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Game Theoretic Models of Connectivity Among Internet Access ProvidersBadasyan, Narine 22 June 2004 (has links)
The Internet has a loosely hierarchical structure. At the top of the hierarchy are the backbones, also called Internet Access Providers (hereafter IAPs). The second layer of the hierarchy is comprised of Internet Service Providers (hereafter ISPs). At the bottom of the hierarchy are the end users, consumers, who browse the web, and websites. To provide access to the whole Internet, the providers must interconnect with each other and share their network infrastructure. Two main forms of interconnection have emerged — peering under which the providers carry each other's traffic without any payments and transit under which the downstream provider pays the upstream provider a certain settlement payment for carrying its traffic.
This dissertation develops three game theoretical models to describe the interconnection agreements among the providers, and analysis of those models from two alternative modeling perspectives: a purely non-cooperative game and a network perspective. There are two original contributions of the dissertation. First, we model the formation of peering/transit contracts explicitly as a decision variable in a non-cooperative game, while the current literature does not employ such modeling techniques. Second, we apply network analysis to examine interconnection decisions of the providers, which yields much realistic results.
Chapter 1 provides a brief description of the Internet history, architecture and infrastructure as well as the economic literature. In Chapter 2 we develop a model, in which IAPs decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering relative to being connected only through National Access Points (hereafter NAPs). The model is formulated as a multistage game. Private peering agreements reduce congestion in the Internet, and so improve the quality of IAPs. The results show that even though the profits are lower with private peerings, due to large investments, the network where all the providers privately peer is the stable network.
Chapter 3 discusses the interconnection arrangements among ISPs. Intra-backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected to the same backbone, whereas inter-backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected to different backbones. We formulate the model as a two-stage game. Peering affects profits through two channels - reduction of backbone congestion and ability to send traffic circumventing congested backbones. The relative magnitude of these factors helps or hinders peering. In Chapter 4 we develop a game theoretic model to examine how providers decide who they want to peer with and who has to pay transit. There is no regulation with regard to interconnection policies of providers, though there is a general convention that the providers peer if they perceive equal benefits from peering, and have transit arrangements otherwise. The model discusses a set of conditions, which determine the formation of peering and transit agreements. We argue that market forces determine the terms of interconnection, and there is no need for regulation to encourage peering. Moreover, Pareto optimum is achieved under the transit arrangements. / Ph. D.
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Agricultural trade liberalization : an international trade network approachMay Montana, Daniel Esteban January 2018 (has links)
A number of attempts have been made to facilitate agricultural trade liberalisation over the last decades. In spite of these efforts, trade liberalisation of agricultural and food processed goods has been modest. It is argued that this lack of trade liberalisation is explained by the existence of governments that are politically biased in the sense that they place anti-trade policies in order to favour powerful sectors in the economy. While there exists some evidence supporting this argument, it is difficult to assess how these biases influence agricultural trade patterns because existing quantitative modelling approaches do not normally consider simultaneously key aspects that characterise the food industry such as intra-industry trade and the existence of intermediaries in the supply chain with significant market power, among others. The objective of this thesis is to offer an alternative theoretical model that has the potential to accommodate these key aspects and corresponds to an international trade network model that extends the framework developed by Goyal and Joshi (2006). The model was solved by means of simulations and the results revealed that policy biased indeed can prevent trade liberalisation of agricultural and food processed goods. However, other factors that apparently have not been reported so far and that are related to the market power exercised by intermediaries were identified. They correspond to the position of a country in the trade network (i.e. a country occupying a central position in the network is less likely to support trade liberalisation independently of any policy bias), the possibility that global free trade is an unlikely outcome, and the possibility that the world is trapped in an inefficient international trade network. The results also revealed that the adoption of compensatory lump sum payments across countries (i.e. inter-node transfers) or across sectors within a country (i.e. intra-node transfers) could be used a potential tools to achieve global free trade in agriculture as they can compensate losers from trade by gainers achieving, as a consequence, Pareto improving outcomes.
