Revelation is (roughly) the thesis that the natures of phenomenal properties are revealed through experience. In this paper, I respond to Antonin Broi's charge that if both Revelation and the quality space view of phenomenal properties are true, then counterintuitive results that speak against the truth of Revelation obtain. I present a qualified theory of Revelation that not only prevents his arguments from succeeding but has independent plausibility as a solution to worries about the alleged epiphenomenalism of phenomenal properties. / Master of Arts / When you taste a Golden Delicious apple, drink Ethiopian coffee, feel dental pain, hear classical music or have many other conscious experiences of things, there's *something it's like* to be in those states. The taste of the apple and the coffee and the feel of dental pain are phenomenal properties - the "feels" of things in the broadest possible sense. Philosophers wonder what these things - "feels" - really are. Are they neurological features of your brain or a material features generally or are they something different? In a recent essay, Antonin Broi attacks the idea that they are something other than material or brain states. If Revelation - the idea that experiences reveal the essences of phenomenal properties - and some ideas about the general nature of phenomenal properties are both true, then strange results arise. I argue against his reasoning and I give a better way to understand Revelation.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/103599 |
| Date | 03 June 2021 |
| Creators | Smith, Justyn Glynn |
| Contributors | Philosophy, Trogdon, Kelly Griffith, Hoek, Daniel, Patton, Lydia K. |
| Publisher | Virginia Tech |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | ETD, application/pdf |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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