This paper deploy the logit approach model and collect annual data from 1974 to 2004 in 22 OECD countries. It can examine that the option of exchange rate regime may cause the replacements of the governor of central banks during his tenure of office.
According to prior empirical studies shows that the rightist parties favor low inflation, they may choose fixed exchange rate regime for holding monetary stability; otherwise, the leftist parties prefer low unemployment and high production, they may adopt the flexible exchange rate regime to maintain independent monetary policy and to achieve their macroeconomic objectives. Due to diverse political preferences, Does the choice of exchange rate regime disobeyed the political ideology of ruling party will cause that the central bank governors lose their job? Our results manifest that these chairmen of central banks can independently insist and defend their exchange rate regimes in OECD countries.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0907111-094707 |
| Date | 07 September 2011 |
| Creators | Chen, Chin-Pu |
| Contributors | Chien-Chiang Li, Chun-Ping Chang, Pei-Fen Chen, Chyi-Lu Jang |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0907111-094707 |
| Rights | user_define, Copyright information available at source archive |
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