Financial deregulation and concomitant prudential re-regulation have recently been a dominant feature of the regulatory policies of both developed and developing countries. However, the literature on the impact of such policy framework on banks' competition, risk-taking incentives, production performance and on the relationship between ownership and cost efficiency is still rather limited and inconclusive. The purpose of this thesis is to develop a better understanding of these important and interrelated aspects. We address these issues with reference to the reform experience of the Indian commercial banking sector between 1992 and 2004, a time period that encompasses two separate stages of financial reforms. The investigation of banks' risk taking incentives, however, fails to detect the existence of a market-based incentive mechanism to support lenders' information acquisition. Banks with lower monitoring and screening capacity appear to be preferred by borrowers when the market becomes more competitive, thus implying an increase in banks' risk taking incentives along with the increase in competition. Considering the tightening of prudential norms that took place during this stage, the results indicate that the implementation of prudential standards does not imply the establishment of an appropriate incentive mechanism or the strengthening of the banking system.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:499359 |
| Date | January 2008 |
| Creators | Zhao, Tianshu |
| Publisher | University of Reading |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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