A Política de Garantia de Preços Mínimos (PGPM) no Brasil foi inaugurada oficialmente em 1966, com os objetivos de reduzir a instabilidade dos preços agrícolas, assegurar uma renda mínima aos produtores e garantir o abastecimento interno de alimentos. Tratava-se de uma política de caráter universal, no sentido de que qualquer produtor poderia vender a sua produção ao Governo Federal, desde que este último tivesse recursos suficientes para adquiri-la. O governo utilizava-se, até meados da década de 1990, dos instrumentos de intervenção ampla no mercado, as Aquisições do Governo Federal (AGF) e os Empréstimos do Governo Federal (EGF). Com a crise fiscal do Estado nos anos 1980 e as mudanças estruturais liberalizantes da década de 1990, a intervenção governamental reduziu-se gradativamente. No que se refere à ação do governo por meio da PGPM, foram criados instrumentos de apoio à comercialização, cujos subsídios foram reduzidos em relação aos anteriores e levaram à redução de estoques públicos. No Plano de Safra 1996-1997, o governo adicionou aos instrumentos tradicionais de operacionalização da PGPM o Prêmio para Escoamento de Produto (PEP) e o Contrato de Opção de Venda de Produtos Agrícolas (COVPA). Em 2004, foram criados os Contratos Privados de Opção de Venda e Prêmio de Risco de Opção Privada (PROP) e, em 2006, o governo criou o Prêmio Equalizador Pago ao Produtor (PEPRO). Simultaneamente, os instrumentos de operacionalização da PGPM de caráter universal voltaram-se à agricultura familiar, a partir da criação do Plano Safra da Agricultura Familiar, pelo MDA, em 2003. Tomando como base a exposição acima, o objetivo geral desta tese é analisar a política de garantia de preços mínimos no Brasil, no período de 1987 a 2013, ressaltando os instrumentos de execução da PGPM e os seus custos sociais e orçamentários. A escolha desse período devese às grandes mudanças ocorridas na PGPM e à disponibilidade de dados para os cálculos a serem realizados. Especificamente, procurou-se avaliar a influência dos grupos de interesse no redirecionamento da política brasileira de preços no período democrático, bem como quantificar os custos sociais e orçamentários envolvidos na operacionalização dos instrumentos tradicionais (AGF) e dos novos instrumentos, criados a partir de 1996/1997. Para atender aos objetivos propostos, conjugou-se um referencial de economia política para o estudo dos grupos de interesse e dos seus recursos de poder e o referencial da microeconomia para a avaliação dos custos sociais das diferentes políticas de preços agrícolas. Verificou-se que a atuação dos distintos grupos de interesse resultou na dissociação entre os instrumentos de política de garantia de preços voltados à agricultura familiar e não familiar, nos planos de safra e nos ministérios que atendem aos pleitos de cada grupo. No que se refere aos custos sociais e orçamentários da PGPM, verificou-se que a política de compra de excedentes é a mais custosa, seguida pela política de seguro de preços e pela subvenção ao preço para o produtor. / The Minimum Price Guarantee Policy (PGPM) in Brazil was officially started in 1966 with the objective of reducing the volatility of agricultural prices, ensure a minimum income to producers and secure food supply. It was a universal policy, in the sense that any producer could sell their produce to the federal government, since the latter had sufficient resources to acquire it. Until the mid-1990s the government used broad market intervention tools, the Federal Government Acquisitions (AGF) and the Federal Government Loans (EGF). With the fiscal crisis in the 1980s and the liberalizing structural changes of the 1990s, government intervention was reduced gradually. With regard to government action through PGPM, marketing support instruments were created which led to lower subsidies and to the reduction of public stocks. In Harvest Plan 1996-1997, the government added to the traditional instruments of operationalization of the PGPM the Award for Product Flow (PEP) and the Agricultural Products Put Option (COVPA). In 2004, the Private Put Option and Private Option Risk Premium were created (PROP), and in 2006 the government created the Equalizing Premium Paid to Producer (PEPRO). At the same time the instruments of implementation of universal nature of PGPM turned to family farming, since the creation of the Family Agriculture Harvest Plan by the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) in 2003. Based on the above exposure, the overall objective of this thesis is to analyze the minimum price guarantee policy in Brazil, from 1987 to 2013, highlighting the implementation instruments of PGPM and its social and budgetary costs. The choice of this period is due to the large changes in PGPM and the availability of data for the calculations to be performed. Specifically, we sought to evaluate the influence of interest groups in redirecting the Brazilian pricing policy in the democratic period (1988 onwards) and to quantify the social and budgetary costs involved in the operation of traditional instruments (AGF) and the new instruments created from 1996/1997. To meet the proposed objectives, we used both the political economy framework for the study of interest groups and power resources of these groups and the microeconomics framework for assessing the social costs of different agricultural pricing policies. It was found that the performance of the various interest groups resulted in the decoupling of the price guarantee policy instruments aimed at family farming and not family farming, as well as of the harvest plans and ministries that meet the claims of each group. With regard to social and budgetary costs of PGPM, it was found that the surplus purchasing policy is the most expensive, followed by price insurance policy and by the price subvention to producer.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the functioning of Fair Trade and define the main opportunities which it offers to the producers from Africa. The first chapter contains the typical features of this concept, its definition, essential principles, methods of certification, a brief historical overview and current development. It also introduces some important international organizations involved in Fair Trade. The second chapter focuses on Fair Trade in Africa. It includes the analysis of African market, SWOT analysis and definition of some important Fair Trade organizations in Africa and their main activities. The emphasis is given to Fair Trade in Africa, the utilization and distribution of Fair Trade premium, commodity structure, number of farmers involved in the concept of Fair Trade and some other factors. The last part is devoted to the cocoa industry in Africa and two major cooperatives operating in the Ivory Coast and Ghana.

