Ce travail est consacré à l’étude du projet d’ontologie formelle de la fin du Moyen-Âge à l’époque contemporaine. Issue des recherches du jeune Husserl, l’ontologie formelle est théorie du quelque chose ou de l'objet en général énonçant de manière ontologiquement neutre des lois analytiques, ancrées dans certaines catégories ontologico-formelles, orthogonales à toute ontologie régionale et ne se réduisant pas à celles de la logique formelle, mais leur étant néanmoins corrélées. Une première partie de notre étude visait à montrer l’émergence du réseau conceptuel qui a permis l’émergence d’une telle ontologie. Celui-ci relève de plusieurs disciplines : l’ontologie, la logique, les mathématiques et la psychologie. Ainsi, même s’il s’agit d’un projet métaphysique original, il hérite dans une certaine mesure de la tradition ontologique moderne comprise comme tinologie et issue du processus de noétisation de l’objet de la métaphysique initié par le second commencement de la métaphysique à la fin du Moyen Âge, du problème des représentations sans objet dans la tradition philosophique brentanienne dont devait sortir diverses Gegenstandstheorien, du problème des Gestalten dans cette même tradition et de l’émergence d’une nouvelle conception de la formalité dans la mathématique du XIXe siècle. Les deuxième et troisième parties de ce travail sont consacrées à l’étude systématique de la réalisation technique du projet d’ontologie formelle, en particulier au sein de sa reprise analytique à partir de la fin des années 1970, sous la forme d’une méréologie formelle et de ses multiples extensions (méréotopologie, méréologie temporelle et théorie méréologique de la dépendance existentielle), afin de pouvoir résoudre le problème de l’intégrité ontologique des objets.

By extending Husserl’s own historico-critical study to include the conceptual mathematics of more contemporary times – specifically category theory and its emphatic development since the second half of the 20th century – this paper claims that the delineation between mathematics and philosophy must be completely revisited. It will be contended that Husserl’s phenomenological work was very much influenced by the discoveries and limitations of the formal mathematics being developed at Göttingen during his tenure there and that, subsequently, the rôle he envisaged for his material a priori science is heavily dependent upon his conception of the definite manifold. Motivating these contentions is the idea of a mathematics which would go beyond the constraints of formal ontology and subsequently achieve coherence with the full sense of transcendental phenomenology. While this final point will be by no means proven within the confines of this paper it is hoped that the very fact of opening up for the possibility of such an idea will act as a supporting argument to the overriding thesis that the relationship between mathematics and phenomenology must be problematised.

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Ce travail est consacré à l’étude du projet d’ontologie formelle de la fin du Moyen-Âge à l’époque contemporaine. Issue des recherches du jeune Husserl, l’ontologie formelle est théorie du quelque chose ou de l'objet en général énonçant de manière ontologiquement neutre des lois analytiques, ancrées dans certaines catégories ontologico-formelles, orthogonales à toute ontologie régionale et ne se réduisant pas à celles de la logique formelle, mais leur étant néanmoins corrélées. Une première partie de notre étude visait à montrer l’émergence du réseau conceptuel qui a permis l’émergence d’une telle ontologie. Celui-ci relève de plusieurs disciplines :l’ontologie, la logique, les mathématiques et la psychologie. Ainsi, même s’il s’agit d’un projet métaphysique original, il hérite dans une certaine mesure de la tradition ontologique moderne comprise comme tinologie et issue du processus de noétisation de l’objet de la métaphysique initié par le second commencement de la métaphysique à la fin du Moyen Âge, du problème des représentations sans objet dans la tradition philosophique brentanienne dont devait sortir diverses Gegenstandstheorien, du problème des Gestalten dans cette même tradition et de l’émergence d’une nouvelle conception de la formalité dans la mathématique du XIXe siècle. Les deuxième et troisième parties de ce travail sont consacrées à l’étude systématique de la réalisation technique du projet d’ontologie formelle, en particulier au sein de sa reprise analytique à partir de la fin des années 1970, sous la forme d’une méréologie formelle et de ses multiples extensions (méréotopologie, méréologie temporelle et théorie méréologique de la dépendance existentielle), afin de pouvoir résoudre le problème de l’intégrité ontologique des objets. / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette