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中共政治繼承與制度化-從十一屆三中全會至十六屆三中全會人事改選為例

本論文係以「十一屆三中全會」後時序,依次檢驗中共總書記胡耀邦、趙紫陽、江澤民、胡錦濤等領導人之政治繼承中制度面與非制度面,希冀達到三項目的:第一,擺脫兩岸意識型態對峙格局,還原中共政治繼承之真實面貌;第二,宏觀地對中共政治繼承之原則與概念有所解釋,並進一步微觀對其政治繼承之具體措施進行說明。
本文分為五章,茲就主要內容分述如次
一、第一章概述本文研究動機、目的、方法、範圍等。第二章則探討胡耀邦與趙紫陽甄拔與罷黜之情形,期間鄧小平雖有意使政治繼承制度化,然當國內發生危及共黨政權與損及其權力,制度化推行已成次要。
二、第三章分別分析江澤民與胡錦濤接班模式,江澤民任內相繼推出人事制度化改革方案、制定人事法案、落實「幹部四化原則」等。胡錦濤人事佈局並無明顯拉拔親信跡象,係考量權力基礎尚未鞏固,然未來隨權力逐日穩固後,勢將加大人事掌控權。
三、第四章則探討政治繼承與制度化之關係,並比較領導人在拔擢中制度性與非制度性關聯性;正式途徑方面,第二、三、四代領導菁英,大都在地方起步若要進入權力核心則須擠入中央,以十五屆委員為例,黨領導機構係以民主推薦方式而成。非正式途徑方面,諸如來自同宗族、省份、學校等,倘建立良好關係,受庇者在仕途上就具有優勢。
四、第五章檢驗制度化在十六大執行情形;第六章結論則總結研究結果與發現,得出十一屆三中全會後,最高領導人仍有欽定繼承者之權力,人治色彩仍存,惟奉行幹部「四化」原則,並制定人事制度化規定,雖幹部晉升或調職不可避免地受到走後門、拉關係等非制度因素影響,然幹部任職年限或退休年齡已對人事變遷產生一定拘束力。 / This thesis examines PRC’s Political Succession on their institutization and un-institutization based on the Chronicle order of PRC Chairmen from Hu Yaobang to Hu Jintao. Hopefully, this paper can achieve three objectives: first, this paper will put aside the cross-straight ideological confrontation and present a reality of PRC’s political succession. Second, the article will explain the concept and principle of PRC’s political succession in broader sense. Also, I will further describe the concrete measures of succession in detail.
This thesis is divided into five chapters as follows:
1.Chapter one briefly introduces the motive, objective, methodology and scope of this thesis. Chapter two explores the reasons why Deng Xiaoping chosed and abandoned Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. In Deng’s period, he intended to make succession institutionalized, however, when a crisis occurred and endangered regime’s stabilities, the implementation of institutionalization became second importance.
2.Chapter three assesses power succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao respectively. During Jiang in power, he executed the program of personnel institutionalization and promulgated the act of personnel. Hu Jintao doesn’t obviously choose his own men due to his unsolidified power basis. However, when his power is solidified he might enhance his grasp of personnel arrangement.
3.Chapter four explores the relationship between personnel’s institutionalization & non-institutionalization. In the aspect of formal approach, the second, third, fourth generation elites were mostly promoted from the local areas. If they intended to enter the core of power, political elites have to enter PRC’s Center Committee. At the same time, membership can only be made possible by the democratic recommendation and endorsement from party’s member. In the aspect of informal approach, those who have enjoyed certain connections, such as from the same families, province, and schools, might have better opportunities to get promoted.
4.The Chapter five examines the implenation of personnel institutionalization in the 16th CCP Congress. Chapter six concludes results and findings. I finalizes that the reshuffle of PRC’s paramount leaders still remained “strong personal influence”. In other words, PRC officials’ promotion or transfer cannot avoid the influence of personal connections. However, the limits of service tenure and the retiring age still play an important part to the PRC’s personnels’institutionalization.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0909210041
Creators孫紹正, Sun, Shao Cheng
Publisher國立政治大學
Source SetsNational Chengchi University Libraries
Language中文
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
RightsCopyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders

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