Preference is an important element in economic analysis, but usually regarded an inborn and exogenous characteristic. By the concept of natural selection, evolutionary game theory can explain lots of animal characteristics, including humans. With this idea, this paper extends the classical Hawk-Dove game to a two-period-life model, in which fights can cause deaths. We derive the population dynamics and the evolutiona-rily stable strategy. The competitive attitude and patience are determined by resource value and cost. And under a given common patience level, the evolutionarily stable strategy is a mixed strategy. But if the ¡§announcement effect,¡¨ an extra benefit from showing the winning record, is large enough, all-hawk may be the equilibrium. In ad-dition, under variable patient levels, the model can determine the equilibrium patience, and numerical simulation shows that dove-strategy accompanies a higher patient level than hawk.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0624109-015330 |
| Date | 24 June 2009 |
| Creators | Yu, Ming-huei |
| Contributors | Shan-non Chin, Tru-Gin Liu, Shih-Shen Chen |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0624109-015330 |
| Rights | not_available, Copyright information available at source archive |
Page generated in 0.0017 seconds