This dissertation offers a novel interpretation of the metaphysical system Spinoza presents in his Ethics by considering it entirely in terms of power, affectivity and part/whole relations. I begin by arguing that the central concern of the Ethics is what I term ‘the problem of passivity’. Namely, if as part of nature, we are necessarily always subject to passive emotions, we could seemingly not become active to the point of adequate conception without ceasing to be a part of Nature. I argue that adequate conception, rather, requires a mereological conception of oneself as part of the whole of Nature. Since such understanding requires a conception of the whole in which these parts inhere, I explicate Spinoza’s conception of substance as that which enjoys an absolute and infinite power of existence. Inasmuch as this power of existence necessarily involves a coextensive power to act, I then argue that for Spinoza the whole of Nature is defined in terms of power. Consequently, the infinite modifications following from eternal substance ought to be considered as powerful parts of this potestative whole. Individual things are, then, to be defined as dispositional structures manifesting their capacities in interdependent relations. The thesis comes to explain this by using the Medieval mereological category of a ‘virtual whole’ (i.e. a unique particular power whose parts are inseparable from it, and only differentiated according to their own capacities). The dissertation concludes with a suggestion for further research on the possibilities that the presented theory of virtual mereology could have in relation to Spinoza’s ethico-political philosophy. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Determining when some xs compose a y provides the answer to the Special Composition Question. There are three types of possible answers: always, sometimes, never. All of the competing views fall into one of these three categories. I present these competing theories, and explain the advantages and objections to each, and in the cases of those falling into the “always”, and “never” categories explain why the categories cannot provide a satisfactory response. Then I present my own answer to the Special Composition Question and show that it is not vulnerable to the objections the competitor theories cannot overcome. I also present a novel solution to the General Composition Question.

Determining when some xs compose a y provides the answer to the Special Composition Question. There are three types of possible answers: always, sometimes, never. All of the competing views fall into one of these three categories. I present these competing theories, and explain the advantages and objections to each, and in the cases of those falling into the “always”, and “never” categories explain why the categories cannot provide a satisfactory response. Then I present my own answer to the Special Composition Question and show that it is not vulnerable to the objections the competitor theories cannot overcome. I also present a novel solution to the General Composition Question.

In this work I first develop, motivate, and defend the view that mereological composition, the relation between an object and all its parts collectively, is a relation of identity. I argue that this view implies and hence can explain the logical necessity of classical mereology, the formal study of the part-whole relation. I then critically discuss four contemporary views of the same kind. Finally, I employ my thesis in a recent discussion of whether the world is fundamentally one in number.

A pesquisa pretende investigar o significado e a origem da influência de Carl Stumpf na terceira investigação lógica intitulada Sobre a teoria dos todos e das partes(Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen), publicada em 1901, buscando relacioná-la ao desenvolvimento anterior do pensamento de Husserl. Serão abordados o surgimento dos conceitos de auto-suficiência (Selbständigkeit) e não auto-suficiência (Unselbständigkeit) no contexto do problema da origem da representação de espaço e da obra de Stumpf referida ao tema; a interpretação de Husserl destes conceitos; e seu papel sistemático do ponto de vista da evolução da filosofia husserliana em seu período inicial / This research intends to investigate the meaning and origin of the influence of Carl Stumpf on the third logical investigation, entitled On the theory of Wholes and Parts(Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen), published in 1901, trying to relate it do the former development of Husserls thought. It will be taken into account the birth of the concepts of independence (Selbständigkeit) and dependence (Unselbständigkeit) in the context of the problem of the origin of the representation of space and Stumpfs work related to this theme; the interpretation Husserl gives to these concepts; and their systematic role from the point of view of the evolution of the husserlian philosophy on its initial period