A Política de Garantia de Preços Mínimos (PGPM) no Brasil foi inaugurada oficialmente em 1966, com os objetivos de reduzir a instabilidade dos preços agrícolas, assegurar uma renda mínima aos produtores e garantir o abastecimento interno de alimentos. Tratava-se de uma política de caráter universal, no sentido de que qualquer produtor poderia vender a sua produção ao Governo Federal, desde que este último tivesse recursos suficientes para adquiri-la. O governo utilizava-se, até meados da década de 1990, dos instrumentos de intervenção ampla no mercado, as Aquisições do Governo Federal (AGF) e os Empréstimos do Governo Federal (EGF). Com a crise fiscal do Estado nos anos 1980 e as mudanças estruturais liberalizantes da década de 1990, a intervenção governamental reduziu-se gradativamente. No que se refere à ação do governo por meio da PGPM, foram criados instrumentos de apoio à comercialização, cujos subsídios foram reduzidos em relação aos anteriores e levaram à redução de estoques públicos. No Plano de Safra 1996-1997, o governo adicionou aos instrumentos tradicionais de operacionalização da PGPM o Prêmio para Escoamento de Produto (PEP) e o Contrato de Opção de Venda de Produtos Agrícolas (COVPA). Em 2004, foram criados os Contratos Privados de Opção de Venda e Prêmio de Risco de Opção Privada (PROP) e, em 2006, o governo criou o Prêmio Equalizador Pago ao Produtor (PEPRO). Simultaneamente, os instrumentos de operacionalização da PGPM de caráter universal voltaram-se à agricultura familiar, a partir da criação do Plano Safra da Agricultura Familiar, pelo MDA, em 2003. Tomando como base a exposição acima, o objetivo geral desta tese é analisar a política de garantia de preços mínimos no Brasil, no período de 1987 a 2013, ressaltando os instrumentos de execução da PGPM e os seus custos sociais e orçamentários. A escolha desse período devese às grandes mudanças ocorridas na PGPM e à disponibilidade de dados para os cálculos a serem realizados. Especificamente, procurou-se avaliar a influência dos grupos de interesse no redirecionamento da política brasileira de preços no período democrático, bem como quantificar os custos sociais e orçamentários envolvidos na operacionalização dos instrumentos tradicionais (AGF) e dos novos instrumentos, criados a partir de 1996/1997. Para atender aos objetivos propostos, conjugou-se um referencial de economia política para o estudo dos grupos de interesse e dos seus recursos de poder e o referencial da microeconomia para a avaliação dos custos sociais das diferentes políticas de preços agrícolas. Verificou-se que a atuação dos distintos grupos de interesse resultou na dissociação entre os instrumentos de política de garantia de preços voltados à agricultura familiar e não familiar, nos planos de safra e nos ministérios que atendem aos pleitos de cada grupo. No que se refere aos custos sociais e orçamentários da PGPM, verificou-se que a política de compra de excedentes é a mais custosa, seguida pela política de seguro de preços e pela subvenção ao preço para o produtor. / The Minimum Price Guarantee Policy (PGPM) in Brazil was officially started in 1966 with the objective of reducing the volatility of agricultural prices, ensure a minimum income to producers and secure food supply. It was a universal policy, in the sense that any producer could sell their produce to the federal government, since the latter had sufficient resources to acquire it. Until the mid-1990s the government used broad market intervention tools, the Federal Government Acquisitions (AGF) and the Federal Government Loans (EGF). With the fiscal crisis in the 1980s and the liberalizing structural changes of the 1990s, government intervention was reduced gradually. With regard to government action through PGPM, marketing support instruments were created which led to lower subsidies and to the reduction of public stocks. In Harvest Plan 1996-1997, the government added to the traditional instruments of operationalization of the PGPM the Award for Product Flow (PEP) and the Agricultural Products Put Option (COVPA). In 2004, the Private Put Option and Private Option Risk Premium were created (PROP), and in 2006 the government created the Equalizing Premium Paid to Producer (PEPRO). At the same time the instruments of implementation of universal nature of PGPM turned to family farming, since the creation of the Family