful coexistence between the ECHR and higher protection standards. The message of Article 53 ECHR towards the Strasbourg judges is twofold. In its procedural dimension, the Court should use it directly, to sanction a State that, on the national level, did not give precedence to the highest applicable human rights standard. In its substantive dimension, this provision has effects similar to those of Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT. When higher and binding human rights standards are applicable in all Member States, Article 53 ECHR obliges the Court to substantively integrate them into its interpretation of the ECHR. In addition, we argue that Article 53 ECHR offers a symmetric human rights safeguard, preventing a downward evolution of the ECHR on the basis of external human rights instruments offering lower standards. The proposed interpretation of Article 53 ECHR is innovative, yet controversial; so far, the Court has not used it in this manner. In line with Articles 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT and 53 ECHR, we argue that external instruments, under certain conditions, exercise a binding authority. Apart from that, referencing could be exercised in an optional manner, for instance in order to support argumentative purposes such as ‘evolutive’, ‘practical and effective’, and ‘autonomous’ reasoning and/or the establishment of a ‘margin of appreciation’. Essentially, these interpretation principles are covered by a holistic reading of the rules of the VCLT. A concept that catches well a combined reading of the rules of the VCLT, without losing sight of the specificity of human rights law, is the search for ‘opinio juris under the treaty’. Under this interpretative framework, an emerging or an ambiguous State consensus may suffice to develop a dynamic interpretation of the ECHR, provided that the incomplete consensus is confirmed by an opinio juris. To establish an emerging or ambiguous State consensus, ‘hard’ and ratified legal instruments (of national or international origin) are of particular relevance. In addition, a wide variety of (non-binding) external instruments might be useful to demonstrate the opinio juris. Besides legal provisions, some other, less formal, users’ arguments may validate some aspects of the referencing practice. The usage of external human rights catalogues – possibly containing higher protection standards, rights of other ‘generations’, or more specialized and specific provisions – contributes to the creation of human rights that are effective, universal and indivisible. This serves the rights holders who have an interest in equal treatment by a law that operates as a ‘ius gentium’, and in an adjudication process that does justice to all specificities of their identity and lived experiences. In addition, referencing could contribute to progressively evolve the protection of human rights. The referencing practice also enhances the coherence of the system, which is beneficial for ‘legal certainty’ vis-à-vis all users of human rights. Moreover, external referencing may contribute to a more nuanced and ‘shared’ decision-making, inspired by the positions and insights of various actors. Indeed, by means of comparative law, judges can build a dialectic network of mutual influences and communicative enrichment on a global scale. When we acknowledge that it is the Court’s task to translate pluralism in balanced outcomes and to canalize the different interests underlying a case, the importation of external views from across the globe may help the Court is assuming that responsibility. The Strasbourg judges find particularly valuable tools in external instruments. Not only could their usage enhance the procedural economy and the deformalization of the decision-making process, external citations may also make a reasoning more convincing and authoritative towards the audience. However, these benefits only play to the extent that external referencing is transparent, consistent and systematically relies on a solid legal framework.To optimize the justification of the referencing practice, this doctoral thesis recommends the Court to better embed its external citations in both formal and informal arguments. We have done several suggestions as to how such arguments might be developed in practice. Their use could boost the valid usage of external instruments, which, under certain conditions, offers good opportunities for a persuasive interpretation and application of the ECHRWe started our research with a sketch of the present normative environment; it is disordered and can be metaphorically compared to a jungle. The Strasbourg judges walk through this area and use lianas to make connections between all elements that compose this forest. Through their referencing practice, they communicate, learn, and argue. In an ecosystem, all organisms are dependent on one another; they cannot survive in isolation. Following the rules of nature, the organisms mutually profit from each other’s existence and finally, provide each other with oxygen. In order to be good rangers in this jungle, the Strasbourg judges should recognize and acknowledge the existence and the value of all the other organisms. In addition, to ensure a high degree of balance in the ecosystem, they should keep an eye both on the system’s rules (legality) and on the views and interests of those that benefit from the system (the users of human rights). By handling the lianas in such manner, the Court contributes to more coherence of the system (combating ‘fragmentation’) and caters for the users’ needs. This does not mean that one day, the jungle will be turned into a nicely organized cornfield. Some diversity in global times is inevitable and necessary. After all, it is the chaotic context that offers us tools to advance the law, to persuade the public, etc. The art is not to replace pluralism by unity, but to find a balance between divergence and convergence by creating a form of justice that is shared by all. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

