Genealogical arguments which aim to undermine some aspect of ethics by referring to its supposed evolutionary origin have become both more common and more philosophically substantive in recent years. In this thesis, I present what I take to be the strongest evolutionary debunking argument aimed against the meta-ethical view of moral realism. Specifically, I present Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma. I then consider the strongest responses given in defense of moral realism by Derek Parfit and Russ Shafer-Landau. I give reason to reject most of Parfit’s and Shafer-Landau’s responses and then suggest that due to a lack of justification for our moral beliefs (if moral realism is true) we ought to have a lower level of credence in them.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:NSHD.ca#10222/36243 |
| Date | 19 August 2013 |
| Creators | Wolinsky, Max |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
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