Workplace safety is under serious threat due to the increasing trend of active shooter violence in recent years. Therefore, it becomes essential that the safety of a workplace is rigorously and, most importantly, methodologically assessed against active shooter violence. To serve this purpose, this study proposes a machine learning-optimization framework to assess the safety of a building against possible active shooter violence. First, several state-of-the-art machine learning models are employed to predict an agent’s movement decisions (with directions) under different violence scenarios. The predictions are then utilized in a mixed-integer linear programming model to maximize the agent’s utility under a possible active shooter violence situation. The machine learning models and the proposed optimization model considered several building-specific (e.g., staircase/hiding room capacities, building orientation) and agent-specific (e.g., herding behavior, cognitive delay) attributes to realistically capture the violent situation. The performance of the proposed machine learning-optimization framework is assessed on a two-storied test building. Results indicate that the building configuration (e.g., number and location of the staircases, hiding rooms, exits) as well as agent behaviors, such as herding behavior and cognitive delay, play an important role in the recovery/casualty of civilians under a crisis situation.

The dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay, we measure herding by institutional investors in the new economy (internet) stocks during 1998-2001 by examining the changes in the quarterly institutional holdings of internet stocks relative to an average stock. More than 95% of the stocks that are examined are listed on NASDAQ. The second essay attempts to detect intra-day herding using two new measures in an average NYSE stock during 1998-2001. In the second essay, rather than asking whether institutional investors herd in a specific segment of the market, we endeavor to ask if herding occurs in an average stock across all categories of investors. The first essay analyzes herding in one of the largest bull runs in the history of U.S. equity markets. Instead of providing a corrective stabilizing force, banks, insurance firms, investment companies, investment advisors, university endowments, hedge funds, and internally managed pension funds participated in herds in the rise and to a lesser extent in the fall of new economy stocks. In contrast to previous research, we find strong evidence of herding by all categories of institutional investors across stocks of all sizes of companies, including the stocks of large companies, which are their preferred holdings. We present evidence that institutional investors herded into all performance categories of new economy stocks, and thus the documented herding cannot be explained by simple momentum-based trading. Institutional investors' buying exerted upward price pressure, and the reversal of excess returns in the subsequent quarter provides evidence that the herding was destabilizing and not based on information. The second essay attempts to detect herding in financial markets using a set of two methodologies based on runs test and dependence between interarrival trade times. Our first and the most important finding is that markets function efficiently and show no evidence of any meaningful herding in general. Second, herding seems to be confined to very small subset of small stocks. Third, dispersion of opinion among investors does not have much of impact on herding. Fourth, analysts' recommendations do not contribute to herding. Last, the limited amount of herding on price increase days seems to be destabilizing but on the price decrease days, the herding helps impound fundamental information into security prices thus making markets more efficient. Our results are consistent with Avery and Zemsky (1998) prediction that flexible financial asset prices prevent herding from arising. The seemingly contradictory results of the two essays can be reconciled based on the different sample of stocks, and the different methodologies of the two essays which are designed to detect different types of herding. In the first essay, herding is measured for NASDAQ-listed (primarily) internet stocks relative to an average stock, while the second essay documents herding for an average stock. In the first essay, we document herding in more volatile internet stocks, but we do not find any evidence of herding in more established NYSE stocks. The first essay examines herding by institutional investors, while the second essay examines herding, irrespective of the investor type. Consequently, in the first essay, we find that a subset of investors herd but in the second essay market as a whole does not exhibit any herding. Moreover, the first essay measures herding by examining the quarterly institutional holdings of internet stocks, while the second essay measures herding by examining the intra-day trading patterns for stocks. This suggests that it takes a while for investors to find out what others are doing leading to herding at quarterly interval but no herding is observed at intra-day level. The evidence presented in the two essays suggests that while institutional investors herded in the internet stocks during 1998-2001, there was very little herding by all investors in an average stock during this period. / Ph. D.

