Thesis (MA)--Stellembosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this thesis is to argue for a new metric for determining the moral status of another being. Determining this status is of foundational importance in a number of legal, political, and ethical concerns, including but not limited to animal rights, the treatment of criminals, and the treatment of the psychologically afflicted. This metric will be based upon one’s capacity to morally consider others. In other words, in order to have full moral status, one must be able to have moral concern for others and act upon this concern to even a minimal degree. In doing so, one will be considered to belong to a “moral community”, which affords the member a certain set of rights, privileges, and duties towards other community members. Arguing for the existence of such a community achieves the pragmatic aspect of this thesis. I argue that morality is geared towards group-survival strategies which have been evolutionarily selected for, and thus by organizing societal structures towards the tools which nature has armed us with, we may maximize the powers and capacities of the community members. In order to achieve these aims, I defend a concept of morality as based in emotion, requiring certain neurological structures, which gives the first set of criteria for identifying potential members of the moral community. I then discuss the issue of identifying the capacity for morality in non-human minds, arguing that we may infer moral capacities from behaviourism. In summary, the findings of this paper are that first, morality is essentially emotional in nature and is a product of the nature of our neurological system, although rational processes and enculturation shape particular moral sensitivities and priorities. Second, one can infer the existence of moral capacities in animals from their behaviour, and, at risk of engaging in anthropomorphism, to deny these capacities completely entails solipsism. Thirdly, and most importantly, those who are capable of morally considering others ought to be afforded full moral status themselves and be brought into a “moral community” wherein special rights, freedoms, and privileges allow the members to most efficiently contribute to the community, maximizing the powers and benefits of the community. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie tesis is om ’n nuwe maatstaf voor te hou waarvolgens die morele status van ’n ander wese bepaal kan word. Die bepaling van hierdie status is van fundamentele belang vir ’n hele aantal regs-, politiese en etiese aangeleenthede. Dit sluit, onder andere, diereregte, die behandeling van misdadigers en die behandeling van diegene met sielkundige probleme in. Hierdie maatstaf sal gebaseer word op die vermoë van die individuele wese om ander moreel in ag te neem. Met ander woorde om volle morele status te hê, moet 'n wese daartoe in staat wees om moreel besorg te wees oor ander en om, ten minste tot ’n minimale mate, na gelang van hierdie besorgheid op te tree. Op grond hiervan kan daar aanvaar word dat daardie wese tot ’n “morele gemeenskap” behoort, wat ook aan hom ’n stel regte, voordele en pligte teenoor ander gemeenskapslede sal besorg. Om ’n argument vir die bestaan van só ’n gemeenskap te maak sal die pragmatiese doelwit van hierdie tesis bereik. Ek argumenteer dat moraliteit ingestel is op groepsoorlewingstrategieë wat evolusionêr geselekteer is. Dit wil sê deur samelewingstrukture op só ’n wyse te organiseer dat dit gebruik maak van die gereedskap waarmee die natuur ons bewapen het, sal ons die bevoegdhede en die vermoëns van gemeenskapslede kan maksimaliseer. Om hierdie doelwitte te bereik, verdedig ek ’n verstaan van moraliteit as gebaseer in emosies wat sekere neurologiese strukture benodig. Dít verskaf die eerste stel kriteria waarvolgens potensiële lede van die morele gemeenskap geïdentifiseer kan word. Ek bespreek vervolgens die moontlikheid om die vermoë tot moraliteit in nie-menslike verstande te identifiseer en argumenteer dat morele vermoëns vanuit gedragsleer afgelei kan word. Ter opsomming is die bevindinge van hierdie tesis, eerstens, dat moraliteit wesenlik emosioneel van aard en ’n produk van ons neurologiese sisteem is, alhoewel rasionele prosesse en verkulturering spesifieke morele sensitiwiteite en prioriteite vorm. Tweedens kan die bestaan van morele vermoëns in diere afgelei word vanuit hulle optrede, en, alhoewel ons hier die risiko van antropomorfisme loop, behels die ontkenning van hierdie vermoëns solipsisme. Derdens, en die belangrikste, diegene wat daartoe in staat is om ander moreel in ag te neem behoort self volledig morele status toegeken te word. Hulle word sodoende in die “morele gemeenskap” betrek waar spesiale regte, vryhede en voordele gemeenskapslede sal toelaat om op die mees effektiewe wyse tot die gemeenskap by te dra om sodoende die bevoegdhede en voordele van die gemeenskap te maksimaliseer.

