本文利用連續Cournot 寡占模型分析垂直相關市場中，產能限制如何幫助垂直整合廠商提高對手成本，並檢視歐盟執委會非水平結合準則中對於此議題規範的妥適性。結果顯示，垂直整合廠商提高對手誘因與攫取市場分額無直接關係，且與無產能限制情況相比，在相當範圍內，垂直整合廠商反而偏好自己產能受到限制。當垂直整合廠商受到產能限制時，獨立上游競爭廠商將減少中間財生產，使得垂直整合廠商可以藉由少量中間財購買，大幅提高對手成本，增加利潤。 / This paper analyzes the impact of capacity constraint on vertically integrated firm and other independent downstream in a Cournot Duopoly market. The result shows that vertically integrated firm may prefer to be constrained in its capacity since it could raise rivals’ cost with fewer cost after supply shrink of other upstream suppliers. Aside from EC Guideline, 2004, the research proves no direct relevance between market share captures and raising rival’s cost of a vertically integrated firm. Vertically integrated firm with capacity constraint may as well further raise rival’s cost even such may reduce its market share or revenue as the tremendous reduction cost on strategic buying. Moreover, as the fringe downstream expands to three, the profit gap of vertically integrated firm between constrained and unconstrained capacity will be wider.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0103351003 |
| Creators | 盧冠豪 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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