O presente trabalho tem duplo objetivo, prático e teórico. Em termos práticos, busca sistematizar as discussões sobre a responsabilização dos militares e do Estado por acontecimentos do regime militar, bem como sobre a busca da verdade e a preservação da memória. Destacam-se nas discussões os acontecimentos da Guerrilha do Araguaia. Em termos teóricos, tem a intenção de apresentar uma exposição compreensiva da Teoria da Argumentação, tentando adaptá-la, na medida do possível, às necessidades da Argumentação Jurídica. Para cumprir esse duplo objetivo, o trabalho aplica a Teoria da Argumentação às discussões sobre o regime militar almejando benefícios para a teoria e para a prática. Desse modo, o trabalho inicia apresentando os principais conceitos e ferramentas da Teoria da Argumentação. Em seguida, realiza algumas adaptações das ferramentas para que sejam utilizadas na argumentação jurídica. Por fim, utilizando os conceitos e ferramentas expostos e adaptados, apresenta o Mapa Argumentativo dos debates sobre o regime militar, com destaque para as discussões sobre a possibilidade de responsabilizar criminalmente os militares por torturas, execuções e desaparecimentos forçados. São levados em consideração especialmente os aspectos fáticos do caso da Guerrilha do Araguaia e argumentos levantados pelo STF no julgamento da ADPF 153 e pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos no Caso Gomes Lund (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. Brasil. A dissertação conclui que os militares não foram beneficiados pela Lei de Anistia e aponta para a continuidade dos debates tanto sobre o aspecto criminal quanto outros problemas identificados no Mapa. Na parte teórica, chama-se atenção para a necessidade de continuar o estudo da Teoria da Argumentação e de adaptá-la às necessidades da Argumentação Jurídica. / This dissertation has two objectives: a practical and a theoretical one. The practical objective is to organize discussions concerning the responsibility of the State and the Military due to events occurred in the Brazilian Military Government, as well as discussions about the search for the historical truth and preservation of its memory. Special attention is draw upon the Araguaias Guerilla. Theoretically, the work intends to present the main aspects of Argumentation Theory trying to adapt it - as long as possible - to be used in Legal Argumentation. To fulfill this double objective, one applies Argumentation Theory to the Military Government events discussions aiming for benefits both for theory and practice. Hence, it begins presenting the essential concepts and tools of Argumentation Theory. It follows with the tools adaptations to Legal Argumentation. Finally, the Argumentation Map of the discussions is presented. The problem whether the most severe crimes of the military personnel (tortures and executions for instance) were amnestied is dealt with in greater detail. The events of Araguaias Guerrilla, the arguments of Brazilian Supreme Court in ADPF 153 and the arguments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Gomes Lund v Brazil Case are all given special attention. The dissertation concludes that the military (States agents) were not amnestied. It also points out the next steps in the discussions. As for the theoretical concerns, the conclusion draws attention to the importance of studying and developing Argumentation Theory in connection with Legal Argumentation.

A hipótese do trabalho é a de que o Supremo Tribunal Federal utiliza argumentos consequencialistas para admitir e julgar o controle de constitucionalidade de leis e normas orçamentárias. A tese é dividida em duas partes. Na primeira são tratados os temas que fundam a análise argumentativa das decisões judiciais. A argumentação jurídica é proposta como lente de exame das decisões judiciais, especialmente o ramo da retórica. De acordo com esse referencial teórico, os tribunais e juízes buscam convencer o auditório de que produzem a decisão mais adequada possível. É ressaltada a importância do argumento na formação do precedente, no que há de fundamental nas decisões (ratio decidendi) e no que é periférico (obiter dictum). O argumento consequencialista é visto diante de diversas teorias que o propõem, como o utilitarismo e o pragmatismo, com destaque, em capítulo próprio, para a teoria de Neil MacCormick, que propõe um consequencialismo essencialmente jurídico. Em sua segunda parte, a tese explora os temas que levarão às conclusões da hipótese. Em primeiro lugar, as características marcantes da produção de leis e normas orçamentárias, sua natureza jurídica e seu fundamento de validade. É revisto o controle de constitucionalidade dessas normas no ordenamento brasileiro, sendo pontuadas as particularidades e limites pertinentes ao seu controle principal. E por fim, no último capítulo, são analisadas pormenorizadamente as decisões que o Supremo Tribunal Federal produziu no controle principal de leis e normas orçamentárias, demarcando a presença de argumentos consequencialistas e buscando estabelecer quais são os precedentes vigentes no direito brasileiro. Ao fim, conclui-se que o controle de constitucionalidade principal é a via mais adequada nas matérias orçamentárias; que o precedente estabelecido no Supremo Tribunal Federal é o de possibilidade de controle de constitucionalidade principal de normas orçamentárias por ADI e ADO, não por ADPF; e que o tribunal usa adequadamente, na maioria das vezes, os argumentos consequencialistas, porquanto estes predominam (ratio decidendi) nas decisões mais importantes sobre a matéria. / The hypothesis of this work is that the Supreme Court uses consequentialist arguments to admit the judicial review of budgetary laws. The thesis is divided in two parts. In the first, the themes that underlie the argumentative analysis of judicial decisions are discussed. Legal argumentation is proposed as a lens for examining decisions, especially rhetoric. According to this theoretical framework, the courts and judges seek to convince the audience that they produce the most appropriate decisions possible. It highlights the significance of the argument in shaping the precedent, in what is crucial in decisions (ratio decidendi), and what is peripheral (obiter dictum). The consequentialist argument is analyzed according to the various theories that underlie it, such as utilitarianism and pragmatism, especially, in a separate chapter, according to Neil MacCormicks theory, that offers an essentially legal consequentialism. In its second part, the thesis explores the issues that lead to the conclusions of the hypothesis. Firstly, the salient features of the production of budget laws, its legal status and fundament of validity. The judicial review of these laws in the Brazilian legal system is revised, and the limits and particularities of its main control are punctuated. And finally, in the last chapter, the decisions produced by the Supreme Court in the main judicial review of budgetary laws are minutely explored, the existence of consequentialist arguments is indicated, and it seeks to establish the precedents existing in Brazilian law. It concludes, lastly, that the abstract judicial review is the most suitable option in budget matters; that the precedent set in the Supreme Court is about the possibility of the abstract judicial review of budgetary laws by ADI and ADO, but not ADPF; and that the court properly uses, most often, consequentialist arguments, and they predominate (ratio decidendi) in the most important decisions about it.