This dissertation focuses on studying various network formation games in Economics. We explore a different model in each chapter to capture various aspects of networks. Chapter 1provides an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 studies the possible Nash equilibrium configurations in a model of signed network formation as proposed by Hiller (2017). We specify the Nash equilibria in the case of heterogeneous agents. We find 3 possible Nash equilibrium configurations: Utopia network, positive assortative matching, and disassortative matching. We derive the specific conditions under which they arise in a Nash equilibrium. In Chapter 3, we study a generalized model of signed network formation game where the players can choose not only positive and negative links but also neutral links. We check whether the results of the signed network formation model in the literature still hold in our generalized framework using the notion of pairwise Nash equilibrium. Chapter 4 studies inequality in a weighted network formation model using the notion of Nash equilibrium. As a factor of inequality, there are two types of players: Rich players and poor players. We show that both rich and poor players designate other rich players as their best friends. As a result, We present that nested split graphs are drawn from survey data because researchers tend to ask respondents to list only a few friends. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation focuses on studying various network formation games in Economics. We explore a different model in each chapter to capture various aspects of networks. Chapter 1 provides an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 studies the possible singed network configurations in equilibrium. In the signed network, players can choose a positive (+) relationship or a negative (-) relationship toward each other player. We study the case that the players are heterogeneous. We find 3 possible categories of networks in equilibrium: Utopia network, positive assortative matching, and disassortative matching. We derive the specific conditions under which they arise in equilibrium. In Chapter 3, we study a generalized model of signed network formation game where the players can choose not only positive and negative links but also neutral links. We check whether the results of the signed network formation model in the literature still hold in our generalized framework. Chapter 4 studies inequality in a weighted network formation model using the notion of Nash equilibrium. In this weighted network model, each player can choose the level of relationship. As a factor of inequality, there are two types of players: rich players and poor players. We show that both rich and poor players choose other rich players as their best friends. As a result, we present that nested split graphs are drawn from survey data because these social network data are censored due to the limit of the number of responses.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/104598 |
| Date | 06 August 2021 |
| Creators | Kim, Sunjin |
| Contributors | Economics, Sarangi, Sudipta, Bahel, Eric A., Kovach, Matthew, Lin, Xu |
| Publisher | Virginia Tech |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
| Format | ETD, application/pdf |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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