Ce travail est consacré à l’étude du projet d’ontologie formelle de la fin du Moyen-Âge à l’époque contemporaine. Issue des recherches du jeune Husserl, l’ontologie formelle est théorie du quelque chose ou de l'objet en général énonçant de manière ontologiquement neutre des lois analytiques, ancrées dans certaines catégories ontologico-formelles, orthogonales à toute ontologie régionale et ne se réduisant pas à celles de la logique formelle, mais leur étant néanmoins corrélées. Une première partie de notre étude visait à montrer l’émergence du réseau conceptuel qui a permis l’émergence d’une telle ontologie. Celui-ci relève de plusieurs disciplines : l’ontologie, la logique, les mathématiques et la psychologie. Ainsi, même s’il s’agit d’un projet métaphysique original, il hérite dans une certaine mesure de la tradition ontologique moderne comprise comme tinologie et issue du processus de noétisation de l’objet de la métaphysique initié par le second commencement de la métaphysique à la fin du Moyen Âge, du problème des représentations sans objet dans la tradition philosophique brentanienne dont devait sortir diverses Gegenstandstheorien, du problème des Gestalten dans cette même tradition et de l’émergence d’une nouvelle conception de la formalité dans la mathématique du XIXe siècle. Les deuxième et troisième parties de ce travail sont consacrées à l’étude systématique de la réalisation technique du projet d’ontologie formelle, en particulier au sein de sa reprise analytique à partir de la fin des années 1970, sous la forme d’une méréologie formelle et de ses multiples extensions (méréotopologie, méréologie temporelle et théorie méréologique de la dépendance existentielle), afin de pouvoir résoudre le problème de l’intégrité ontologique des objets.

In “Proof-Theoretic Justification of Logic”, building on work by Dummett and Prawitz, I show how to construct use-based meaning-theories for the logical constants. The assertability-conditional meaning-theory takes the meaning of the logical constants to be given by their introduction rules; the consequence-conditional meaning-theory takes the meaning of the logical constants to be given by their elimination rules. I then consider the question: given a set of introduction (elimination) rules \(\mathcal{R}\), what are the strongest elimination (introduction) rules that are validated by an assertability (consequence) conditional meaning-theory based on \(\mathcal{R}\)? I prove that the intuitionistic introduction (elimination) rules are the strongest rules that are validated by the intuitionistic elimination (introduction) rules. I then prove that intuitionistic logic is the strongest logic that can be given either an assertability-conditional or consequence-conditional meaning-theory. In “Grounding Grounding” I discuss the notion of grounding. My discussion revolves around the problem of iterated grounding-claims. Suppose that \(\Delta\) grounds \(\phi\); what grounds that \(\Delta\) grounds that \(\phi\)? I argue that unless we can get a satisfactory answer to this question the notion of grounding will be useless. I discuss and reject some proposed accounts of iterated grounding claims. I then develop a new way of expressing grounding, propose an account of iterated grounding-claims and show how we can develop logics for grounding. In “Is the Vagueness Argument Valid?” I argue that the Vagueness Argument in favor of unrestricted composition isn’t valid. However, if the premisses of the argument are true and the conclusion false, mereological facts fail to supervene on non-mereological facts. I argue that this failure of supervenience is an artifact of the interplay between the necessity and determinacy operators and that it does not mean that mereological facts fail to depend on non-mereological facts. I sketch a deflationary view of ontology to establish this. / Philosophy

A pesquisa pretende investigar o significado e a origem da influência de Carl Stumpf na terceira investigação lógica intitulada Sobre a teoria dos todos e das partes(Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen), publicada em 1901, buscando relacioná-la ao desenvolvimento anterior do pensamento de Husserl. Serão abordados o surgimento dos conceitos de auto-suficiência (Selbständigkeit) e não auto-suficiência (Unselbständigkeit) no contexto do problema da origem da representação de espaço e da obra de Stumpf referida ao tema; a interpretação de Husserl destes conceitos; e seu papel sistemático do ponto de vista da evolução da filosofia husserliana em seu período inicial / This research intends to investigate the meaning and origin of the influence of Carl Stumpf on the third logical investigation, entitled On the theory of Wholes and Parts(Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen), published in 1901, trying to relate it do the former development of Husserls thought. It will be taken into account the birth of the concepts of independence (Selbständigkeit) and dependence (Unselbständigkeit) in the context of the problem of the origin of the representation of space and Stumpfs work related to this theme; the interpretation Husserl gives to these concepts; and their systematic role from the point of view of the evolution of the husserlian philosophy on its initial period

