This paper tries to search for a moral justification for the compensation of the imprudent. It argues that it is not necessary for individuals to be prudent to have access to wealth and incomes.  It argues that as far as individuals are participating in common social venture, this in itself should be considered as a criterion for allowing them from having access to wealth and incomes.  It argues, basically, against luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism argues that effort should be the central criterion for having access to goods and services. But this will exclude individuals from having access to goods and services, if they are imprudent and this is unfair. The paper argues that since access to goods and services are central to live a meaningful life other criterion has to be introducing as criterion for distributing of goods and services. I propose that some kind of independent agreement among the participant of a common social venture could be used as a criterion for compensating if anyone fails in his option luck.  The content of the agreement could be that some percent of (say 25%) of the initial capital has to be compensated for individuals if he fails in his effort. Having proposed this I have argued that the flower farmers should be compensated even if they fail in the flower industry.

How should we understand the question "Why be moral?" Can we answer this question? If so, how? In this paper I develop an exemplarist theory of practical moral justification; that is, a theory of the justification of the prima facie moral things that we do, not the moral beliefs that we have. I take as my starting point that morality is, essentially, a set of practices in which all persons, in virtue of their being persons, participate. I argue that skillful practitioners of these various practices should be understood as moral authorities, and that the appeal to a moral authority for the purpose of one's justifying one's moral doings is necessarily justified for the appealer whenever she is practicing the same practice as the moral authority. This theory holds that moral authorities, so circumscribed, are Authoritative Exemplars, and as the appeal to their authority is necessarily justified they are able to provide a foundation for practical moral justifications, and thus rebutting the objection that all such justifications will run to regress. Among other things this account allows us to interpret the "Why be moral?" question as a question asking for more than can be had posed from a position of misunderstanding the nature of morality and practical moral justification. We cannot answer the "Why be moral?" question any more than we can answer the "Why be human?" question. / Master of Arts

Having soberly reflected upon the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the author observed that though international law and treaties restrict pre-emptive war, they do allow for war in self-defense. Consequently, some powerful nations have used this as a justification for launching pre-emptive strikes. The threats posed by the powerful nations using self-defense as a justification for pre-emptive strikes and the inability of weaker nations to do the same, greatly account for the unprecedented explosion of global terrorism. The author thinks that confronting terrorism therefore requires a pro-pacifist ethical framework whose principles have to be applied with international law to narrow the legitimacy of self-defense wars. Hence, he proposes "Moral Consistency" as a required condition for launching pre-emptive strikes with two main aims - to reduce violent conflicts and to draw a substantial distinction between reason and justification, and between crime and criminal justice.

Having soberly reflected upon the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the author observed that though international law and treaties restrict pre-emptive war, they do allow for war in self-defense. Consequently, some powerful nations have used this as a justification for launching pre-emptive strikes. The threats posed by the powerful nations using self-defense as a justification for pre-emptive strikes and the inability of weaker nations to do the same, greatly account for the unprecedented explosion of global terrorism. The author thinks that confronting terrorism therefore requires a pro-pacifist ethical framework whose principles have to be applied with international law to narrow the legitimacy of self-defense wars. Hence, he proposes "Moral Consistency" as a required condition for launching pre-emptive strikes with two main aims - to reduce violent conflicts and to draw a substantial distinction between reason and justification, and between crime and criminal justice.

Killing in role-playing video games is often a prominent feature. Most of the times, the characters killed are nameless criminals or minions of the true antagonist and if the game wants the player to kill, the player will most probably kill. This research was conducted to see how a dynamic narrative could affect a player’s choice of whether or not to kill expendable adversaries when a choice was provided. Participants played an interactive narrative in two different versions, followed by interviews, to see how narrative consequences and mechanisms for moral disengagement affected the players’ choices. The results showed that the choice of whether or not to kill could be affected if the narrative is dynamic and the non-playable characters reflect upon the choices made. Future studies should be conducted to see how graphics and sound affect the choices, and to see if it might be the mere choice in itself that affects the players the most.

Syftet med studien var att undersöka om bedömning av negativa beteenden, tortyr och mobbing, påverkas av mekanismerna moraliskt rättfärdigande, språklig omskrivning samt förskjutning av ansvar enligt Banduras (1986) teori om moraliskt frikopplande. Ett flerfaktoriellt experiment utfördes på 195 deltagare. Deltagarna ombads bedöma hur acceptabla negativa beteenden var, genom att läsa texter där det förekom skriftliga manipulationer av studiens oberoende variabler moraliskt rättfärdigande, språklig omskrivning samt förskjutning av ansvar. Resultatet visade att moraliskt rättfärdigande samt förskjutning av ansvar hade en effekt. Tortyr bedömdes mer acceptabelt då texten manipulerats med moraliskt rättfärdigande samt förskjutning av ansvar. Även mobbing bedömdes mer acceptabelt vid manipulation av moraliskt rättfärdigande. Dock bedömdes mobbing mindre acceptabelt vid förskjutning av ansvar än vid ingen manipulation i texten. En interaktionseffekt visades i tortyrfallet, tortyr blev mer acceptabelt när moraliskt rättfärdigande och språklig omskrivning kombinerades, än vid manipulation var för sig.