Agriculture Harvest Plan by the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) in 2003. Based on the above exposure, the overall objective of this thesis is to analyze the minimum price guarantee policy in Brazil, from 1987 to 2013, highlighting the implementation instruments of PGPM and its social and budgetary costs. The choice of this period is due to the large changes in PGPM and the availability of data for the calculations to be performed. Specifically, we sought to evaluate the influence of interest groups in redirecting the Brazilian pricing policy in the democratic period (1988 onwards) and to quantify the social and budgetary costs involved in the operation of traditional instruments (AGF) and the new instruments created from 1996/1997. To meet the proposed objectives, we used both the political economy framework for the study of interest groups and power resources of these groups and the microeconomics framework for assessing the social costs of different agricultural pricing policies. It was found that the performance of the various interest groups resulted in the decoupling of the price guarantee policy instruments aimed at family farming and not family farming, as well as of the harvest plans and ministries that meet the claims of each group. With regard to social and budgetary costs of PGPM, it was found that the surplus purchasing policy is the most expensive, followed by price insurance policy and by the price subvention to producer.

L'Organisation Internationale de Labellisation du Commerce Equitable FLO ( Fairtrade Labelling Organization ) a la responsabilité de l'élaboration des standards du Commerce Equitable pour les organisations de petits producteurs dans trois volets, soit les volets économique, social et environnemental. FLO élabore aussi des standards commerciaux pour les produits labellisés Commerce Equitable (aussi appelés dans ce travail : produits équitables) ; pour exemple, Max Havelaar est l'un des labels qui certifient que la production et la commercialisation d’un produit sont faits selon des standards du Commerce Equitable. Alors qu'il existe des informations sur le prix minimum du Commerce Equitable pour les fèves de cacao (Theobroma cacao) ou sur le prix équitable (prix minimum du Commerce Equitable + un prime) Free on Board (FOB) que reçoivent les producteurs certifiés Commerce Equitable de cacao de pays du Sud, il n’y a pas assez d’informations sur les prix que reçoit le producteur équitable « à la porte de sa ferme ». Afin de mieux connaître le prix équitable que reçoivent « directement » les producteurs de cacao, nous avons sélectionné la Coopérative « Le CEIBO » en Bolivie. Une démonstration basée sur l’étude du cas du prix des fèves de cacao et la comparaison du prix équitable et du prix conventionnel dans la Région de Alto Beni. Bien que le CEIBO soit en situation de monopsone, la tendance du pourcentage de prix FOB que reçoivent les petits producteurs de fèves de cacao d'Alto Beni en général est à la hausse entre la période 2000-2006. / The International Fair-Trade Labelling Organization has the responsibly of elaborating the norms of fair-trade applied to the organisations which group small producers in three sectors i.e. Economical, social and environmental. FLO also sets the trade standards for the products labelled Fair Trade (also named in this work: fair products): for example, Max Havelaar is one of the labels which certifies the production and commercialisation of a product made as per the norms of fair trade. Although there is some information on the minimum price for fair trade concerning the cocoa-nibs (Thobroma cacao) or on the fair price (minimum price for fair trade + Subsidy) Free On Board (FOB) which are allowed to the certified fair trade cocoa producers in Southern countries, there is not enough information about the price perceived by the fair trade producer at the “Farm Gate”. In order to know better the fair price that the producers of cocoa receive “directly”, we have chosen the Cooperative “Le CEIBO” in Bolivia, a model based on the study of the price of the cacao-nib and the comparison with the fair price and the conventional price in the Alto Beni region. Though the CEIBO is in a situation of monopsony, the perception of the small cacao-nibs producers is that the percentage of the FOB price has generally risen between 2000-2006 in Alto Beni.

