This paper tries to search for a moral justification for the compensation of the imprudent. It argues that it is not necessary for individuals to be prudent to have access to wealth and incomes. It argues that as far as individuals are participating in common social venture, this in itself should be considered as a criterion for allowing them from having access to wealth and incomes. It argues, basically, against luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism argues that effort should be the central criterion for having access to goods and services. But this will exclude individuals from having access to goods and services, if they are imprudent and this is unfair. The paper argues that since access to goods and services are central to live a meaningful life other criterion has to be introducing as criterion for distributing of goods and services. I propose that some kind of independent agreement among the participant of a common social venture could be used as a criterion for compensating if anyone fails in his option luck. The content of the agreement could be that some percent of (say 25%) of the initial capital has to be compensated for individuals if he fails in his effort. Having proposed this I have argued that the flower farmers should be compensated even if they fail in the flower industry.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:liu-69616 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Mammo Wersema, Zelalem |
| Publisher | Linköpings universitet, Centrum för tillämpad etik |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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