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Investment manager trading behaviour and fund performance

This dissertation investigates three types of investment manager trading behaviour to ascertain whether behavioural biases are present in the Australian investment management industry. In particular, this thesis examines whether these biases are detrimental to fund performance and market efficiency, and whether there is a need for regulatory review given the behaviour of institutions in their trading on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). The three empirical issues examined in this thesis are: leader and follower patterns in institutional trading; quarter-end gaming behaviour; and short-term trading activity and the role of institutional monitoring. Firstly, in the analysis of leader-follower behaviour, this thesis finds profitable trade packages are executed using multiple brokers as a way to accumulate a larger package in a shorter window of time and as means of enhancing disguise. Profitability is higher when these trade packages are mimicked and when there are up to three mimickers, compared to situations in which no mimicking occurs. Potential mimickers do not appear to ignore their own signal when deciding whether or not to follow when the sequence is short, but may do so for longer sequences as predicted by Grenadier (1999). It is concluded that short sequences of mimicking trades by active fund managers speed the price discovery process. Secondly, in an investigation of ??portfolio pumping?? by Australian active investment managers, this thesis finds significant abnormal stock and fund returns on the final business day of the calendar quarter-end. This thesis then identifies particular trades, appearing mostly in less liquid stocks, which accompany stocks that are marked up at quarter-end (it is not possible in this thesis to prove causation given the trades in this sample are not time-stamped). Fund managers execute more purchases than normal on the last day of the quarter in stocks in which they are overweight, providing strong evidence that manager behaviour is modified on the last day of the quarter-end. This study also finds poor-performing managers are more likely to perpetrate gaming trades, which may be as a result of career concerns and business risk management. New investors in funds would benefit substantially by delaying their entry to the fund until the day after the end of the quarter, as there is a lower entry price into the fund. However, portfolio pumping does not substantially affect the returns of extant fund investors, as the trading cost associated with the relatively small gaming trades is relatively small. Attempts by the ASX to reduce price manipulation, such as instituting a closing price call auction and then later revising the algorithm of this auction, have been effective in limiting both the number of occurrences, as well as the severity of gaming on the efficiency of the market. Thirdly, in an examination of the short-term trading activity of active investment managers which threaten exit, this thesis find that a larger number of actively trading multi-blockholders significantly raises firm performance. It remains true that an individual blockholder who intervenes to raise firm performance has to share gains with other blockholders. But firm manager effort is enhanced by the threat of exit by blockholders when they receive a bad signal concerning managerial effort. This study tests seven nested hypotheses proposed by Edmans and Manso (2008) using sequences of short-term institutional trades that threaten exit. Blockholder net profit is diminishing in the number of traders, consistent with a common signal of poor managerial performance. Moreover, these trade sequences are profitable even after transaction costs. Spreads are lower and the firm??s share price becomes more sensitive to managerial performance as more blockholders threaten exit. From the three broad investigations into fund manager activity this thesis undertakes, active fund managers are shown to behave rationally and, apart from their behaviour at quarter-end, they act in the interests of their investors, aid price discovery, reduce bid-ask spreads and thereby exhibit a positive influence on market efficiency.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/257955
Date January 2008
CreatorsGardner, Peter Alan, Banking & Finance, Australian School of Business, UNSW
PublisherPublisher:University of New South Wales. Banking & Finance
Source SetsAustraliasian Digital Theses Program
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Rightshttp://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/copyright, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/copyright

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