The aim of this thesis is to conduct a case study examining the intrusion of marketplace ideals on various aspects of everyday life. In this thesis, I provide a case study of a new business in San Francisco, ReservationHop, that transforms the previously first come, first serve restaurant reservation service into an auction style scalping (resell at a higher price) system, thereby affecting the distribution of an economic service, or good. In order to investigate this phenomenon, this thesis is organized into six main sections. First, I will provide a brief introduction to the thesis, presenting my aim and purpose in writing and why I believe that this is an important topic. I then introduce ReservationHop and describe the site and its business model, the controversy that it has evoked, and the app's creator Brian Mayer's attempts to defend the app's legitimacy. Thirdly, I will provide considerations in support of the ethical permissibility of the ReservationHop business model, using two neoclassical economic arguments: consumer choice theory and the Pareto-efficiency argument. Fourthly, I will counter these arguments, claiming that this service is not a Pareto optimal improvement because it involves deception, which is incompatible with genuine Pareto optimality. In the fifth section, I will introduce my main argument against ReservationHop in which I introduce the idea that there is something inherently wrong with the service even if its deceptive characteristics were corrected for. I argue that there should be "things that money cannot buy" because unfettered marketization erodes the nonmarket value of community, or commonality. In conclusion, this thesis argues that the intrusion of marketplace values on all aspects of society should be resisted, and that we must rethink the increased influence of marketization for it crowds out other important non-market values, e.g., our sense of community solidarity.

'Climate change is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen' Stern (2006 p. xvii). This vigorous description highlights one of the most important and frustrating realizations of the last decades. The main reason of that market failure stems from the fact that climate change is a complex global externality. This makes the design of appropriate measures to mitigate the problem and the identification of their effects on economic activity of paramount importance. The transboundary nature of pollution combined with the skewed distribution of the origin and impact of emissions among countries reveals the need for international cooperation in the direction of multilateral agreements among countries. The characterization of Pareto-efficient environmental and trade policies has been a key issue (and continues to be) in the literature. Predominantly, however, the literature has focused on the role of taxes (trade and pollution) in achieving the first-best paying no attention to the role (if there is any) of non-tradeable goods. Chapter 4 deals with this issue. A key issue in mitigating climate change is with the appropriate extent of harmonization of environmental policies. This thesis (Chapters 2) addresses this within a general equilibrium model of international trade with endogenous pollution discharges, paying particular attention to the allocation of tax revenues. It argues that there indeed exist instances in which pollution tax harmonization (that moves the initial pollution taxes towards an appropriately weighted pollution tax vector) can deliver potential Pareto improvements. The difficulty with the achievement of global environmental agreements should not be, however, ignored. Chapter 3 deals with the possibility that governments may act unilaterally in order to mitigate the social cost of pollution. It shows that (under certain conditions) there exist unilateral Pareto improving trade policy reforms. Chapter 5 discusses the welfare implication of environmental policy reforms within a subset of countries. It shows that environmental policy coordination has opposing effect on the welfare of the coordinating and non-coordinating countries.

In this thesis we study models, which search for an optimal portfolio from a set of stocks. On the contrary to the classical approach focusing only on expected return and variance, we examine models where an additional crite- rion of skewness is included. Furthermore we formulate a model for measuring performance of a portfolio defined as the distance from the Pareto efficient frontier. In numerical experiments we apply the models on historical prices and stock data from the electronic stock market NASDAQ. We analyze the stock data from companies listed in the index NASDAQ-100. We conclude by comparing of optimal portfolios created using different models among each other, with trivial single-stock portfolios and the with NASDAQ-100 index itself.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第24381号 / 経博第668号 / 新制||経||303(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 関口 格, 教授 原 千秋, 教授 NEWTON Jonathan Charles Scott / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

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Users today are concerned about how their information is collected, stored and used by Internet sites. Privacy policy languages, such as the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), allow websites to publish their privacy practices and policies in machine readable form. Currently, software agents designed to protect users' privacy follow a "take it or leave it" approach when evaluating these privacy policies. This approach is inflexible and gives the server ultimate control over the privacy of web transactions. Privacy policy negotiation is one approach to leveling the playing field by allowing a client to negotiate with a server to determine how that server collects and uses the client's data. We present a privacy policy negotiation protocol, "Or Best Offer", that includes a formal model for specifying privacy preferences and reasoning about privacy policies. The protocol is guaranteed to terminate within three rounds of negotiation while producing policies that are Pareto-optimal, and thus fair to both parties. That is, it remains fair to both the client and the server.