thèse cherche d’abord à confronter les prétentions respectives des méthodes phénoménologique et analytico-linguistique classiques à fournir chacune une explication de la connaissance a priori des nécessités d’essence qui soit aussi dépourvue que possible de présupposés et de pétitions de principe. Le problème précis autour duquel se noue cette confrontation est celui de la possibilité des vérités a priori matérielles. Dans un premier temps, nous proposons une lecture et une résolution méréologiques de ce problème en termes husserliens de touts composés des parties dépendantes, qui permet mieux de rendre compte des tels ensembles que la méréologie atomiste qui caractérise la plupart des ontologies formelles « analytiques » ; et nous proposons ce faisant une compréhension de la méthode d’intuition eidétique comme analyse méréologique. Dans un second temps, nous appliquons cette analyse à la méthode phénoménologique elle-même, comprenant la réduction transcendantale comme une variation méréologique sur l’a priori matériel de la corrélation qui caractérise la structure même de la relation entre l’ego et le monde, ce qui nous oblige de voir cette structure à son tour comme un tout concret intuitionnable dont les parties subjective et objective ne sont que des moments absolument dépendants, sans aucun privilège accordé au pôle sujet de cette structure. Ainsi, ce n’est qu’à la stricte condition que la phénoménologie se « désubjectivise » qu’elle puisse à la fois réfuter un certain nombre de dogmes analytiques et empiristes et fonder sa propre méthode dans une absence comparative de présupposés. / This dissertation takes as its point of departure a polemical comparison of the respective claims of the phenomenological and classical analytic-linguistic methods to provide an account of a priori knowledge of essential or necessary truth that is as free as possible of presuppositions and circular reasoning. The precise problem around which this confrontation crystalizes is the one concerning the possibility of material a priori truths. First, we propose a mereological interpretation of and solution to this problem in the Husserlian terms of wholes composed of dependent parts, which allows for a better account of such wholes than does the atomistic mereology that characterizes most “analytic” formal ontologies, and we propose an understanding of the method of eidetic intuition as mereological analysis. Secondly, we apply this analysis to the phenomenological method itself, understanding the transcendental reduction as a mereological variation on the material a priori of correlation that characterizes the very structure of the relation between the ego and the world; this obliges us to see this structure in turn as an intuitable concrete whole whose subjective and objective parts are merely absolutely dependent moments, without privileging the subject-pole of this structure. In this way, it is only on the strict condition that phenomenology “desubjectivize” itself that it might at once refute a certain number of analytic and empiricist dogmas and ground its own method without recourse to unnecessary and untenable presuppositions.

The original and still a major purpose of ontologies in computer and information sciences is to serve for the semantic integration of represented content, facilitating information system interoperability. Content can be data, information, and knowledge, and it can be distributed within or across these categories. A myriad of languages is available for representation. Ontologies themselves are artifacts which are expressed in various languages. Different such languages are utilized today, including, as well-known representatives, predicate logic, subsuming first-order (predicate) logic (FOL), in particular, and higher-order (predicate) logic (HOL); the Web Ontology Language (OWL) on the basis of description logics (DL); and the Unified Modeling Language (UML). We focus primarily on languages with formally defined syntax and semantics. This overall picture immediately suggests questions of the following kinds: What is the relationship between an ontology and the language in which it is formalized? Especially, what is the impact of the formal semantics of the language on the formalized ontology? How well understood is the role of ontologies in semantic integration? Can the same ontology be represented in multiple languages and/or in distinct ways within one language? Is there an adequate understanding of whether two expressions are intensionally/conceptually equivalent and whether two ontologies furnish the same ontological commitments? One may assume that these questions are resolved. Indeed, the development and adoption of ontologies is widespread today. Ontologies are authored in a broad range of different