The thesis is an examination of the familiar objection that Consequentialism is unreasonably demanding (hereafter the Demandingness Objection). The focus is on attempts to construct a moral theory which avoids making unreasonable demands, without departing too much from traditional Consequentialism. The thesis is in two parts. In Part ONE, a wide range of contemporary forms of Consequentialism are examined, particularly the theories of Parfit, Brandt, Hooker, Murphy, Slote and Scheffler. It is argued that none of these is able to provide an adequate response to the Demandingness Objection. In Part TWO, a new Consequentialist theory is sketched. The core of this theory is a theoretical innovation: nonproportional accounts of the relationships between the values of outcomes, the costs faced by agents, and the lightness or wrongness of actions. It is argued that such accounts can provide the basis for a response to the Demandingness Objection. It is also argued that nonproportional elements can be incorporated into the theories of Scheffler and Parfit, and that the resulting theories are superior to the originals. It is concluded that the notion of nonproportionality is worthy of further exploration, and that the best possible Consequentialist moral theory is very likely to incorporate some non-proportional elements. It is also concluded that it would be premature to assume that Consequentialists will never be able to put together an adequate response to the Demandingness Objection.

No description available.

Thesis (doctoral)--Stockholm University, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [204]-207) and index.

In this thesis, I investigate two challenges for Act Consequentialism which arise in situations where many agents together can make a difference in the world. Act Consequentialism holds that agents morally ought to perform those actions which have the best expected consequences. The first challenge for Act Consequentialism is that it often asks too much. This problem arises in situations where agents can individually make a difference for the better, e.g. by donating money to charities that fight extreme poverty. Act Consequentialism here often requires agents to make immense sacrifices which threaten to compromise agents future ability to do more good, reduce agents to a drastically simple lifestyle, and amount to taking up the slack left by others. The second challenge is that Act Consequentialism often asks too little. This problem arises both in situations where agents can not make any difference for the better, e.g. by stopping to pollute the environment, and in situations where they can not make any difference whatsoever, e.g. when they individually vote or protest against a morally bad but widely supported policy. Act Consequentialism is subject to the above challenges because it only considers the differences that individuals can make on their own. A natural response is to adopt a form of Collective Consequentialism which considers the difference that agents can make together. I investigate how far Act Consequentialism can deal with each of the above challenges, and how far these challenges require us to adopt Collective Consequentialism.

後果論（Consequentialism）和義務論（Deontology）是規範倫理學裏兩個基本理論。兩個理論之間的差異，經常成為討論基本倫理問題的框架。一方面，義務論認為後果論道德上容許任何能達到最好結果的行為，這是過於寬鬆。另一方面，後果論認為義務論是自相矛盾的；因為它既禁止某些行為，視之為不道德，但又不容許人們以違反義務為手段，整體減少這類行為發生的次數。 / 這篇論文的旨趣是研究用後果論的理論框架，來表達義務論的可能性。這將提供一個新的視角，以了解後果論和義務論的基本理論差異。 / 全文共分四個部分。第一章，我會檢視兩個理論的一些基本特徵。第二章，我第一次嘗試用後果論的理論框架來表達義務論。方法是給違反義務的行為分配一個負面道德價值。然而，這方法不能成功把義務論表達為一種後果論。因為它引申了一些義務論不接受的道德判斷。第三章，我會檢視義務論和道德價值之間的關係；並順著 Louise (2004) 提出的理論，論證後果論的理論框架可以用來表達義務論。方法是把遵從義務的行為視為把時間和行動者相對 (time-relative and agent-relative) 的道德價值最大化。第四章，我將嘗試回應對這理論可能提出的反駁。 / Discussions in basic ethical problems are often framed by the essential differences between consequentialism and deontology - two fundamental theories in normative ethics. Most arguments in those ethical problems are basically reiteration of how the two theories differs from each other: Deontology holds that consequentialism is too lax as it allows all actions that leads to the best outcome, while consequentialism holds that deontology is essentially paradoxical because it forbids agents to act against a constraint even when doing so can avoid more violations. / My interest in this thesis is to examine a possible alternative in characterizing the differences between consequentialism and deontology, namely the doctrine of "consequentializing deontology". This doctrine holds that all deontological theories can be given a representation in consequentialist form. / This thesis consists of four parts. In Chapter 1, I will first examine three essential features of consequentialism, namely it is structurally axiological, teleological and maximizing. Then I will examine various formulations of deontological constraints and argue that they are best formulated as agent-relative reasons for action. In Chapter 2, I will explicate the first attempt to consequentialize deontological constraints by assigning a negative weighing to any violation. I will show that this attempt is not satisfactory because it entails a number of implausible claims. In Chapter 3, I proceed to examine various accounts that explain the normative power of deontological constraints in terms of values. Following Louise (2004), I argue that deontology can be consequentialized by giving a consequentialist representation to deontology, so that when an agent acts upon a deontological constraint, he is maximizing values that are both agent-relative and temporal-relative in nature. In Chapter 4, I will examine possible challenges to consequentializing deontology and respond to them. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Chan, Pui Yee June. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Delineating Consequentialism and Deontology --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Consequentializing Deontology: A Possible Alternative to Characterizing the Differences between Consequentialism and Deontology --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Thesis Overview --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- What Makes a Theory in Normative Ethics Consequentialist? --- p.11 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Conception of Outcome: Future-Oriented is Not a Necessary Principle for Consequentialism --- p.13 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Maximizing is a Necessary Principle for Consequentialism --- p.17 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- Consequentialism Essentials Summarized --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4 --- Deontological Constraints --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- Absolute and Threshold Deontological Constraints --- p.26 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Agent-Relative & Agent-Neutral Reasons for Action: Two Approaches --- p.27 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- Deontological Constraints & Reasons for Action --- p.31 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Attempt of Consequentializing Deontology without Agent-Relativity --- p.36 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Consequentialism/Deontology Distinction & the Agent-relative/Agent-neutral Distinction --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Threshold Constraints --- p.39 / Chapter 2.3 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Absolute Constraints --- p.42 / Chapter 2.4 --- Limits and Problems with Consequentializing Deontology --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Perfect calculus leads to implausible implications --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Agent-relativity in Deontological Constraints --- p.46 / Chapter 2.5 --- Responding to Challenges --- p.48 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Perfect calculus leads to implausible implications --- p.48 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Agent-relativity in Deontological Constraints --- p.50 / Chapter 2.6 --- Summary: Consequentializing Deontology Fails --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Deontology and Agent-Relative Values --- p.54 / Chapter 3.1 --- Consequentializing Deontology and Agent-Relativity in Values --- p.54 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction and The Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction in Values --- p.55 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Agent-Relative & Temporal-Relative Values --- p.58 / Chapter 3.2 --- Nagel: Agent-Relative Reasons and Agent-Relative Values --- p.59 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Reasons of Autonomy --- p.61 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Reasons of Deontology --- p.63 / Chapter 3.3 --- Korsgaard: Deontology and Inter-subjectivity --- p.70 / Chapter 3.4 --- Pettit: The Honoring/Promoting Distinction as the Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction --- p.78 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Values that cannot be honored --- p.80 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- It is not always clear what counts as "honoring" a value --- p.82 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Honoring is promoting agent-relative value --- p.83 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Consequentializing Deontology - Its Limits and Implications --- p.88 / Chapter 4.1 --- Thesis Project Recap --- p.88 / Chapter 4.2 --- Consequentializing deontology and agent-relativity --- p.94 / Chapter 4.3 --- Extended application of consequentializing to other ethical theories --- p.99 / Chapter 4.4 --- Fragmentation of values and consequentializing --- p.101 / Chapter 4.5 --- Conclusion: How successful consequentializing contributes to moral discussions --- p.104 / Bibliography --- p.107