Cette thèse est un recueil de trois articles sur la théorie microéconomique. Les deux premiers traitent de la question de la course vers le bas lorsque les gouvernements se livrent à la concurrence pour certains facteurs mobiles. Le troisième article propose une extension du problème d'appariement plusieurs-à-un en y introduisant des agents de tailles différentes. Dans le premier article, nous montrons comment le résultat standard de course vers le bas (race-to-the-bottom) peut être évité en introduisant du bien public dans un modèle de compétition fiscale. Notre économie comporte deux juridictions peuplées par de la main-d’œuvre parfaitement mobile répartie en deux catégories : qualifiée et non-qualifiée. Les gouvernements, en poursuivant un objectif Rawlsien (max-min), annoncent simultanément leur projet d'investissement en bien public avant d'adopter une politique de taxation non-linéaire du revenu. Les travailleurs, après avoir observé la politique de taxation des différents gouvernements et leurs promesses d'investissement en bien publique, choisissent chacun un lieu de résidence et une offre de travail. Ainsi, les gouvernements atteignent leurs objectifs de redistribution en cherchant à attirer de la main-d’œuvre productive à travers la fourniture de bien public en plus d'une politique de taxation favorable. Nous montrons qu'il existe des équilibres où les travailleurs qualifiés paient une taxe strictement positive. En outre, lorsque l'information sur le type des travailleurs est privée, il existe, pour certaines valeurs des paramètres, des équilibres où la main-d’œuvre non-qualifiée bénéficie d'un transfert net (ou subvention) de la part du gouvernement. Dans le second article, nous étudions comment le modèle standard de compétition des prix à la Bertrand avec des produits différenciés pourrait fournir des informations utiles pour les programmes de citoyenneté par investissement dans les Caraïbes. Nous montrons que lorsque les pays peuvent être classés en deux types en fonction de la taille de leur demande, l'imposition d'un prix minimum uniforme et d'un quota maximum appropriés amène les pays à un résultat efficace qui Pareto domine l'équilibre de Nash non coopératif. Enfin, le troisième article explore une extension du problème standard d'appariement plusieurs-à-un en y incorporant des agents de tailles différentes (familles de réfugiés) d'un côté, à assigner à des foyers de capacités différentes de l'autre. La taille d'une famille de réfugiés représente le nombre de membres qui la compose. Une caractéristique spécifique à ce modèle est qu'il n'autorise pas de répartir les membres d'une même famille entre différents foyers. Il est bien connu que, dans ces conditions, bon nombre de propriétés désirables des règles d'appariement s'effondrent. Nous faisons donc l'hypothèse des priorités croissantes avec la taille pour chaque foyer, c'est-à-dire qu'une famille d'accueil préférerait toujours un plus grand nombre de réfugiés tant que la capacité de son foyer le permet. Nous montrons qu'un appariement stable par paire existe toujours sous cette hypothèse et nous proposons un mécanisme pour le trouver. Nous montrons que notre mécanisme est non-manipulable du point de vue des réfugiés : aucun groupe de réfugiés ne pourrait tirer profit d'une déclaration truquée de leurs préférences. Notre mécanisme est également optimal pour les réfugiés en ce sens qu'il n'existe aucun autre mécanisme stable par paire qui serait plus profitable à tous les réfugiés. / This thesis is a collection of three articles on microeconomic theory. The first two articles are concerned with the issue of race-to-the-bottom when governments engage in competition for some mobile factor. The third article proposes an extension for the many-to-one matching problem by introducing different-size agents. In the first article, we show how the standard race-to-the-bottom result can be avoided by introducing public good into a tax competition model. Our economy has two jurisdictions populated by perfectly mobile workers divided into two categories: skilled and unskilled. Governments, in pursuit of a Rawlsian objective (max-min), simultaneously announce their plans for investing in public good before deploying a nonlinear income tax schedule. After observing the tax schedules of the governments and their promises to invest in public good, each worker chooses a place of residence and a supply of labour. Thus, governments achieve their redistribution objectives by seeking to attract productive labour through the provision of public goods in addition to favorable taxation policy. We show that there exist equilibria where skilled workers pay a strictly positive tax. In addition, when information on the type of workers is private, there are equilibria for certain parameter values in which unqualified workers receive a net transfer (or subsidy) from the government. In the second article, we investigate how the Bertrand standard price competition with differentiated products could provide useful insight for Citizenship By Investment programs in the Caribbean. We show that when countries can be classified into two types according to the size of their demand, imposing appropriate uniform minimum price and maximum quota brings countries to an efficient outcome that Pareto dominates the Non-Cooperative Nash Equilibrium. Finally. in the third article, we explore an extension of the standard many-to-one matching problem by incorporating different-size agents (refugee families) on the many side of the market, to be assigned to entities (homes) with different capacities on the other side. A specific feature of this model is that it does not allow refugee families to be split between several homes. It is well known that many of the desirable properties of matching rules are unachievable in this framework. We introduce size-monotonic priority ranking over refugee families for each home, that is, a host family (home) would always prefer a greater number of members of refugee families until its capacity constraint binds. We show that a pairwise stable matching always exists under this assumption and we propose a mechanism to find it. We show that our mechanism is strategy-proof for refugees: no refugee family could benefit from misrepresenting his preferences. Our mechanism is also refugees optimal pairwise stable in the sense that there is no other pairwise stable mechanism that would be more profitable to all refugees.