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Agentproblematik i producentkooperativens ekonomistyrning : En fallstudie av Sydgrönts agentproblematik och dess hantering med fokus på styrning och mål

Master thesis (4FE18E) Master of Science in Business and Economics, School of Business and Economics at Linnaeus University in Växjö, Spring 2023 Title: Agent problems in producer cooperatives' financial management"A case study of Sydgrönt's agent problem and its management with a focus on governance and goals" Background and problem: Cooperatives make up a significant part of Swedish business life, but are a form of business that is rarely talked about from a research point of view, even though the governance-related challenges are great. The challenges arise when the ownership and management of the company is separated, which means that the owners completely hand over the operational management to an external business management. For it to work, there needs to be good communication and trust between the members and the management, where both parties are also working towards the same goal, and where deficiencies can lead to challenges such as agent problems and goal congruence between the different parts of the organization. Historically speaking, research into corporate governance has been great if you look at the traditional joint-stock companies, but the cooperatives have been in the background. The problems that previous research has highlighted have included that a potential problem is that the organization easily becomes ineffective. This has led to the ownership structure in cooperative organizations being changed to try to deal with inefficiencies such as the agent problem, it is about the owners' goals not being followed effectively by the company management and thus the business is adapted to the company management instead of the owners. Previous studies also only highlight specific parts of the agent problem, hence this study intends to contribute with a holistic perspective that ultimately produces a framework for how producer cooperative organizations should be able to detect and avert possible agent problems. Purpose: The purpose of the study is to make an empirical and theoretical contribution by mapping and analyzing from an agency theory perspective how ownership structure and governance look like in a larger producer cooperative company and how it affects the company's goal achievement. The analysis that is done must then be summarized in the form of a case study-based model that shows how to handle the agent problem, which in turn should facilitate goal fulfillment and governance in producer cooperative companies. Method: A qualitative research approach has been used for the implementation of the study, where a case study of the Swedish producer cooperative Sydgrönt has been made. Sydgrönt is Sweden's largest cooperative in its field and delivers fruit and vegetables all over the country for its members. The study is divided and begins with a theoretical frame of reference whose purpose is to create an understanding of cooperative governance and agent problems. Next comes an empirical section that contains all the collected material produced at Sydgrönt through semi-structured interviews with all parts of the company, which should give a comprehensive picture of how the company views the current issues. In conclusion, the collected material is analyzed which results in the framework that has been produced and which should provide greater clarity in which factors give rise to agent problems and how these can be handled based on what was observed at the case company. Conclusion: The study concludes that the agent theory is a good tool for discovering problems and establishing governance and goals in a producer cooperative. The management of goal formulation starts in the important statutes and then the goals are first broken down by the board and in turn it is further broken down by the company management. This is then checked by having monthly budget follow-up and follow-up on KPIs. A governance system is built on the basis of forming experts on the board and a member council next to it to ensure the balance between expertise and representation. Finally, important incentives for management and employees are a good base salary instead of bonuses combined with providing a familiar and tight corporate culture to make the employees care about following the goals to create value for the members. These processes should ultimately provide a high level of goal congruence and high efficiency for producer cooperatives.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:lnu-123164
Date January 2023
Creatorsgummesson, Axel, Jönsson, Adam
PublisherLinnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för management (MAN)
Source SetsDiVA Archive at Upsalla University
LanguageSwedish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeStudent thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text
Formatapplication/pdf
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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