Three related topics in probabilistic epistemology are studied. 1. Issues in the theory of rationality raised by cases in which eithermultiple doxastic attitudes would be warranted if you had them or none would. 2. The concept of credential deference, which lies behind David Lewis's Principal Principle, Bas van Fraassen's Reflection Principle, et al., is analyzed. Particular interest comes from considering agents who are not always certain what their own credences are. 3. The concept of conditional probability. It is argued that the ratio formula for conditional probability functions as an analytic constraint on what can count as conditional probability, yet the abiding interest of the concept stems from the different concrete relations that (often imperfectly) model this formula. The chapter traces the appearance of these concrete relations through the early centuries of probability theory, in which conditional probability went unrecognized as a distinct concept.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:668983 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Reaber, Grant |
| Publisher | University of Aberdeen |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=227601 |
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