Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this study it is asked why we do not consider ourselves guiltier and more responsible
with regard to the thousands of people who, through no fault of their own, die daily from
preventable, poverty-related causes. Such neglect of the global poor is not surprising from
certain perspectives. However, when the matter is approached from the perspective of
Emmanuel Levinas's ethical philosophy, one is faced with the paradox that Levinas claims
we are infinitely and inescapable responsible for the other, while the preventable dying of
thousands of poor people indicates that we do not behave as though we are infinitely
responsible for the other.
It would seem as though Levinas is crudely mistaken. However, Levinas distinguishes
between an interpersonal ethical relation and an impersonal political relation with the other.
The former is a relation of asymmetrical and infinite responsibility to which we are
summoned by the uniqueness of the other's 'face.' The latter is a relation in which the
'third' is present, therefore requiring that the self limit his responsibility to a specific other
and disperse it amongst numerous others. The presence of the third indicates the beginning
of impersonal justice, institutions, politics, knowledge, as well as equality and reciprocity
between the self and the other. However, every person that I encounter is a general other
with whom I stand in a political relation, while at the same time, also a specific other who
commands my infinite responsibility. With every other, I am simultaneously in a
symmetrical political relation and an asymmetrical ethical relation. This is the ambiguity of
political society: do I relate to the other politically or ethically? Both options enjoy
legitimacy; however, from a Levinasian perspective, the choice to politically respond to the
other less so.
To understand our indifference to the global poor, this study analyses the principal debate
about transnational responsibility, the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, from a
Levinasian perspective. Three ways in which the ethical relation with the extremely poor
global other have been suppressed, thereby contributing to our ethical indifference to him,
are identified. First, writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate seek to preserve the subject in the greatest autonomy and freedom possible and thereby 'legitimise' a political
response to the other. Second, when approaching the issue of global justice, cosmopolitan
and communitarian theorists suppress the otherness of the other, which is what reminds us
of our infinite responsibility for the other and the fact that justice is always incomplete.
Third, insofar cosmopolitans prioritise and advocate a greater concern for the global poor,
the strategy they favour (they emphasize human equality) is counterproductive for it
overlooks and suppresses the uniqueness of both the subject and the other in the
interpersonal ethical relation. The criticism of these three aspects of the cosmopolitancommunitarian
debate is then extended into claims that a more ethical relating to the
globally poor than is presently the case is possible. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie vra waarom ons onsself nie skuldiger en meer verantwoordelik beskou
teenoor die duisende mense wat elke dag, sonder enige toedoen van hul eie, as gevolg van
voorkombare, armoed-verwante oorsake, sterf nie. Vanuit sekere perspektiewe is sulke
nalatigheid te wagte. Wanneer ons egter die kwessie vanuit die perspektief van Emmanuel
Levinas se etiese filosofie benader, kom ons voor 'n teenstrydigheid te staan, aangesien
Levinas aandring dat ons oneindiglik en onvermydelik verantwoordelik is vir die ander,
terwyl die daaglikse voorkombare sterftes van duisende arm mense aandui dat ons nie
optree asof ons onsself as oneindiglik verantwoordelik teenoor die ander beskou nie.
Dit wil voorkom asof Levinas eenvoudig verkeerd is. Levinas tref egter 'n onderskeid
tussen 'n interpersoonlike etiese verhouding en 'n onpersoonlike politiese verhouding met
die ander. Eersgenoemde is 'n verhouding van asimmetriese en oneindige
verantwoordelikheid waartoe ons beveel word deur die uniekheid van die ander se 'gesig.'
Laasgenoemde is 'n verhouding waarby ook 'n 'derde' betrokke is, en daarom moet die self
sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor die spesifieke ander beperk om so ook sy
verantwoordelikheid teenoor 'n veelheid van andere na te kom. Die teenwoordigheid van
die derde dui die beginpunt van onpersoonlike geregtigheid, institusies, politiek, kennis,
asook gelykheid en wederkerigheid tussen die self en die ander, aan. Elke person wat ek
teëkom is 'n algemene ander met wie ek in 'n politiese verhouding staan, asook,
tegelykertyd, 'n spesifieke ander teenoor wie ek oneindiglik verantwoordelik is. Teenoor
elke ander staan ek terselfdetyd in 'n simmetriese politiese verhouding en 'n asimmetriese
etiese verhouding. Die dubbelsinnigheid van die samelewing lê daarin dat ek moet besluit
of ek polities of eties teenoor die ander gaan optree. Beide opsies geniet 'n mate van
legitimiteit, alhoewel, 'n politiese respons teenoor die ander minder legitiem is vanuit 'n
Levinasiaanse oogpunt.
In 'n poging om ons apatie teenoor die wêreld se armes te verstaan, word die sentrale debat
rondom die kwessie van transnasionale verantwoordelikheid, die kosmopolitiaanse kommunitêre
debat, vanuit 'n Levinasiaanse perspektief geanaliseer. Drie wyses waarop die etiese verhouding met die ander onderdruk word, en sodoende bydra tot ons etiese apatie
teenoor die ander, word geïdentifiseer. Eerstens poog skrywers in die kosmopolitiaanse kommunitêre
debat om die subjek so 'n groot mate van outonomie en vryheid as moontlik
te handhaaf en te bewaar, en 'legitimiseer' in die proses 'n politiese respons teenoor die
ander. Tweedens, wanneer die kwessie van globale geregtigheid deur skrywers in die
kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat aangeraak word, word die andersheid van die ander,
wat ons aan ons etiese verantwoordelikheid teenoor die ander, asook aan die onvoltooide
aard van geregtigheid, herinner, onderdruk. Derdens, in soverre kosmopolitaanse skrywers
hulself beywer om 'n groter mate van besorgdheid teenoor arm persone regoor die wêreld
te ontlok, blyk die strategie wat deur hulle gevolg word (hulle beklemtoon menslike
gelykheid) teenproduktief te wees, aangesien hierdie strategie die uniekheid van die subjek
en die ander in die etiese verhouding misken en onderdruk. Die kritiek teenoor hierdie drie
aspekte van die kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat word dan uitgebrei na aansprake dat
'n meer etiese houding teenoor die wêreld se armes moontlik is.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/50403 |
| Date | 03 1900 |
| Creators | Jordaan, Eduard Christiaan |
| Contributors | Nel, Philip, Van Der Merwe, Willie, Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Political Science. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | en_ZA |
| Detected Language | Unknown |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 139 p. |
| Rights | Stellenbosch University |
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