Thesis (MA)--Stellembosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this thesis is to argue for a new metric for determining the moral status of
another being. Determining this status is of foundational importance in a number of legal,
political, and ethical concerns, including but not limited to animal rights, the treatment of
criminals, and the treatment of the psychologically afflicted. This metric will be based upon
one’s capacity to morally consider others. In other words, in order to have full moral status,
one must be able to have moral concern for others and act upon this concern to even a
minimal degree. In doing so, one will be considered to belong to a “moral community”,
which affords the member a certain set of rights, privileges, and duties towards other
community members. Arguing for the existence of such a community achieves the
pragmatic aspect of this thesis. I argue that morality is geared towards group-survival
strategies which have been evolutionarily selected for, and thus by organizing societal
structures towards the tools which nature has armed us with, we may maximize the
powers and capacities of the community members.
In order to achieve these aims, I defend a concept of morality as based in emotion,
requiring certain neurological structures, which gives the first set of criteria for identifying
potential members of the moral community. I then discuss the issue of identifying the
capacity for morality in non-human minds, arguing that we may infer moral capacities from
behaviourism.
In summary, the findings of this paper are that first, morality is essentially emotional
in nature and is a product of the nature of our neurological system, although rational
processes and enculturation shape particular moral sensitivities and priorities. Second,
one can infer the existence of moral capacities in animals from their behaviour, and, at risk
of engaging in anthropomorphism, to deny these capacities completely entails solipsism.
Thirdly, and most importantly, those who are capable of morally considering others ought
to be afforded full moral status themselves and be brought into a “moral community”
wherein special rights, freedoms, and privileges allow the members to most efficiently
contribute to the community, maximizing the powers and benefits of the community. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie tesis is om ’n nuwe maatstaf voor te hou waarvolgens die
morele status van ’n ander wese bepaal kan word. Die bepaling van hierdie status is van
fundamentele belang vir ’n hele aantal regs-, politiese en etiese aangeleenthede. Dit sluit,
onder andere, diereregte, die behandeling van misdadigers en die behandeling van
diegene met sielkundige probleme in. Hierdie maatstaf sal gebaseer word op die vermoë
van die individuele wese om ander moreel in ag te neem. Met ander woorde om volle
morele status te hê, moet 'n wese daartoe in staat wees om moreel besorg te wees oor
ander en om, ten minste tot ’n minimale mate, na gelang van hierdie besorgheid op te tree.
Op grond hiervan kan daar aanvaar word dat daardie wese tot ’n “morele gemeenskap”
behoort, wat ook aan hom ’n stel regte, voordele en pligte teenoor ander
gemeenskapslede sal besorg. Om ’n argument vir die bestaan van só ’n gemeenskap te
maak sal die pragmatiese doelwit van hierdie tesis bereik. Ek argumenteer dat moraliteit
ingestel is op groepsoorlewingstrategieë wat evolusionêr geselekteer is. Dit wil sê deur
samelewingstrukture op só ’n wyse te organiseer dat dit gebruik maak van die gereedskap
waarmee die natuur ons bewapen het, sal ons die bevoegdhede en die vermoëns van
gemeenskapslede kan maksimaliseer.
Om hierdie doelwitte te bereik, verdedig ek ’n verstaan van moraliteit as gebaseer
in emosies wat sekere neurologiese strukture benodig. Dít verskaf die eerste stel kriteria
waarvolgens potensiële lede van die morele gemeenskap geïdentifiseer kan word. Ek
bespreek vervolgens die moontlikheid om die vermoë tot moraliteit in nie-menslike
verstande te identifiseer en argumenteer dat morele vermoëns vanuit gedragsleer afgelei
kan word.
Ter opsomming is die bevindinge van hierdie tesis, eerstens, dat moraliteit wesenlik
emosioneel van aard en ’n produk van ons neurologiese sisteem is, alhoewel rasionele
prosesse en verkulturering spesifieke morele sensitiwiteite en prioriteite vorm. Tweedens
kan die bestaan van morele vermoëns in diere afgelei word vanuit hulle optrede, en,
alhoewel ons hier die risiko van antropomorfisme loop, behels die ontkenning van hierdie
vermoëns solipsisme. Derdens, en die belangrikste, diegene wat daartoe in staat is om
ander moreel in ag te neem behoort self volledig morele status toegeken te word. Hulle
word sodoende in die “morele gemeenskap” betrek waar spesiale regte, vryhede en
voordele gemeenskapslede sal toelaat om op die mees effektiewe wyse tot die
gemeenskap by te dra om sodoende die bevoegdhede en voordele van die gemeenskap
te maksimaliseer.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/97136 |
| Date | 04 1900 |
| Creators | Stephens, Christopher |
| Contributors | De Villiers-Botha, Tanya, Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | en_ZA |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | v, 89 pages |
| Rights | Stellenbosch University |
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