The environment is seen by different people as being valuable for different reasons. A pervasive debate in Environmental Philosophy revolves around which values should hold sway in the case of conflicts between the various kinds of value associated with the environment. This debate is relevant to, and fuelled by, debates how human communities should make decisions about the environment. By exploring the methods for balancing the various forms of environmental value proposed by Bryan G. Norton, Mark Sagoff, and David Pearce, I will argue that, as of yet, there has been little progress towards constructing a morally satisfactory basis for giving particular environmental values more weight than others. I will argue that to the extent that decision-maker obligations constitute moral obligations to the community, they can act as a basis for justifying giving some environmental values precedence over others in the decision-making context.

<p>This thesis deals with two species of a very well known and popular method of moral justification called the method of reflective equilibrium. These two species are narrow and wide reflective equilibrium (NRE/WRE). More specifically, the thesis looks at the roles so called background theories are expected to play in WRE. The use of background theories distinguishes WRE from NRE. Whether background theories can fulfil all these roles, and whether these roles are needed at all, is discussed. One conclusion is that whether WRE is preferable to NRE or not, depends to large degree on how the key concept of coherence is understood. Given a common understanding of coherence as something thicker than mere logical consistency though, WRE is clearly preferable to NRE as a method of justification.</p> / <p>Uppsatsen tar upp två varianter av en metod för rättfärdigande av moralteorier kallad reflektivt ekvilibrium-metoden. Dessa varianter är VPDOW respektive EUHWW reflektivt ekvilibrium. Framför allt undersöks den roll så kallade bakgrundsteorier förväntas spela i brett reflektivt ekvilibrium. Användning av bakgrundsteorier skiljer brett reflektivt ekvilibrium från smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium. Om bakgrundsteorier kan uppfylla alla de förväntningar som ställs på dem, samt om dessa förväntningar verkligen behöver uppfyllas, diskuteras. En slutsats är att huruvida brett eller smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium är att föredra är starkt kopplat till vilken förståelse av begreppet koherens som företräds. Givet en vanlig uppfattning av koherens som något fylligare än endast motsägelsefrihet så är dock brett reflektivt ekvilibrium att föredra.</p>

This thesis deals with two species of a very well known and popular method of moral justification called the method of reflective equilibrium. These two species are narrow and wide reflective equilibrium (NRE/WRE). More specifically, the thesis looks at the roles so called background theories are expected to play in WRE. The use of background theories distinguishes WRE from NRE. Whether background theories can fulfil all these roles, and whether these roles are needed at all, is discussed. One conclusion is that whether WRE is preferable to NRE or not, depends to large degree on how the key concept of coherence is understood. Given a common understanding of coherence as something thicker than mere logical consistency though, WRE is clearly preferable to NRE as a method of justification. / Uppsatsen tar upp två varianter av en metod för rättfärdigande av moralteorier kallad reflektivt ekvilibrium-metoden. Dessa varianter är VPDOW respektive EUHWW reflektivt ekvilibrium. Framför allt undersöks den roll så kallade bakgrundsteorier förväntas spela i brett reflektivt ekvilibrium. Användning av bakgrundsteorier skiljer brett reflektivt ekvilibrium från smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium. Om bakgrundsteorier kan uppfylla alla de förväntningar som ställs på dem, samt om dessa förväntningar verkligen behöver uppfyllas, diskuteras. En slutsats är att huruvida brett eller smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium är att föredra är starkt kopplat till vilken förståelse av begreppet koherens som företräds. Givet en vanlig uppfattning av koherens som något fylligare än endast motsägelsefrihet så är dock brett reflektivt ekvilibrium att föredra.

Moral development is a universal phenomenon which is an important ingredient in self-development and the acquisition of values. Adolescents become familiar with values and social norms through education and socialisation within social structures. The South African society evidences pluralistic values and current social, political and economic change that further renders the issue of individual and group values complex and challenging. Adolescents growing up in South Africa face many social problems such as alcohol and drug abuse, sexual problems, HIV/AIDS pandemic, poverty, teenage pregnancy, violence and family disintegration. This study aimed to address the influence of social factors on South African black adolescents’ moral development by a literature study and empirical inquiry using an interpretive approach. To provide a conceptual framework for the empirical inquiry, a literature study investigated theoretical perspectives on moral development and discussed ecological theories with regard to adolescent development with particular reference to Bronfenbrenner’s model. Furthermore, recent trends with regard to moral development of black adolescents within the South African context were addressed. A qualitative research inquiry was used to explore factors influencing the moral development of a small sample of eighteen black adolescents who attend a township school in Tshwane, Gauteng. The sample included an equal number of boys and girls. Maximum variation and purposive sampling strategies were used to select information-rich participants. Data gathering was done by individual semi-structured interviews using a moral dilemma question and focus group interviews. Data was analysed by content analysis and Guba’s model of trustworthiness was used to enhance credibility. Measures to ensure ethical research included consent from the Gauteng Department of Education, the principal and parents. Participation was voluntary and pseudonyms were used to protect the identity of participants. The researcher’s role was described. The key themes were organised around person moral behaviour- shapers, including the sub-themes of personal needs, personal ownership, identity, cognition and the influence of academic achievement; social moral behaviour- shapers, including the role of family, peers, church and social media and community moral behaviour-shapers, including congruent application of values and safety. The study concluded with recommendations to enhance the development of moral behaviour among adolescents. / Educational Studies / D. Ed. (Socio-Education)