Empirical findings on herding behavior among institutional investors suggest that those market participants speed up the price adjustment to new information and as such stabilize stock prices. Other findings indicate the opposite, that institutional herds drive stock prices away from fundamental values, and thus destabilize stock prices. This study examines the effect that Swedish institutional investors have on the stock prices on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. More precisely, we analyze the relationship of institutional herding with future excess stock returns. Major findings from this paper suggest that persistent herding among Swedish institutional investors leads to future long-term return reversals, which to some extent indicates a destabilizing influence at long horizons.

This dissertation investigates three types of investment manager trading behaviour to ascertain whether behavioural biases are present in the Australian investment management industry. In particular, this thesis examines whether these biases are detrimental to fund performance and market efficiency, and whether there is a need for regulatory review given the behaviour of institutions in their trading on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). The three empirical issues examined in this thesis are: leader and follower patterns in institutional trading; quarter-end gaming behaviour; and short-term trading activity and the role of institutional monitoring. Firstly, in the analysis of leader-follower behaviour, this thesis finds profitable trade packages are executed using multiple brokers as a way to accumulate a larger package in a shorter window of time and as means of enhancing disguise. Profitability is higher when these trade packages are mimicked and when there are up to three mimickers, compared to situations in which no mimicking occurs. Potential mimickers do not appear to ignore their own signal when deciding whether or not to follow when the sequence is short, but may do so for longer sequences as predicted by Grenadier (1999). It is concluded that short sequences of mimicking trades by active fund managers speed the price discovery process. Secondly, in an investigation of ??portfolio pumping?? by Australian active investment managers, this thesis finds significant abnormal stock and fund returns on the final business day of the calendar quarter-end. This thesis then identifies particular trades, appearing mostly in less liquid stocks, which accompany stocks that are marked up at quarter-end (it is not possible in this thesis to prove causation given the trades in this sample are not time-stamped). Fund managers execute more purchases than normal on the last day of the quarter in stocks in which they are overweight, providing strong evidence that manager behaviour is modified on the last day of the quarter-end. This study also finds poor-performing managers are more likely to perpetrate gaming trades, which may be as a result of career concerns and business risk management. New investors in funds would benefit substantially by delaying their entry to the fund until the day after the end of the quarter, as there is a lower entry price into the fund. However, portfolio pumping does not substantially affect the returns of extant fund investors, as the trading cost associated with the relatively small gaming trades is relatively small. Attempts by the ASX to reduce price manipulation, such as instituting a closing price call auction and then later revising the algorithm of this auction, have been effective in limiting both the number of occurrences, as well as the severity of gaming on the efficiency of the market. Thirdly, in an examination of the short-term trading activity of active investment managers which threaten exit, this thesis find that a larger number of actively trading multi-blockholders significantly raises firm performance. It remains true that an individual blockholder who intervenes to raise firm performance has to share gains with other blockholders. But firm manager effort is enhanced by the threat of exit by blockholders when they receive a bad signal concerning managerial effort. This study tests seven nested hypotheses proposed by Edmans and Manso (2008) using sequences of short-term institutional trades that threaten exit. Blockholder net profit is diminishing in the number of traders, consistent with a common signal of poor managerial performance. Moreover, these trade sequences are profitable even after transaction costs. Spreads are lower and the firm??s share price becomes more sensitive to managerial performance as more blockholders threaten exit. From the three broad investigations into fund manager activity this thesis undertakes, active fund managers are shown to behave rationally and, apart from their behaviour at quarter-end, they act in the interests of their investors, aid price discovery, reduce bid-ask spreads and thereby exhibit a positive influence on market efficiency.

In this thesis we study a new type of pursuit-evasion game, which we call the herding problem. Unlike typical pursuit evasion games where the pursuer aims to catch or intercept the evader, the goal of the pursuer in this game is to drive the evader to a certain location or region in the x-y plane. This herding model is proposed and represented using dynamic equations. The model is implemented in an effort to understand how two pursuers work cooperatively to drive multiple evaders to the desired destination following weighted time-optimal and effort-optimal control paths. Simulation of this herding problem is accomplished through dynamic programming by utilizing the SNOPT software in the MATLAB environment. The numerical solution gives us the optimal path for all agents and the corresponding controls as well as the relative distance and angle variables. The results show that the pursuers can work cooperatively to drive multiple evaders to the goal.

