In this paper, we explore mystical experiences and knowledge through the application of Miranda Fricker's framework of epistemic injustice. Focusing on experiences in which the usual division between Self and Other temporarily dissolves (brought about spontaneously, through contemplative or religious practice, or through the ingestion of psychedelics), we examine the knowledge gained from these experiences in its multiple forms and discuss how the mystic, when attempting to share the knowledge she has gained, may face challenges to effective testimonial exchange which constitute testimonial injustices. Similarly, due to a cultural privileging of the rational and objective, we imagine how the mystic’s interlocutor in an exchange may lack the necessary epistemic resources to understand an account of the mystic’s experience and its epistemic fruits as knowledge, thus subjecting the mystic to a hermeneutical injustice. Exploring the possibility of an anti-mystical bias, we present a new realm for the application of Miranda Fricker’s concepts.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-3120 |
| Date | 01 January 2019 |
| Creators | Hudson-Humphrey, Jake |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2018 John K Hudson-Humphrey, default |
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