In this thesis, I attempt to map a relationship between theories of selfhood and theories of free will. In doing so, I hope to establish that the metaphysical commitments that characterize major branches of libertarian theory entail a commitment to an ‘executive’ model of selfhood as opposed to a ‘psychological’ model. In essence, I argue that there exist two major lines of disagreement between libertarian and compatibilist thinkers. The first disagreement is over the truth of the determinism thesis, and a second disagreement is over the nature of the self or agent. I then argue that while much attention has been given to the first of these disagreements, the most significant problem facing free will has to do with the nature of the self, and that if stronger efforts were devoted to uncovering the nature of selfhood, there would be much to be learned about the possibility of free will. / Graduate / 0422
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uvic.ca/oai:dspace.library.uvic.ca:1828/4913 |
Date | 04 September 2013 |
Creators | Brown, Danielle Linda |
Contributors | Rysiew, Patrick William |
Source Sets | University of Victoria |
Language | English, English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis |
Rights | Available to the World Wide Web |
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