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Previous issue date: 2013-10-30 / This thesis is composed of three articles. The first article, 'Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard', considers a principal-agent problem under the simultaneous presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection, where the adverse selection dimension is given over the outcome conditional probabilities given the agents actions. The second article, 'Public-Private Partnerships in the Presence of Adverse Selection' analyses the optimality of private-public partnerships under the presence of adverse selection. The third article, 'Regulation Under Stock Market Information Disclosure', by its turn, considers the problem of regulating publicly traded companies, where firms have incentives to send opposing signals to the regulator and the market. / Esta tese é composta de três artigos. No primeiro artigo, 'Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard', é considerado um problema de principal-agente sob a presença simultânea dos problemas de risco moral e seleção adversa, em que a dimensão de seleção adversa se dá sobre as distribuições de probabilidade condicionais as ações do agente. No segundo artigo, 'Public-Private Partnerships in the Presence of Adverse Selection' é analisada a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas sob a presença de seleção adversa. No terceiro artigo, 'Regulation Under Stock Market Information Disclosure', por sua vez, é considerado o problema da regulação de firmas de capital aberto, onde as firmas possuem incentivos para mandar sinais opostos para o regulador e o mercado.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/11744 |
| Date | 30 October 2013 |
| Creators | Rodrigues, Rafael Mourão dos Santos |
| Contributors | Iachan, Felipe Saraiva, Gottlieb, Daniel, Silva, Sergei Vieira, Escolas::EPGE, Moreira, Humberto Ataíde |
| Source Sets | IBICT Brazilian ETDs |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | Portuguese |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
| Source | reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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