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Subjective Assessments of Self and Competitor Expertise: Influences on Bidding and Post-Auction Product Valuation

This dissertation contains two essays focusing on how Self and Competitor Expertise influence valuation both during and post-auction. The first essay, "Competitor Expertise: Influences on bidding behavior and post-auction values in ascending auctions," considers how a bidder's perception of competitors' expertise types and levels influences valuation both during (bid level), after (WTP/WTA), and over time (∆WTP/∆WTA). Generally, I find that despite normative predictions regarding bidding behavior in a competitive auction environment, bidders tend to bid higher and maintain higher post-auction valuations when competing against experts in the product domain, although not amateurs or experts in other domains (e.g., auction bidding strategies). Post-auction valuation patterns further depended on Auction Outcome. The second essay, "Assessed Self-Expertise: Influences on Bidding Behavior and Post-Auction Values Against Competitors of Varying Expertise Levels," extends our investigation to consider how a bidder's perception of their own expertise type and level also influences valuation both during and post-auction. Broadly, I find additional support that bidders post higher valuations both during and post-auction when competing against Experts vs. Amateurs, but that this behavior is primarily driven by bidders who assess themselves as Experts and further depends on Auction Outcome. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation contains two essays that consider the influence of how one's own type and level of expertise (Self-Expertise) as well as one's perception of their competitors' expertise (Competitor Expertise) influence bidding behavior and post-auction product valuation. In the first essay, "Competitor Expertise: Influences on bidding behavior and post-auction values in ascending auctions," the issue of how bidders perceive Competitor Expertise levels is considered. Generally, bidders tend to bid higher and maintain higher post-auction valuations when competing against experts with expertise in the product category. Post-auction valuations and their durability further depend on whether bidders win or lose the auction. In the second essay, "Assessed Self-Expertise: Influences on Bidding Behavior and Post-Auction Values Against Competitors of Varying Expertise Levels," the issue of how one's self-assessment of their own type and level of expertise is further considered. Broadly, bidders tend to post higher valuations when they assess themselves as experts in the product category. Interestingly, this effect is largely driven by experts competing against other experts, although this also further depends on whether bidders won or lost.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/107587
Date12 January 2022
CreatorsHood, Stephen
ContributorsBusiness, Chakravarti, Dipankar, Bagchi, Rajesh, Cheema, Amar, Herr, Paul Michael
PublisherVirginia Tech
Source SetsVirginia Tech Theses and Dissertation
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeDissertation
FormatETD, application/pdf
RightsIn Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

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