It is argued that reference in first-person thought is distinct from reference in other thoughts about objects. This difference is located in the lack of acquaintance required for first-person thought. In order to be in the position to think about and refer to other objects, a subject must be acquainted with them. It is this acquaintance relation which enables him to think about a particular object. In contrast, a subject can think about himself without being acquainted with himself because he is the subject of his thought. No acquaintance relation is required in order for him to be in a position to think about himself - he is in this position already. Part I of this thesis sets out the problem of first-person thought, and introduces a distinction between subjective and objective first-person thought. Part II explores singular thought, and what it is for a subject to have a thought about a particular object. It is argued that a subject's acquaintance with an object is necessary for him to be able to think about and refer to an independent object. This means that for a subject to think about an independent object that object must in some way be present to him. In Part III it is argued that for a subject to think first-personally the object - himself - need not be present to him. The subject has experiences from the first-person perspective, grounding his subjective first-person thoughts. Because he has such experiences he can refer reflexively. He is at the centre of his scheme of reference. And it is because he can refer in subjective first-person thoughts that he can refer in objective first- person thoughts.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:487211 |
| Date | January 2007 |
| Creators | Taylor, Jennifer Elizabeth Vaughan |
| Publisher | University College London (University of London) |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445160/ |
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