The primary goal of this study was to determine the impact of price discrimination on tourism demand. Four objectives were defined with reference to the primary research goal. The first objective was to analyse the concept of price discrimination and relevant theories by means of a literature study. In this regard it was found that price discrimination between markets is fairly common and that it occurs if the same goods were sold to different customers at different prices. Price discrimination is also possible as soon as some monopoly power exists and it is feasible when it is impossible or at least impractical for the buyers to trade among themselves. Three different kinds of price discrimination can be applied, namely first-degree, second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. The data also indicated that price discrimination is advantageous (it mainly increases profit) and that it has several other effects too. The second objective was to analyse examples of price discrimination by means of international case studies. In these different case studies it was found that demand and supply, therefore consumer and product, formed the basis of price discrimination. If demand did not exist, it would be impossible to apply price discrimination. The findings also indicated that, for an organisation to be able to practice price discrimination, the markets must be separated effectively and it will only be successful if there is a significant difference in demand elasticity between the different consumers. Furthermore, the ability to charge these different prices will depend on the consumer's ability and willingness to pay. If an organisation should decide to price discriminate, it would lead to a higher profit, a more optimal pricing policy and also to an increase in sales. The third objective was to analyse national case studies. This was done through comparing the data of a tourism organisation price discriminating (Mosetlha Bush Camp, situated in the North West) to two organisations that did not implement price discrimination (Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in the Northern Cape and Golden Leopard Resort, also situated in the North West). It was found that a customer with low price elasticity is less deterred by a higher price than a customer with a high price elasticity of demand. As long as the customer's price elasticity is less than one, it will be very advantageous to increase the price: the seller will in this case get more money for less goods. With the increase in price the price elasticity tends to rise above one. The fourth objective was to draw conclusions and make recommendations. It was concluded that price discrimination could be applied successfully in virtually any organisation or industry. Furthermore, price discrimination does not always have a negative effect; but can have a positive ass well. It can have a positive effect on tourism demand. The findings emphasised that the main reason for implementing price discrimination is to increase profit at the cost of reducing consumer surplus. From the results it was recommended that more research on this topic should be conducted. / Thesis (M.Com. (Tourism))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2006.

Ce texte a pour but de monter que l’efficience telle qu’utilisée par les économistes dans le cadre de recommandations de politiques publiques suppose toujours l’adoption de certains critères moraux. Je voudrai d’abord montrer que les recommandations des économistes en matière de politiques publiques ont déjà été identifiées aux recommandations de l’utilitarisme. Plusieurs économistes ont voulu abstraire leur science de toute discussion morale au XXe siècle. Cette séparation entre faits et valeur s’est soldée par l’apparition de l’efficience de Pareto, grandement utilisée dans le cadre de l’économie du bien-être. Cependant, cette utilisation de l’efficience suppose à la fois qu’il est moralement désirable d’améliorer le bien-être des individus et que ce bien-être peut être évalué en termes de satisfaction des préférences, ce qui constitue un jugement de nature éthique et morale qui ne peut être fait seulement à partir de faits scientifiques. L’efficience ne peut plutôt être utilisée de manière non moralement discutable seulement si l’on examine au préalable les objectifs sociaux que l’utilisation de cette mesure présuppose. D’un point de vue scientifique, l’économiste qui veut utiliser une mesure d’efficience doit donc toujours prendre pour acquis les éléments normatifs qui sont intégrés aux calculs d’efficience. La discussion concernant la pertinence de ces objectifs sociaux ainsi que l’importance relative de chacun des objectifs sociaux est une discussion portant avant tout sur des questions morales qui ne sont pas du domaine des sciences économiques. / This text aims to show that efficiency, as used by economists in the context of public policy recommendations, always implies the acceptance of certain moral criterions. I will aim to show that economical recommendations concerning public policy have been identified to utilitarianism in the past. Many economists have then tried to separate their science from debates concerning morals in the XXth century. This separation has had as one of its results the creation of the concept of Pareto efficiency, which has seen wide usage in welfare economics. However, this particular use of efficiency supposes that it is both morally desirable to seek to improve welfare of individuals and that this welfare can be evaluated in terms of preference satisfaction. Both of these affirmations constitute ethical and moral judgements that cannot be made within the sole scope of scientific claims. Efficiency can rather be used in a non-morally controversial way only if the underlying moral considerations are properly identified. A purely scientific use of efficiency needs to take for granted the normative elements implied in measures of efficiency. The determination of the relevance of various social objectives and the relative importance of each of these objectives remains moral questions that cannot be addressed by economics as such.

