Chapter one forms the first part of my explication of 'essential' reflexivity. It discusses the marmer in which analysts have sought to 'remedy' the problem of context, and the ways in which indexical utterances have been regarded as problematic by logicians, and latterly by sociological analysts. I argue that 'essential' reflexivity must treat members" utterances as contexted, and not seek to 'remedy' this feature of natural language. Chapter two discusses the marmer in which Garfinkel advocates' essential' reflexivity as a feature of accounts which is uninteresting to members. However, it is important to note that reflexivity is an essential component of accounts and the circumstances they describe. I show how Garfinkel's 'analytic mentality' produces a non-ironic treatment of members sense-making practices within the natural attitude. Chapter three is a treatment of the work of Edward Rose and his ethnoinquiries analytic mentality. It is arguably the first thorough treatment of Rose's 'small languages' project, which is used to illustrate the marmer in which natural language is employed by members as a descriptive resource. Rose's approach is also shown to yield a non-ironic diachronic analysis of the relationship of words to things in the world, and is contrasted with the work of Foucault. Chapter four discusses correspondence and coherence epistemologies in an attempt to show how we may illustrate the epistemological commitments of the two modes of reflexivity that are discussed in the thesis. I argue that 'essential' reflexivity may be regarded as employing a coherence theory wherein accounts are constitutive of the world, while 'stipulative' reflexivity' employs a correspondence theory that may privilege analytic accounts of the world. Chapter five discusses the reflexivities to be found within the sociology of scientific knowledge. It critically assess the 'strong programme', 'discourse analysis' and 'new literary forms' arguing that each arrogates interpretive privilege to the analyst. The chapter ends with a comparison between the 'stipulative' reflexivities and the ethnomethodological study of scientific practice. Chapter six treats the work of those anthropologists who follow Clifford and Marcus (1986). I show how a reflexivity concerned with the text and the production of texts can only be stipulative in that it arrogates interpretive privilege to analysts suggesting that such a treatment may re-contextualise artefacts and accounts. I return to the themes of the first two chapters in my critique of this mode of reflexivity, saying that we must treat accounts in context if they are to remain 'phenomenologically intact'.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:488028 |
| Date | January 1996 |
| Creators | Slack, Roger Simon |
| Publisher | University of Manchester |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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