Throughout his career, Husserl characterizes the philosophical program he calls “phenomenology” as a “science of essences” (Ideas I, Introduction). But there are two distinct senses in which phenomenology is a science of essences. The first is that phenomenology has the essences of conscious acts for its subject matter. The second is that phenomenology is supposed to constitute a methodology for determining the essence of any natural kind. While the first sense has been a central theme in Husserl scholarship, very little critical analysis has been devoted to the second. My aim in this dissertation is to fill this lacuna by providing a systematic account of how phenomenology can be used to acquire knowledge of the essences of natural kinds. In doing so I hope to show that Husserl’s phenomenology is valuable to the contemporary metaphysics and epistemology of natural kinds. My primary thesis is that the phenomenological method can be used to defend the controversial position that natural kinds have mind-independent essences.
In Chapter 1 I develop a general account of natural kinds as universals that impart structure to their instances, i.e., explain their regimentation into their specific parts. In Chapter 2 I attempt to establish the most perspicuous ideology by which to articulate natural kind essentialism, and I draw on Husserl’s realist account of universals to vindicate the intelligibility of the claim that natural kinds themselves, and not their individual instances, can be the subjects of essential truths. In Chapter 3 I raise two fundamental challenges for the account of natural kind essentialism that emerges from the argumentation of the first two chapters, the first concerning the unity of natural kinds and the second concerning the extendibility of their features across possible worlds. In Chapter 4 I base a solution to the first of these challenges on the unity-making role that essence plays in Husserl’s ontology of parts and wholes. In Chapter 5 I defend a novel interpretation of Husserl’s method for acquiring knowledge of essences, and I show how, on my conception, the method enables us to overcome the second challenge to natural kind essentialism. / 2024-03-30T00:00:00Z
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bu.edu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/44103 |
| Date | 30 March 2022 |
| Creators | Butler, Andrew P. |
| Contributors | Dahlstrom, Daniel O. |
| Source Sets | Boston University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis/Dissertation |
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