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Husserl&rsquo / s phenomenology can be analyzed simply by relying on the conception of intentionality. What I want to do is to put forward the logical grounds on which I can construct an acceptable account of Husserl&rsquo / s theory of intentionality. For this aim, firstly, I need to put some light on the nature of intentional acts or experiences.This suggests us that there is a close connection between the acts and what they are directed towards. Actually many have specified the relation between the act and the object, but what they have ignored was to give an exclusive explication of how such a relation can be connected with the content component. The penomenological content mediates between the intentional act and the intended object. There are some disagreements as regards whether the act is also directed towards the content or not. One of the significant aims of this research is to shed some light on the adequate arguments by which I will try to clarify that one can speak of such a directedness of intentional acts. In other words I believe that one can not only describe an intentional relation between the act and the intended object but also similar relations between the act and the content. There seem to be three parts to be examined interconnectedly: these, namely, are act, content and the object. For, the act is directed towards the object with the intermediation of the content. So his theory is not the same as the object theory of intentionality of which there are some defenders. Husserl&rsquo / s content theory is firstly examined in Logical investigations and Ideas respectively.

本論文欲陳述現象學經驗的產生來由，因此首當從經驗的實質意涵入手，藉由經驗意向本質的揭露來指陳其發生原因。所以，相關於經驗是什麼，我們也就進一步探討經驗和被經驗所掌握的對象間之關係。於是我們問，這是一種「實在」關係，一一對應的關係嗎，還是可以被經驗豐富詮釋的關係？是一種基礎論的知識類型？若是，什麼意義下的基礎論，若否，又是側重什麼問題意識呢？心理活動和被經驗對象之間的關係為何？經驗如何客觀地掌握對象，對象在哪裡被掌握，知識是什麼？是心理經驗法則的結果嗎，這會造成什麼樣的認識論困局呢？相較於分析哲學從語言分析的途徑入手來解釋客觀知識如何獲得的問題，胡賽爾又如何從現象之為現象的分析描述中來揭露我們和世界之間所發生的種種事端呢？這些問題在本論文將有進一步說明。