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Vertical Structures in the Global Liquefied Natural Gas Market: Vertical Structures in the Global Liquefied Natural Gas Market: Empirical Analyses Based on Recent Developments in Transaction Cost Economics

During the last decade, the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market altered substantially. Significant investments have been realized, traded volumes increased and contracting structures gained in flexibility. Various governance forms co-exist, including the poles of spot market transactions and vertical integration as well as numerous hybrid forms such as long-term contracts, joint ventures, and strategic partnerships. This dissertation empirically investigates, based on transaction cost economics and recent extensions thereof, which motivations drive companies towards the choice of hierarchical governance forms. First, the likelihood of vertical integration and the impact of inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter accounting for differences in the institutional environment are analyzed. Estimation results confirm transaction cost economics by showing that relationship-specific investments in an uncertain environment drive LNG companies to invest in successive stages along the value chain. Furthermore, the
presence of inter-organizational trust increases the likelihood of less hierarchical governance modes. Second, alternative theories of the firm are linked in order to explain the menu of strategic positions recently observed in this dynamic market. Estimation results support the positioning-economizing perspective of the firm. The three strategic choices of target market position, resource profile, and organizational structure are interdependent. Third, the determinants of optimal contract length as a trade-off between the minimization of transaction costs due to repeated bilateral bargaining and the risk of being bound in an inflexible agreement in uncertain environments is discussed. Estimation results show that the presence of high asset specificity results in longer contracts whereas the need for flexibility in today’s LNG market supports shorter agreements. When firms have experience in bilateral trading, contract duration decreases. In addition, countries heavily reliant on natural gas imports via LNG are often willing to forgo some flexibility in favor of supply security. Contracts dedicated to competitive downstream markets on average are shorter than those concluded with customers in non-liberalized importing countries.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa:de:qucosa:25333
Date25 June 2010
CreatorsRüster, Sophia
ContributorsHirschhausen, Christian von, Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco, Technische Universität Dresden
Source SetsHochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typedoc-type:doctoralThesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, doc-type:Text
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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