My aim in this essay is wholly constructive: it is to present the lines along which a satisfactory utilitarianism may be developed. Such a theory is satisfactory in respect of its being able to over, come or evade objections to previous utilitarianisms, specifically, to previous act_utilitarianisms; I have picked several of these objections to form the rock upon which the strength of a utilitarian is to be tested. The objections in question all center around the question of whether, given his consequential account of rightness, an act_utilitarian can support the useful social rules and institutions of our society; or whether his position, because of its consequential account of rightness, commits him to acting in such a way as to undermine these rules and institutions. I shall argue that a new form of act_utilitarianism, which I call tempered act_utilitarianism, can both retain its consequential account of rightness and yet can (a) accommodate these rules and institutions within it, (b) allow its proponents on act_utilitarian grounds to advocate adherence to them, as providing us with the beet chance of doing the right or optimific thing, (c) cater to the views of the 'plain man' in this important respect, and (d) achieve all this without recourse to rule_utilitarianism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Duke University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

The use of reason appears to lead to divergent conclusions for what is right and what is good in human action. While reason is a central feature in ethical theory, there is a problem when that central feature does not lead to consistent conclusions about how to act in a given situation. Several philosophers have attempted to combine previous moral theories in order to provide a better template for human action. I contend that the use of reason is of vital import when determining the foundation for moral action and that moral theories, to be consistent with reason, should incorporate aspects of both non-consequentialist and consequentialist ethical theories. I argue that there is a unifying foundation presupposed by the moral theories of both Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Through the use of reason the theories of Kant and Mill can be reconciled to show that these theories can be combined when understanding the basic foundation that they share.

The presented master's thesis examines experiments on humans conducted in Nazi concentration camps during WWII and focuses on the conflict between the victims on one side and scientists on the other. In this conflict, which is centered around the fate of the data, both sides take a strong stand. The criteria for an ethical evaluation is to objectively articulate the main argumentation pillars from both sides and assess their validity in the contrast of two ethical theories which are virtue theory and the theory of consequentialism. To reach this objective, the thesis draws from available literal and audio-visual sources from the fields of history, philosophy, psychology, anthropology and bioethics. The paper is divided into three main parts. The first part is dedicated to terminology, technical execution, integrity, impact and logistics of the experiments. The second part analyzes victim testimonies and impact statements and arguments that had been put forward by the research community. The third part deals with the meaning of the term person's dignity/KAVOD, evaluates the argument points in the contrast of ethical theories, introduces the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance and deliberates the scientific community stance. Keywords Bioethics, cognitive dissonance, concentration camps,...