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Network Formation and Economic ApplicationsChakrabarti, Subhadip 29 September 2004 (has links)
Networks, generically, refer to any application of graph theory in economics. Consider an undirected graph where nodes represent players and links represent relationships between them. Players can both form and delete links by which we mean that they can both form new relationships and terminate existing ones. A stable network is one in which no incentives exist to change the network structure. There can be various forms of stability depending on how many links players are allowed to form or delete at a time. Under strong pairwise stability, each player is allowed to delete any number of links at a time while any pair of players can form one link at a time.
We introduce a network-value function, which assigns to each possible network a certain value. The value is allocated according to the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule, which divides the value generated by a component equally among members of the component (where a component refers to a maximally connected subgraph). An efficient network is one that maximizes the network value function. We show that there is an underlying conflict between strong pairwise stability and efficiency. Efficient networks are not necessarily strongly pairwise stable. This conflict can be resolved only if value functions satisfy a certain property called "middlemen-security". We further find that there is a broad class of networks called "middlemen-free networks" for which the above condition is automatically satisfied under all possible value functions.
We also look at three network applications. A peering contract is an arrangement between Internet Service Providers under which they exchange traffic with one another free of cost. We analyze incentives for peering contracts among Internet service providers using the notion of pairwise stability.
A hierarchy is a directed graph with an explicit top-down structure where each pair of linked agents have a superior-subordinate relationship with each other. We apply the notion of conjunctive permission value to demonstrate the formation of hierarchical firms in a competitive labor market.
Comparative or targeted advertising is defined as any form of advertising where a firm directly or indirectly names a competitor. We also examine a model of targeted advertising between oligopolistic firms using non-cooperative game theoretic tools. / Ph. D.
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Essays on Network formation gamesKim, Sunjin 06 August 2021 (has links)
This dissertation focuses on studying various network formation games in Economics. We explore a different model in each chapter to capture various aspects of networks. Chapter 1provides an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 studies the possible Nash equilibrium configurations in a model of signed network formation as proposed by Hiller (2017). We specify the Nash equilibria in the case of heterogeneous agents. We find 3 possible Nash equilibrium configurations: Utopia network, positive assortative matching, and disassortative matching. We derive the specific conditions under which they arise in a Nash equilibrium. In Chapter 3, we study a generalized model of signed network formation game where the players can choose not only positive and negative links but also neutral links. We check whether the results of the signed network formation model in the literature still hold in our generalized framework using the notion of pairwise Nash equilibrium. Chapter 4 studies inequality in a weighted network formation model using the notion of Nash equilibrium. As a factor of inequality, there are two types of players: Rich players and poor players. We show that both rich and poor players designate other rich players as their best friends. As a result, We present that nested split graphs are drawn from survey data because researchers tend to ask respondents to list only a few friends. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation focuses on studying various network formation games in Economics. We explore a different model in each chapter to capture various aspects of networks. Chapter 1 provides an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 studies the possible singed network configurations in equilibrium. In the signed network, players can choose a positive (+) relationship or a negative (-) relationship toward each other player. We study the case that the players are heterogeneous. We find 3 possible categories of networks in equilibrium: Utopia network, positive assortative matching, and disassortative matching. We derive the specific conditions under which they arise in equilibrium. In Chapter 3, we study a generalized model of signed network formation game where the players can choose not only positive and negative links but also neutral links. We check whether the results of the signed network formation model in the literature still hold in our generalized framework. Chapter 4 studies inequality in a weighted network formation model using the notion of Nash equilibrium. In this weighted network model, each player can choose the level of relationship. As a factor of inequality, there are two types of players: rich players and poor players. We show that both rich and poor players choose other rich players as their best friends. As a result, we present that nested split graphs are drawn from survey data because these social network data are censored due to the limit of the number of responses.