This dissertation examines the characterization of transient investors by financial analysts. Transient investors have been portrayed in the literature as either 1) informed investors or 2) poor monitors. No research to date, however, has examined how financial analysts, who are important information intermediaries, characterize transient investors. A view of transient investors through the lens of a financial analyst is obtained through examining how the presence of transient owners in a firm affects financial analysts' decision making. Specifically, this study examines how transient ownership affects both the propensity of analysts to herd when issuing earnings forecasts for a given firm as well as the incidence with which analysts revise their forecasts when the firm issues earnings guidance. Empirical tests show that financial analysts exhibit a greater propensity to herd when there are transient investors present. The proposed reason for this effect is analysts are herding due to reputational concerns. Further testing, however, does not show that the relation between transient ownership and analyst herding is owed to poor monitoring behavior of transient-owned firms. In contrast, evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the firm information environment of transient-owned firms is an important cause of analyst herding. In summary, evidence is consistent with the informed investor portrayal of transient investors and there is no evidence indicating financial analysts view transient owners as poor monitors. Finally, when the decision of analysts to issue revised forecasts is examined, it is found that having a higher percentage of the firm owned by dedicated or long-term investors increased the propensity of analysts to issue a revised forecast. Thus, while my analysis is inconsistent with a poor monitoring portrayal of transient investors, results suggest that a dedicated investor base can enhance the perceived credibility of firm disclosures. / Ph. D.

No description available.

The objectives of this thesis are: first, to investigate the impact of investor sentiment in UK financial markets in different investment intervals through the construction of separate sentiment measures for UK investors and UK institutional investors; second, to examine institutional herding behaviour by studying UK mutual fund data; third, to explore the causal relation between institutional herding and investor sentiment. The study uses US, German and UK financial market data and investor sentiment survey data from 1st January 1996 to 30th June 2011. The impact of investor sentiment on UK equity returns is studied both in general, and more specifically by distinguishing between tranquil and financial crisis periods. It is found that UK equity returns are significantly influenced by US individual and institutional sentiment and hardly at all by local UK investor sentiment. The sentiment contagion across borders is more pronounced in the shorter investment interval. The investigation of institutional herding behaviour is conducted by examining return dispersions and the Beta dispersions of UK mutual funds. Little evidence of herding in return is found, however strong evidence of Beta herding is presented. The study also suggests that beta herding is not caused by market fundamental and macroeconomic factors, instead, it perhaps arises from investor sentiment. This is consistent between closed-end and open-ended funds. The relation between institutional herding and investor sentiment is investigated by examining the measures of herding against the measures of investor sentiment in the UK and US. It suggests that UK institutional herding is influenced by investor sentiment, and UK institutional sentiment has a greater impact as compared to UK market sentiment. Open-end fund managers are more likely to be affected by individual investor sentiment, whereas closed-end fund managers herd on institutional sentiment.

Magister Commercii - MCom / Since the discovery of herding behaviour in financial markets in the 1990s, it has become an area of interest for many investors, practitioners and scholars. Herding behaviour occurs when investors and market participants trade in the same direction during the same time period, as a result of the influence of other investors. Studies on herding behaviour have been undertaken in both the developed and developing economies and majority of these studies have confirmed the existence of herding behaviour in the stock markets. Despite its tremendous growth, the South African financial markets are not immune to such market anomaly. Herding behaviour on the JSE was first investigated in 2002 focusing in the unit trust industry on the South African stock market. Motivated by this, this study assessed the presence of herding behaviour using the Johannesburg Securities Exchange tradable sector indices. Four indices were employed, namely Financials, Industrials and Resources and were benchmarked against the JSE All Share Index for the period from January 2007 to December 2017. The industrials index ((FINI15) constitutes of 25 largest industrial stocks by market capitalization, the financials index (FINI15) comprises of 15 largest financial stocks by market capitalization, the resources index (RESI10) which represents 10 largest resources stocks by market capitalization and lastly the FTSE/JSE All Share Index defined as a market capitalization-weighted index which is made up of 150 JSE listed companies and is the largest index in terms of size and overall value JSE. The FTSE/JSE All Share Index was used as a benchmark for investors to check how volatile an investment is. The South African economy experienced the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis from 01 July 2007 to 31 August 2009. This study split the examination period into three categories namely before the global financial crises which was the period starting from 1 January 2007 to 30 June 2007, then the period during the global financial crisis which was from 1 July 2007 to 31 August 2009 and lastly the period after the global financial crises which was from 1 September 2009 to 31 December 2017. Apart from the diversity of the indices, the length of the examination period also had a significant influence towards the magnitude of herding behaviour on the JSE.

