This dissertation deals with the moral permissibility of
abortion. It is argued that abortion is morally justifiable
when the pregnancy is a result of rape (but only during the
first trimester of pregnancy), when the pregnancy threatens
the woman's life or long-term health, or when tests indicate
to a high degree of scientific certainty that the foetus will
be abnormal to such an extent, so as never to be capable of
acquiring any human characteristics other than basic
biological properties.
Potential is adopted as a suitable criterion by which a
being acquires a serious right to life. Rationality is
examined closely, but shown to be inadequate since it leads to
inconsistencies and does not accord with our general belief
and sentiments.
It is argued that all living beings have some right to
life, but that sentient beings have more moral standing than
nonsentient ones. Potential is argued to be the suitable
comparison criterion when comparing beings of different
species, and sentience when comparing beings of the same species.
The dissertation is rights-oriented and reasons are given
why this approach was adopted in favour of a virtue-oriented
one. It is argued that a rights-oriented approach is more precise. / Philosophy, Practical and Systemic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:unisa/oai:uir.unisa.ac.za:10500/16497 |
| Date | 11 1900 |
| Creators | Wolf, Markus Johann. |
| Contributors | Voice, Paul, 1958- |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
| Format | 1 online resource (205 leaves) |
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