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Essays in forward looking behavior in strategic interactionsMantovani, Marco 09 May 2013 (has links)
The general topic of our thesis is forward looking behavior in strategic situations. Mixing theoretical and experimental analysis, we document how strategic thinking is affected by the specific features of a dynamic interaction. The overarching result is that the information regarding decisions that are close to the current one, receive a qualitatively different consideration, with respect to distant ones. That is, the actual decisions are based on reasoning over a limited number of steps, close to actual decison node. We capture this feature of behavior both in a strategic (limited backward induction) and in a non-strategic (limited farsightedness) set up, and we identify relevant consequences on the outcome of the interaction, which powerfullly explain many observed experimental regularities.<p>In the first essay, we present a general out-of-equilibrium framework for strategic thinking in sequential games. It assumes the agents to take decisions on restricted game trees, according to their (limited) foresight level, following backward induction. Therefore we talk of limited backward induction (LBI). We test for LBI using a variant of the race game. Our design allows to identify restricted game trees and backward reasoning, thus properly disentangling LBI behavior. The results provide strong support in favor of LBI. Most players solve intermediate tasks - i.e. restricted games - without reasoning on the terminal histories. Only a small fraction of subjects play close to equilibrium, and (slow) convergence toward it appears, though only in the base game. An intermediate task keeps the subjects off the equilibrium path longer than in the base game. The results cannot be rationalized using the most popular models of strategic reasoning, let alone equilibrium analysis.<p>In the second essay, a subtle implication of the model is investigated: the sensitivity of the players’ foresight to the accessibility and completeness of the information they have, using a Centipede game. By manipulating the way in which information is provided to subjects, we show that reduced availability of information is sufficient to shift the distribution of take-nodes further from the equilibrium prediction. On the other hand, similar results are obtained in a treatment where reduced availability of information is combined with an attempt to elicit preferences for reciprocity, through the presentation of the centipede as a repeated trust game. Our results could be interpreted as cognitive limitations being more effective than preferences in determining (shifts in) behavior in our experimental centipede. Furthermore our results are at odds with the recent ones in Cox [2012], suggesting caution in generalizing their results. Reducing the availability of information may hamper backward induction or induce myopic behavior, depending on the strategic environment.<p>The third essay consists of an experimental investigation of farsighted versus myopic behavior in network formation. Pairwise stability Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are perfectly farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these extreme theories, but find evidence against both of them: the subjects are consistent with an intermediate rule of behavior, which we interpret as a form of limited farsightedness. On aggregate, the selection among multiple pairwise stable networks (and the performance of farsighted stability) crucially depends on the level of farsightedness needed to sustain them, and not on efficiency or cooperative considerations. Individual behavior analysis corroborates this interpretation, and suggests, in general, a low level of farsightedness (around two steps) on the part of the agents. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Three essays in microeconomic theorySidibé, Abdoul Karim 06 1900 (has links)
Cette thèse est un recueil de trois articles sur la théorie microéconomique. Les deux premiers traitent de la question de la course vers le bas lorsque les gouvernements se livrent à la concurrence pour certains facteurs mobiles. Le troisième article propose une extension du problème d'appariement plusieurs-à-un en y introduisant des agents de tailles différentes.
Dans le premier article, nous montrons comment le résultat standard de course vers le bas (race-to-the-bottom) peut être évité en introduisant du bien public dans un modèle de compétition fiscale. Notre économie comporte deux juridictions peuplées par de la main-d’œuvre parfaitement mobile répartie en deux catégories : qualifiée et non-qualifiée. Les gouvernements, en poursuivant un objectif Rawlsien (max-min), annoncent simultanément leur projet d'investissement en bien public avant d'adopter une politique de taxation non-linéaire du revenu. Les travailleurs, après avoir observé la politique de taxation des différents gouvernements et leurs promesses d'investissement en bien publique, choisissent chacun un lieu de résidence et une offre de travail. Ainsi, les gouvernements atteignent leurs objectifs de redistribution en cherchant à attirer de la main-d’œuvre productive à travers la fourniture de bien public en plus d'une politique de taxation favorable. Nous montrons qu'il existe des équilibres où les travailleurs qualifiés paient une taxe strictement positive. En outre, lorsque l'information sur le type des travailleurs est privée, il existe, pour certaines valeurs des paramètres, des équilibres où la main-d’œuvre non-qualifiée bénéficie d'un transfert net (ou subvention) de la part du gouvernement.