languages, including offering equally named ontologies in distinct languages. Much research is devoted to techniques and technologies that orbit ontologies, for example, ontology matching, modularization, learning, and evolution, to name a few. Ontologies have found numerous beneficial applications, and hundreds of ontologies have been created, considering solely the context of biomedical research. For us, these observations increase the relevance of the stated questions and close relatives thereof, and raise the desire for solid theoretical underpinnings. In the literature of computer and information sciences, we have found only few approaches that tackle the foundations of ontologies and their representation to allow for answering such questions or that actually answer them. We elaborate an analysis of the subject as the first item of central contributions within this thesis. It mainly results in the identification of a vicious circularity in (i) the intended use of ontologies to mediate between formal representations and (ii) solely exploiting formal semantic notions in representing ontologies and defining ontology-based equivalence as a form of intensional/conceptual equivalence. On this basis and in order to overcome its identified limitations, we contribute a general model-theoretic semantic account, named \\\"ontological semantics\\\". This kind of semantics takes the approach of assigning arbitrary entities as referents of atomic symbols and to link syntactic constructions with corresponding ontological claims and commitments. In particular, ontological semantics targets the avoidance of encoding effects in its definition. Therefore we argue that this semantic account is well suited for interpreting formalized ontologies and for defining languages for the representation of ontologies. It is further proposed as a fundament for envisioned novel definitions of the intensional equivalence of expressions, in potential deviation from only being formally equivalent under set-theoretic semantics. The thesis is defended that a particular usage of a formalism and its respective vocabulary should be accompanied by establishing an ontological semantics that is tailored to that use of the formalism, in parallel to the formal semantics of the language, in order to capture the ontological content of the formal representation for adequate reuse in other formalisms. Accordingly, we advocate ontological semantics as a useful framework for justifying translations on an intensional basis. Despite all deviations of ontological semantics from its set-theoretic blueprint, close relationships between the two can be shown, which allow for using established FOL and DL reasoners while assuming ontological semantics.

The original and still a major purpose of ontologies in computer and information sciences is to serve for the semantic integration of represented content, facilitating information system interoperability. Content can be data, information, and knowledge, and it can be distributed within or across these categories. A myriad of languages is available for representation. Ontologies themselves are artifacts which are expressed in various languages. Different such languages are utilized today, including, as well-known representatives, predicate logic, subsuming first-order (predicate) logic (FOL), in particular, and higher-order (predicate) logic (HOL); the Web Ontology Language (OWL) on the basis of description logics (DL); and the Unified Modeling Language (UML). We focus primarily on languages with formally defined syntax and semantics. This overall picture immediately suggests questions of the following kinds: What is the relationship between an ontology and the language in which it is formalized? Especially, what is the impact of the formal semantics of the language on the formalized ontology? How well understood is the role of ontologies in semantic integration? Can the same ontology be represented in multiple languages and/or in distinct ways within one language? Is there an adequate understanding of whether two expressions are intensionally/conceptually equivalent and whether two ontologies furnish the same ontological commitments? One may assume that these questions are resolved. Indeed, the development and adoption of ontologies is widespread today. Ontologies are authored in a broad range of different languages, including offering equally named ontologies in distinct languages. Much research is devoted to techniques and technologies that orbit ontologies, for example, ontology matching, modularization, learning, and evolution, to name a few. Ontologies have found numerous beneficial applications, and hundreds of ontologies have been created, considering solely the context of biomedical research. For us, these observations increase the relevance