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This study examines several issues related to mutual fund herd behavior. First, a unifying and consistent framework for measuring herd behavior is developed. This framework generates portfolio-level measures for each fund manager over each quarter, and relates herd behavior to other aspects of portfolio dynamics. Simulations indicate significant and persistent non-random herd behavior. Second, mechanisms that potentially underly herd behavior are tested. Empirical results indicate that herding funds tend to i) change their holdings towards levels similar to peers, ii) have less experienced managers, and iii) underperform their peers. These results are consistent with a career concerns theory of herding. Third, the impact of mutual fund herding on stock liquidity is examined. Empirical results indicate that herd behavior can lead to correlation in stock-level liquidity. / text

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This dissertation investigates three types of investment manager trading behaviour to ascertain whether behavioural biases are present in the Australian investment management industry. In particular, this thesis examines whether these biases are detrimental to fund performance and market efficiency, and whether there is a need for regulatory review given the behaviour of institutions in their trading on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). The three empirical issues examined in this thesis are: leader and follower patterns in institutional trading; quarter-end gaming behaviour; and short-term trading activity and the role of institutional monitoring. Firstly, in the analysis of leader-follower behaviour, this thesis finds profitable trade packages are executed using multiple brokers as a way to accumulate a larger package in a shorter window of time and as means of enhancing disguise. Profitability is higher when these trade packages are mimicked and when there are up to three mimickers, compared to situations in which no mimicking occurs. Potential mimickers do not appear to ignore their own signal when deciding whether or not to follow when the sequence is short, but may do so for longer sequences as predicted by Grenadier (1999). It is concluded that short sequences of mimicking trades by active fund managers speed the price discovery process. Secondly, in an investigation of ??portfolio pumping?? by Australian active investment managers, this thesis finds significant abnormal stock and fund returns on the final business day of the calendar quarter-end. This thesis then identifies particular trades, appearing mostly in less liquid stocks, which accompany stocks that are marked up at quarter-end (it is not possible in this thesis to prove causation given the trades in this sample are not time-stamped). Fund managers execute more purchases than normal on the last day of the quarter in stocks in which they are overweight, providing strong evidence that manager behaviour is modified on the last day of the quarter-end. This study also finds poor-performing managers are more likely to perpetrate gaming trades, which may be as a result of career concerns and business risk management. New investors in funds would benefit substantially by delaying their entry to the fund until the day after the end of the quarter, as there is a lower entry price into the fund. However, portfolio pumping does not substantially affect the returns of extant fund investors, as the trading cost associated with the relatively small gaming trades is relatively small. Attempts by the ASX to reduce price manipulation, such as instituting a closing price call auction and then later revising the algorithm of this auction, have been effective in limiting both the number of occurrences, as well as the severity of gaming on the efficiency of the market. Thirdly, in an examination of the short-term trading activity of active investment managers which threaten exit, this thesis find that a larger number of actively trading multi-blockholders significantly raises firm performance. It remains true that an individual blockholder who intervenes to raise firm performance has to share gains with other blockholders. But firm manager effort is enhanced by the threat of exit by blockholders when they receive a bad signal concerning managerial effort. This study tests seven nested hypotheses proposed by Edmans and Manso (2008) using sequences of short-term institutional trades that threaten exit. Blockholder net profit is diminishing in the number of traders, consistent with a common signal of poor managerial performance. Moreover, these trade sequences are profitable even after transaction costs. Spreads are lower and the firm??s share price becomes more sensitive to managerial performance as more blockholders threaten exit. From the three broad investigations into fund manager activity this thesis undertakes, active fund managers are shown to behave rationally and, apart from their behaviour at quarter-end, they act in the interests of their investors, aid price discovery, reduce bid-ask spreads and thereby exhibit a positive influence on market efficiency.

This dissertation consists of two chapters. First chapter examines whether herding by actively managed equity funds affects their performance. For this purpose, first the effect of herding on stock returns is reexamined and evidence is found that, during the herding quarter, stocks bought intensely by herds outperform stocks sold intensely by herds. Controlling for subsequent quarter herding, this performance difference reverses, an indication that herding drives prices away from their fundamental values. It is also shown that herding funds benefit from this activity during the quarter in which they herd. The evidence is provided that herded stocks positively contribute to the herding funds' trade portfolio returns in the following quarter, but no association is found between the extent to which funds herd and their holding-based and subsequent quarter net returns. Introducing the concept of leader and follower funds this study shows that the subsequent quarter performance of funds that lead the herd is superior to that of follower funds. However, because leader and follower funds do not strongly retain their status overtime, they exhibit similar long-run performances. Second chapter examines whether mutual funds herd in industries and the extent to which such herding impacts industry valuations and fund performance. Using two herding measures proposed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Sias (2004) it is documented that mutual funds herd in industries beyond what would be expected by chance. It is shown that industry herding is not driven by investor flows and that it is not a manifestation of individual stock herding. The evidence suggests that, during the herding quarter(s), industries that experience strong buy herding by mutual funds outperform industries that experience strong sell herding. Industries that are subjected to strong herding by mutual funds exhibit no return reversals indicating that this activity does not destabilize industry values. Using a modified Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers' (1995) fund herding measure that quantifies the degree to which a fund joins the herd during a given quarter, no compelling evidence is found that industry herding affects the subsequent performance of herding funds. / Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Cambridge University. / "Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology"--Cover. Includes bibliographical references (p. [245]-271.