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Way of life theory: the underlying structure of worldviews, social relations and lifestyles

What is the structure of society? Many thinkers have pondered the regularities. Way of life theory (WOLT) shows the relationship of every rational, social issue to every other rational, social issue.

From two dichotomised, theoretical dimensions called grid and group, Mary Douglas deduced four ways of life usually called individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism, and fatalism. WOLT shows the same four ideal types may be deduced from any significant pair of social issues, including competition, cooperation, coercion, freedom, justice, self-identity, nature, human nature, and more. Since four types may be divided pair-wise in three ways, there are three, not two, dimensions or axes.

WOLT also deduces Douglas’s fifth type (the hermit) and resolves the long-standing logical anomalies of grid-group theory.

In all, seven social theorists have independently deduced four types from various dimension pairs. Mistakes aside, they find the same four theoretical types. Evidently, the four types are natural kinds. Between them these theorists use three axes.

Numerous intuitive theorists from across social science have developed types without dimensions, and dimensions without types. Though incomplete, they show no significant disagreement.

It appears that every issue that must be taken into account to live socially fits the three axes. There is no flexibility: each issue fits the axes one way. Geometrically, three dichot¬omised dimensions yield eight types, however four of them are not viable and do not arise. Given just four valid points, the number of dimensions is necessarily limited to three. The axes generate thousands of predictions.

Since deduction yields the same four types whatever issues are placed on the dimensions, the four types are, like objects of natural science, independent of any theorist. In turn, these four types control which issues fit and how they fit, delimiting the scope and refining the meaning of the issues—which places the issues, too, beyond any theorist’s determination.

As in natural science, the sphere of application is set by the deductive theory, not by a theorist’s pronouncement: what fits, fits. The domain appears to cover matters which people must take a position on to live socially. Emotional and internal personal issues will not fit.

WOLT sharpens meaning, formalises structure and extends connections in areas as diverse as equality, liberalism, game theory, corporate culture, national culture, political right and left, religion, and working-class health.

Like a natural science theory, WOLT is relational, not only taxonomic. As in natural science, no person, organisation, or social situation will conform exactly to its ideal types. It is falsifiable by deducing, or finding empirically, rival social types or a social phenomenon that will not fit. Empirical testing of the theory as a whole is awkward owing to its structure and to parochial effects. Three data sets failed to refute it.

WOLT reveals how every social issue relates to every other social issue, providing a tool for analysing worldview, social structure, and social behaviour.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/244505
Date January 2009
CreatorsPepperday, Michael Edward, mike.pepperday@gmail.com
PublisherThe Australian National University. Research School of Social Sciences
Source SetsAustraliasian Digital Theses Program
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Rightshttp://www.anu.edu.au/legal/copyrit.html), Copyright Michael Edward Pepperday

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