Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Departamento de Economia, 2005. / Submitted by Alexandre Marinho Pimenta (alexmpsin@hotmail.com) on 2009-10-26T16:33:04Z
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Previous issue date: 2005-07 / Esta dissertação desenvolve um modelo teórico do mercado de telefonia fixa-móvel, buscando analisar a característica da externalidade no consumo presente nas indústrias de rede, bem como o fenômeno específico do bottleneck existente neste mercado, em que as firmas celulares detêm certo domínio sobre seus clientes. Tal poder de mercado leva as firmas celulares a maximizar sua lucratividade marginal, estabelecendo as tarifas de interconexão no nível de monopólio, sob a hipótese de preços diferenciados das chamadas fixas-móveis. Em virtude da externalidade no consumo, fica demonstrado que a variação do lucro destas firmas em relação ao número de assinantes é estritamente positiva, facultando as firmas celulares a estabelecer um subsídio aos seus clientes com objetivo estritamente competitivo. Assim, quanto maior o market share das firmas celulares, maior será a variação positiva do lucro por assinante. Fica demonstrado, ainda, que, independentemente da política social adotada, o bem-estar social é maximizado quando as tarifas de interconexão tendem ao seu custo marginal. __________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This piece of work develops a theoretical model of the fixed-mobile telephony market, trying to analyze the characteristic of consumer’s externality (network externality) existent in the network industries, as well as the specific phenomenon of bottleneck in that market, in which the cellulars firms have certain domain over their costumers. This market power leads the cellulars firms to maximize their marginal lucrativity through the establishment of access prices on the monopoly level, under the differentiated fixed-mobile prices. Due to network externality, it has been shown that the profit variation in relation to the number of subscribers is strictly positive, enabling the firms to establish a subsidy to their customers, aiming at conquering them. Thus, the greater the market share of cellulars firms, the greater will the positive profit variation per subscribe be. In addition, it has been pointed out that, independently of the social policy adopted, the social welfare is maximized when the access prices converge to their marginal costs.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:repositorio.unb.br:10482/4974 |
| Date | 07 1900 |
| Creators | Rodrigues, Marcelo Moraes |
| Contributors | Ellery Junior, Roberto de Goes, Britto, Paulo Augusto Pettenuzzo de |
| Source Sets | IBICT Brazilian ETDs |
| Language | Portuguese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Source | reponame:Repositório Institucional da UnB, instname:Universidade de Brasília, instacron:UNB |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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