Ordinary material objects, such as guitars and houses, do not seem to pose any serious philosophical problems. However, the nature of the material objects and their part-whole relation raises serious questions about fundamental ontologies. Furthermore, part-whole relations are not necessarily spatial; they can be temporal as well. My dissertation investigates the problems posed by ordinary material objects, and the different ontological views that attempt to provide answers to these problems. I then present a new and radical view, which I call Nihilist Perdurantism (NP). NP claims that objects have temporal parts, but not spatial parts. I arrive at this view by first exploring and arguing against different views on composition, with a focus on arguments against common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. I then discuss the nature of mereological simples and argue against several views that claim that qualitatively heterogeneous simples are possible (Markosian and McDaniel). Next, I present my arguments against perdurantist, endurantist, and presentist view of persistence. I especially focus on endurantism, and use the aforementioned argument against the possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous simples to construct a similar argument against endurantism. Finally, I argue in favor of my view, NP. This view combines a mereological nihilist view (defended at various times by Unger, Van Inwagen, Merricks, and Sider) about spatial parts with a perdurantist view (defended at various times by Lewis, Hawley, Heller, and Sider) of temporal parts. Therefore, according to NP, there are no guitars, trees, or houses. The only objects that exist are NP objects; these are line-shaped objects that extend through spacetime. With respect to the three spatial dimensions, these objects have no parts. However, with respect to the temporal dimension, NP objects do have parts in the form of points and line segments. My work shows that NP has better solutions to many of the puzzles and problems posed by material objects, such as the puzzle of change, over the three standard views. Hinchliff argues that change is puzzling because in order for there to be real change, then the following four intuitions must be true: (1) The candle persists through the change. It existed when it was straight, and it exists now when it is bent…(2) Shapes are properties not relations. They are one-placed, not many-placed…(3) The candle itself has the shapes. Not just a part but the candle itself was straight, and not just a part but the candle itself is bent…(4) The shapes are incompatible. If the shapes were compatible, there need not have been a change. The puzzle of change is the mutual inconsistency of these four intuitions. I argue that perdurantists must deny intuition (3), endurantists must deny intuition (2), and presentists must deny intuition (1). I then argue that only NP can accommodate all four intuitions about both macroscopic and microscopic change while resolving the inconsistency of the four intuitions. My dissertation presents a new view that provides a fresh perspective on the debate about the nature of material objects. My development of NP touches on a number of other philosophical problems. In Chapter One, I discuss the role of intuitions in metaphysics, and argue that many supposedly “common sense” intuitions are already philosophical positions. In Chapter 2, I argue against Korman’s and Markosian’s common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. In Chapter 3, I argue that the endurantist view of persistence is inconsistent and should be rejected. In addition to making the case for NP and its solution to the puzzle of change in Chapter 4, I also argue that NP can solve the problem of motion in a homogenous substance. Finally, in Chapter Five, I argue against the possibility of both gunky and junky material objects.

Throughout his career, Husserl characterizes the philosophical program he calls “phenomenology” as a “science of essences” (Ideas I, Introduction). But there are two distinct senses in which phenomenology is a science of essences. The first is that phenomenology has the essences of conscious acts for its subject matter. The second is that phenomenology is supposed to constitute a methodology for determining the essence of any natural kind. While the first sense has been a central theme in Husserl scholarship, very little critical analysis has been devoted to the second. My aim in this dissertation is to fill this lacuna by providing a systematic account of how phenomenology can be used to acquire knowledge of the essences of natural kinds. In doing so I hope to show that Husserl’s phenomenology is valuable to the contemporary metaphysics and epistemology of natural kinds. My primary thesis is that the phenomenological method can be used to defend the controversial position that natural kinds have mind-independent essences. In Chapter 1 I develop a general account of natural kinds as universals that impart structure to their instances, i.e., explain their regimentation into their specific parts. In Chapter 2 I attempt to establish the most perspicuous ideology by which to articulate natural kind essentialism, and I draw on Husserl’s realist account of universals to vindicate the intelligibility of the claim that natural kinds themselves, and not their individual instances, can be the subjects of essential truths. In Chapter 3 I raise two fundamental challenges for the account of natural kind essentialism that emerges from the argumentation of the first two chapters, the first concerning the unity of natural kinds and the second concerning the extendibility of their features across possible worlds. In Chapter 4 I base a solution to the first of these challenges on the unity-making role that essence plays in Husserl’s ontology of parts and wholes. In Chapter 5 I defend a novel interpretation of Husserl’s method for acquiring knowledge of essences, and I show how, on my conception, the method enables us to overcome the second challenge to natural kind essentialism. / 2024-03-30T00:00:00Z