of the stated questions and close relatives thereof, and raise the desire for solid theoretical underpinnings. In the literature of computer and information sciences, we have found only few approaches that tackle the foundations of ontologies and their representation to allow for answering such questions or that actually answer them. We elaborate an analysis of the subject as the first item of central contributions within this thesis. It mainly results in the identification of a vicious circularity in (i) the intended use of ontologies to mediate between formal representations and (ii) solely exploiting formal semantic notions in representing ontologies and defining ontology-based equivalence as a form of intensional/conceptual equivalence. On this basis and in order to overcome its identified limitations, we contribute a general model-theoretic semantic account, named \\\"ontological semantics\\\". This kind of semantics takes the approach of assigning arbitrary entities as referents of atomic symbols and to link syntactic constructions with corresponding ontological claims and commitments. In particular, ontological semantics targets the avoidance of encoding effects in its definition. Therefore we argue that this semantic account is well suited for interpreting formalized ontologies and for defining languages for the representation of ontologies. It is further proposed as a fundament for envisioned novel definitions of the intensional equivalence of expressions, in potential deviation from only being formally equivalent under set-theoretic semantics. The thesis is defended that a particular usage of a formalism and its respective vocabulary should be accompanied by establishing an ontological semantics that is tailored to that use of the formalism, in parallel to the formal semantics of the language, in order to capture the ontological content of the formal representation for adequate reuse in other formalisms. Accordingly, we advocate ontological semantics as a useful framework for justifying translations on an intensional basis. Despite all deviations of ontological semantics from its set-theoretic blueprint, close relationships between the two can be shown, which allow for using established FOL and DL reasoners while assuming ontological semantics.:* Preface ** Abstract ** Contents ** Acknowledgments ** Foreword 1 Introduction 1.1 Background 1.2 Motivations 1.3 Theses, Objectives and Scope 1.4 Outline and Contributions 1.5 Formal Preliminaries 2 Foundations on Languages, Semantics, and Ontology 2.1 Formal Syntax and Formal Semantics 2.2 The Role of Ontologies in Semantic Integration 2.3 Ontological Analysis and Meta-Ontological Architecture 2.4 Conceptualization of Categories and Relations - CR 2.5 Summary of the Analysis and Next Steps 3 Views on Set-Theoretic Semantics of Classical Predicate Logics 3.1 Tarskian Model Theory and Set-Theoretic Superstructure 3.2 Formal Semantics and Choices for Entity Postulation 3.3 Theory View of Semantics 3.4 Aims for an Ontologically Neutral Semantic Account 4 Ontological Semantics 4.1 Definition of Ontological Structures by Analogy to the Set-Theoretic Approach 4.2 Properties and Further Background for Ontological Structures in General 4.3 Ontological Models & Signature Aspects 4.4 Semantics of Predication 4.5 Semantics of Connectives and Quantifiers & Semantic Notions 4.6 Relations between Ontological and Set-Theoretic Semantics 4.7 Ontological Neutrality 5 Ontological Engineering and Applications 5.1 Formalization Method for Ontology Representation in FOL 5.2 Ontological Usage Schemes 5.3 Glimpse on Characterizing Modular Representation 5.4 Applications in the Biomedical Domain 6 Contributions to Ontologies 6.1 Formalizations of Categories and Relations - CR 6.2 Remarks on Further Contributions 6.3 Ontologies of Time 7 Conclusion and Continuation 7.1 Resume 7.2 Related Work 7.3 Conclusions 7.4 Beginnings of Future Work Appendix A Additional Preliminaries A.1 Logical Notions A.2 Axiomatic Systems of Set and Number Theory B Axioms of the CR Taxonomy in OWL B.1 Asserted OWL Class Axioms B.2 Asserted OWL Object Property Axioms C Lists of Figures and Tables C.1 List of Figures C.2 List of Tables D Abbreviations, Acronyms and Names D.1 Abbreviations D.2 Acronyms and Names E References E.1 Literature References E.2 Web References/List of URLs F Work and Author Information ** Selbständigkeitserklärung (Declaration of Authorship) ** Bibliographic Data ** Scientific Record

本論文欲陳述現象學經驗的產生來由，因此首當從經驗的實質意涵入手，藉由經驗意向本質的揭露來指陳其發生原因。所以，相關於經驗是什麼，我們也就進一步探討經驗和被經驗所掌握的對象間之關係。於是我們問，這是一種「實在」關係，一一對應的關係嗎，還是可以被經驗豐富詮釋的關係？是一種基礎論的知識類型？若是，什麼意義下的基礎論，若否，又是側重什麼問題意識呢？心理活動和被經驗對象之間的關係為何？經驗如何客觀地掌握對象，對象在哪裡被掌握，知識是什麼？是心理經驗法則的結果嗎，這會造成什麼樣的認識論困局呢？相較於分析哲學從語言分析的途徑入手來解釋客觀知識如何獲得的問題，胡賽爾又如何從現象之為現象的分析描述中來揭露我們和世界之間所發生的種種事端呢？這些問題在本論文將有進一步說明。