葉錦明. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988. / Reprint ed. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 165-172. / Ye Jinming. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988. / Chapter 第一章 --- 總論 / Chapter 第一節 --- 「哲學的退位」與邏輯實證論 --- p.1-9 / Chapter 第二節 --- 分析的工具與溝通的進路 --- p.10-17 / 註釋〈一〉 --- p.18-20 / Chapter 第二章 --- 邏輯實證論的背景理論──邏輯原子論 / Chapter 第一節 --- 維根斯坦與維也那學團 --- p.21-24 / Chapter 第二節 --- 命題與事實 --- p.25-33 / Chapter 第三節 --- 邏輯原子論的缺點 --- p.34-42 / 註釋〈二〉 --- p.43-45 / Chapter 第三章 --- 「分析／綜合」區分 --- p.46 / Chapter 第一節 --- 邏輯實證論的「分析／綜合」區分 --- p.47-52 / Chapter 第二節 --- 奎因對「分析性」的批評 --- p.53-62 / Chapter 第三節 --- 評估 / Chapter （三、一） --- 一種約略的區分 --- p.63-65 / Chapter （三、二） --- 形式科學與經驗科學 --- p.65-69 / Chapter （三、三） --- 論「先驗綜合」 --- p.70-82 / 註釋〈三〉 --- p.83-85 / Chapter 第四章 --- 意義判準 --- p.86-89 / Chapter 第一節 --- 檢証原則 --- p.90-97 / Chapter 第二節 --- 否証原則 --- p.98-105 / Chapter 第三節 --- 印証原則 --- p.106-115 / Chapter 第四節 --- 評估 --- p.115-116 / Chapter （四、一） --- 實有型態的形而上學 --- p.117-120 / Chapter （四、二） --- 境界形態的形而上學 --- p.121-129 / 註釋〈四〉 --- p.130-133 / Chapter 第五章 --- 情緒主義 --- p.134-135 / Chapter 第一節 --- 情緒主義的內容 --- p.136-138 / Chapter （一、一） --- 卡納普的情緒主義 --- p.139-141 / Chapter （一、二） --- 艾耶的情緒主義 --- p.142-146 / Chapter 第二節 --- 評估 / Chapter （二、一） --- 倫理學的失墜 --- p.147-149 / Chapter （二、二） --- 斷裂性的二分 --- p.150-153 / Chapter （二、三） --- 相對主義 --- p.154-161 / 註釋〈五〉 --- p.162-164 / 參考書目 --- p.165-172

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- McMaster University, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 140-149). Also available via World Wide Web.

"Rostocker Inaugural-Dissertation." / Includes bibliographical references (p. 126-127).

No description available.

The subject of this thesis is physicalism, understood not as some particular doctrine pertaining narrowly to the philosophy of mind, but rather as a quite general metaphysical claim to the effect that everything is, or is fundamentally, physical. Thus physicalism explicates the thought that in some sense physics is the basic science. The aim of the thesis is to defend a particular brand of physicalism, which I call eliminative type physicalism. It claims, roughly, that every property is a physical property – a property mentioned in the laws of physics, and hence that any putative property not identifiable with a physical property must be eliminated from our ontology. Eliminative type physicalism is apt to face three objections, and so my thesis, like Caesar's Gaul, falls into three parts. In the first, I argue against the idea that there are tenable positions, both physicalist and non-physicalist, alternative to eliminative type physicalism. I argue that each of these positions – token physicalism (Fodor, middle Putnam), supervenience physicalism (Lewis, Horgan) and and a non-physicalist view I call pluralism (Goodman, late Putnam) – is defective. In the second part, responding to the objection that there is just no reason to be a physicalist, I develop a positive argument for eliminative type physicalism, an argument resting upon a strong version of the explanatory test for reality according to which only explanatorily indispensable properties can justifiably be said to exist. In the third and final part, I argue, against the charge that eliminative type physicalism cannot accommodate what I call phenomenal properties (qualia, raw feels etc.), that there is no good reason to deny, and one good reason to affirm, that phenomenal properties just are physical properties.

xi, 358 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1976

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1976.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 302-307). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / Chapter 一 --- 導言 / Chapter 二 --- 維也納學團之起源與發展簡史 / Chapter 1 --- 維也納學團的起源 / Chapter 2 --- 維也納學團的目的與方法 / Chapter 3 --- 維也納學團的理論淵源 / Chapter 4 --- 維也納學團的發展 / Chapter 三 --- 意義判準的提出 / Chapter 5 --- 形上學的消除 / Chapter 6 --- 述句的區分 / Chapter 四 --- 意義判準的早期陳構式 / Chapter 7 --- 意義判準最早期陳構式──完全檢証性原則 / Chapter 8 --- 完全否証性原則及其困難 / Chapter 五 --- 意義判準其他不同之陳構及其困難 / Chapter 9 --- 意義判準第三個樣式──部分檢証性原則 / Chapter 10 --- 可翻譯性原則 / Chapter 11 --- 以可隸屬性來代替可翻譯性 / Chapter 12 --- 「隸屬於人」的意義的釐清 / Chapter 六 --- 經驗論語言及傾向性概念與理論概念之引介 / Chapter 13 --- 語言系統人的建構 / Chapter 14 --- 傾向性概念與化約句子方法 / Chapter 15 --- 理論概念與關連規則 / Chapter 16 --- 語言結構的釐定 / Chapter 七 --- 部分印証性原則 / Chapter 17 --- 意義判準的第四個樣式----------部分印証性原則 / Chapter 八 --- 基礎問題論旨 / Chapter 18 --- 什麽是基礎問題 / Chapter 九 --- 基料述句之性質徵定 / Chapter 19 --- 維根斯坦與基本命題 / Chapter 20 --- 舒力克之基料述句理論 / Chapter 21 --- 奈拿夫之基料述句 / Chapter 22 --- 卡納晉之原始基料述句基料述句 / Chapter 十 --- 基料述句之物理化 / Chapter 23 --- 物理語言為一互為主觀的語言的証明 / Chapter 24 --- 物理語言的互為主觀性 / Chapter 十一 --- 基料述句之語法觀及其困難 / Chapter 25 --- 將「基料述句」視為一語法指謂辭的理論 / Chapter 26 --- 基料述句之語法觀的批評 / Chapter 27 --- 融貫真理論的批評 / Chapter 28 --- 命題與事實的關係 / Chapter 29 --- 「命題與事實比較」是什麽意義? / Chapter 十二 --- 語言結構的選取與基料述句 / Chapter 30 --- 語言結構與基料述句 / Chapter 31 --- 基本謂詞選取的兩個方法論上的決定 / Chapter 32 --- 基本謂詞內容的確定──物理謂詞或心理謂詞之選擇 / Chapter 十三 --- 真確知識基礎之重估

In this essay I have considered some of the philosophical problems involved in attempting to settle the question, What are scientific theories about? And in order to expose these problems, I have dealt with two influential responses to this question of the referents of scientific theories - namely, logical empiricism and realism.