The primary goal of this study was to determine the impact of price discrimination on tourism demand. Four objectives were defined with reference to the primary research goal. The first objective was to analyse the concept of price discrimination and relevant theories by means of a literature study. In this regard it was found that price discrimination between markets is fairly common and that it occurs if the same goods were sold to different customers at different prices. Price discrimination is also possible as soon as some monopoly power exists and it is feasible when it is impossible or at least impractical for the buyers to trade among themselves. Three different kinds of price discrimination can be applied, namely first-degree, second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. The data also indicated that price discrimination is advantageous (it mainly increases profit) and that it has several other effects too. The second objective was to analyse examples of price discrimination by means of international case studies. In these different case studies it was found that demand and supply, therefore consumer and product, formed the basis of price discrimination. If demand did not exist, it would be impossible to apply price discrimination. The findings also indicated that, for an organisation to be able to practice price discrimination, the markets must be separated effectively and it will only be successful if there is a significant difference in demand elasticity between the different consumers. Furthermore, the ability to charge these different prices will depend on the consumer's ability and willingness to pay. If an organisation should decide to price discriminate, it would lead to a higher profit, a more optimal pricing policy and also to an increase in sales. The third objective was to analyse national case studies. This was done through comparing the data of a tourism organisation price discriminating (Mosetlha Bush Camp, situated in the North West) to two organisations that did not implement price discrimination (Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in the Northern Cape and Golden Leopard Resort, also situated in the North West). It was found that a customer with low price elasticity is less deterred by a higher price than a customer with a high price elasticity of demand. As long as the customer's price elasticity is less than one, it will be very advantageous to increase the price: the seller will in this case get more money for less goods. With the increase in price the price elasticity tends to rise above one. The fourth objective was to draw conclusions and make recommendations. It was concluded that price discrimination could be applied successfully in virtually any organisation or industry. Furthermore, price discrimination does not always have a negative effect; but can have a positive ass well. It can have a positive effect on tourism demand. The findings emphasised that the main reason for implementing price discrimination is to increase profit at the cost of reducing consumer surplus. From the results it was recommended that more research on this topic should be conducted. / Thesis (M.Com. (Tourism))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2006.

This thesis consists of three independent papers. They are put in reverse chronological order according to when they were initiated. The first paper, which is a joint work with Özgür Evren, extends the standard rational choice framework with the option to postpone the act of selecting an alternative. In that paper, we propose an axiomatic model of choice over risky prospects that restricts the classical rationality axioms solely to those instances in which the decision maker does not defer. The cardinal approach we follow allows us to identify the preference relation of the decision maker over lotteries, even if the choice data is very scarce due to deferral. Moreover, we also derive the value of deferring choice from a given set of options, which turns out to be an affine utility function over choice sets. At each choice situation, the decision maker compares the utility of each available alternative with that of deferral so as to decide on opting for an alternative immediately. The second paper is a model of status quo bias with choice avoidance. It describes the choice behavior of an otherwise standard decision maker whose choices are affected by the presence of a status quo alternative. The status quo emerges as a temporary choice, which may be reversed upon arrival of new (introspective or objective) information, or upon finding new alternatives. The third paper considers the network formation problem from a matching perspective. In that paper, agents want to link with each other and each has preferences over the subsets of others. We consider various solution concepts regarding the stability of a matching between the agents, establish relations between these concepts under several preference restrictions, and provide sufficient conditions for these solutions to be nonempty. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, 2011