Dans le second article, nous étudions comment le modèle standard de compétition des prix à la Bertrand avec des produits différenciés pourrait fournir des informations utiles pour les programmes de citoyenneté par investissement dans les Caraïbes. Nous montrons que lorsque les pays peuvent être classés en deux types en fonction de la taille de leur demande, l'imposition d'un prix minimum uniforme et d'un quota maximum appropriés amène les pays à un résultat efficace qui Pareto domine l'équilibre de Nash non coopératif.
Enfin, le troisième article explore une extension du problème standard d'appariement plusieurs-à-un en y incorporant des agents de tailles différentes (familles de réfugiés) d'un côté, à assigner à des foyers de capacités différentes de l'autre. La taille d'une famille de réfugiés représente le nombre de membres qui la compose. Une caractéristique spécifique à ce modèle est qu'il n'autorise pas de répartir les membres d'une même famille entre différents foyers. Il est bien connu que, dans ces conditions, bon nombre de propriétés désirables des règles d'appariement s'effondrent. Nous faisons donc l'hypothèse des priorités croissantes avec la taille pour chaque foyer, c'est-à-dire qu'une famille d'accueil préférerait toujours un plus grand nombre de réfugiés tant que la capacité de son foyer le permet. Nous montrons qu'un appariement stable par paire existe toujours sous cette hypothèse et nous proposons un mécanisme pour le trouver. Nous montrons que notre mécanisme est non-manipulable du point de vue des réfugiés : aucun groupe de réfugiés ne pourrait tirer profit d'une déclaration truquée de leurs préférences. Notre mécanisme est également optimal pour les réfugiés en ce sens qu'il n'existe aucun autre mécanisme stable par paire qui serait plus profitable à tous les réfugiés. / This thesis is a collection of three articles on microeconomic theory. The first two articles are concerned with the issue of race-to-the-bottom when governments engage in competition for some mobile factor. The third article proposes an extension for the many-to-one matching problem by introducing different-size agents.
In the first article, we show how the standard race-to-the-bottom result can be avoided by introducing public good into a tax competition model. Our economy has two jurisdictions populated by perfectly mobile workers divided into two categories: skilled and unskilled. Governments, in pursuit of a Rawlsian objective (max-min), simultaneously announce their plans for investing in public good before deploying a nonlinear income tax schedule. After observing the tax schedules of the governments and their promises to invest in public good, each worker chooses a place of residence and a supply of labour. Thus, governments achieve their redistribution objectives by seeking to attract productive labour through the provision of public goods in addition to favorable taxation policy. We show that there exist equilibria where skilled workers pay a strictly positive tax. In addition, when information on the type of workers is private, there are equilibria for certain parameter values in which unqualified workers receive a net transfer (or subsidy) from the government.
In the second article, we investigate how the Bertrand standard price competition with differentiated products could provide useful insight for Citizenship By Investment programs in the Caribbean. We show that when countries can be classified into two types according to the size of their demand, imposing appropriate uniform minimum price and maximum quota brings countries to an efficient outcome that Pareto dominates the Non-Cooperative Nash Equilibrium.
Finally. in the third article, we explore an extension of the standard many-to-one matching problem by incorporating different-size agents (refugee families) on the many side of the market, to be assigned to entities (homes) with different capacities on the other side. A specific feature of this model is that it does not allow refugee families to be split between several homes. It is well known that many of the desirable properties of matching rules are unachievable in this framework. We introduce size-monotonic priority ranking over refugee families for each home, that is, a host family (home) would always prefer a greater number of members of refugee families until its capacity constraint binds. We show that a pairwise stable matching always exists under this assumption and we propose a mechanism to find it. We show that our mechanism is strategy-proof for refugees: no refugee family could benefit from misrepresenting his preferences. Our mechanism is also refugees optimal pairwise stable in the sense that there is no other pairwise stable mechanism that would be more profitable to all
refugees.
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