The thesis examines herding behavior of investors towards the market average in 10 CEE stock markets during the period 2000-2018. Least squares and quantile regression methods provide evidence of herding inside the majority of the countries. During the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis, the herding mentality was more intense only in Slovenia and Croatia. The thesis finds mixed results in asymmetric herding during days of positive and negative market returns. The main finding, and a contribution to the literature, is that the domestic cross-sectional dispersion of returns in the CEE is affected by the dispersion of returns of the foreign stock markets in the USA, the UK, and Germany. In addition, empirical results suggest that extreme market conditions in the U.K. market have an impact on the formation of herding forces within the CEE stock markets. Short-run arbitrageurs can benefit from collective decisions of investors that in turn drive stock prices away from their fair value, but the presence of herding undermines benefits of portfolio diversification. In the long-run, the contagious international effects may result in a severe instability of the whole region and in market inefficiency.

自從政府開放外資法人投資國內股市，以及開放新投信的設立以來，機構投資人在股市的地位便日益重要，其交易的動態也成為市場矚目的焦點。然而，機構投資人是否扮演好了穩定股市、促進發展的角色，仍受到一些質疑。 本研究以共同基金為例，主要的目的便在於探討機構投資人是否存在herding和positive-feedback的交易行為，以及其對市場穩定性的可能影響。 實證結果顯示，共同基金的交易行為的確存在有herding的現象，且參與交易基金家數愈多的股票，其herding的程度愈明顯。而在feedback策略的使用方面，則無一致的證據可以支持共同基金使用positive或是negative的策略。而實證結果也發現，共同基金的herding行為會增加股市的波動性，同時共同基金無論使用positive或是negative的feedback策略，也都會增加股市的波動性，而可能使得股市更加不穩定。

Abstract The wild forest reindeer is a subspecies of the reindeer. Wild forest reindeer earlier had a wide distribution range in Sweden, but it was extinct in the middle of the 19:th century because of extensive hunting. In Finland, the w.f.reindeer was extinct a few decades later by similar reasons. Later they migrated back to the eastern parts of Finland in the middle of the 20: th century. Around 1980, the w.f.reindeer was actively rentroduced to western Finland, and there the population has had a positive development. In eastern Finland though, the population have declined fast during the last years. This is partly due to an increased abundance of large predators, particularly wolf. In this study I investigated the possibilities for, and attitudes towards, a reintroduction of w.f.reindeer in parts of Sweden. My result indicates that the environmental possibilities for a reintroduction of w.f. reindeer to parts of Sweden probably are fairly good to good. The attitudes towards the w.f.reindeer is both positive and negative, much depending if you ask a hunter or an owner of semi-domestic reindeer. Many persons in my study can see several benefits with a reintroduction of w.f. reindeer, e.g. increase of hunting and recreational value of the nature. A problem that a reintroduction of w.f.reindeer in Sweden could cause, is that the w.f.reindeer can be mixed with the herds of semi-domestic reindeer. Experiences from Finland show that the reindeermanagement is disturbed when this happens. This is an important problem, or challenge, to solve if a reintroduction should be possible in the future.

The subprime mortgage of America caused the global financial crisis. Most invest bankers and brokers were hurt deeply by the financial crisis. Due to the collapse of the financial system, the value of the investor¡¦s assets reduced rapidly. Those investors who invest in the mutual funds are exposed to the high risk. The mutual fund investors become the victims of the herding behavior. People invest in the hot investment market like Brazil, China, Russia etc.. The undue sales of the variable universal life (VUL) and the structure notes have destroyed the faith relationship between the investors and the financial consultants. However, the financial consultants did not show up the investment risk entirely in the process of sales. Therefore the investors neglected the risk which they could bear. For this reason, the risk of their investment behavior also exceeded the limit. Consequently, we discuss the change of the investors¡¦ investment behavior and risk preference of the mutual fund investors.