My hypothesis is that social contract theory does not satisfactorily explain why we owe a serious concern or respect to profoundly mentally disabled individuals (PMD). This is a problem for social contract theories if we assume, like I do in this dissertation, that the PMD possess a robust moral status (RMS). My dissertation will explore the main strategies deployed by contractarian and contractualist theorists to bring the PMD within the purview of the social contract, in order to clarify why some aspects of their claims are promising but why they nonetheless fail to fully explain the robust moral status of the PMD. I notably find that they leave morally important dimensions of human relations out of the contractual frame, which means that they exclude the PMD from the scope of justice and morality when they claim that this contractual frame offers the only valid explanation to be a subject of justice and a moral patient. I do not conclude that this requires us to reject social contract theory altogether, nor do I count it as a reason to question whether the PMD have a robust moral status. In my concluding chapter, I will rather suggest a theoretical frame that has the potential of incorporating both contractual and non-contractual relations within the spheres of morality and justice, because both kinds of relation vehicle important intuitions about what is of value in human life. This dissertation will contribute to orientate future research on the moral and political grounds for the rights of profoundly mentally disabled people, as well as question or curtail the breadth of certain key assumptions of social contract theories.

<p>The paper deals with the problem of the moral status of human embryos <em>in vitro</em> obtained via somatic cell nuclear transfer, <em>in vitro</em> fertilization and similar biotechnologies. The purpose of research is to investigate whether it is possible to ascribe the position of full moral status to the embryo <em>in vitro</em> relying on its intrinsic properties. In particular, the property of totipotency of a human zygote was taken as presupposition in carrying out further moral assessments. To achieve these goals I have examined the applicability of the potentiality argument for evaluating moral status of the embryo within the frameworks of modal logic. The potential of the human embryo to become a person with full-fledged number of moral rights was interpreted using real, dispositional and counterfactual predicates. It was found that the role of potentiality argument is reduced to a precautionary principle and it failed to provide full moral status to the embryo <em>in vitro</em>. The potential of the embryo proper has a strong relational component that assigns it certain instrumental value. The latter implies that biomedical experimentation with the embryos <em>in vitro</em> cannot be considered as morally unacceptable.</p>

The paper deals with the problem of the moral status of human embryos in vitro obtained via somatic cell nuclear transfer, in vitro fertilization and similar biotechnologies. The purpose of research is to investigate whether it is possible to ascribe the position of full moral status to the embryo in vitro relying on its intrinsic properties. In particular, the property of totipotency of a human zygote was taken as presupposition in carrying out further moral assessments. To achieve these goals I have examined the applicability of the potentiality argument for evaluating moral status of the embryo within the frameworks of modal logic. The potential of the human embryo to become a person with full-fledged number of moral rights was interpreted using real, dispositional and counterfactual predicates. It was found that the role of potentiality argument is reduced to a precautionary principle and it failed to provide full moral status to the embryo in vitro. The potential of the embryo proper has a strong relational component that assigns it certain instrumental value. The latter implies that biomedical experimentation with the embryos in vitro cannot be considered as morally unacceptable.

No description available.

The question of whether parents-to-be have a moral obligation to maximize the welfare of their future children before they are born has fuelled considerable debate and a multitude of contrasting opinions from within the philosophical, legal and medical academic literature over the last three decades. It is unsurprising that this burst of activity in the field has coincided with continuous and significant advances in the field of reproductive, perinatal and neonatal medicine. These advances perpetually re-set the bar as to what screening processes and therapies can be offered before birth to ensure that infants are born in the healthiest possible state. By extension, I argue, that our obligations towards the unborn should also change. Within this thesis I explore philosophical and legal theories relating to responsibilities held to the unborn child by those wishing to be parents but also the State. In doing so, I approach the available literature from a more clinical viewpoint. I argue that in future, when screening processes and in utero therapies are likely to be safer and more effective, the duty of future parents to bring to life the healthiest child possible will become more compelling. In my articles I employ a personhood view of the foetus and argue that eventual children can be harmed in the pre-personal stage. I carefully analyze what it means to be harmed and apply a comparative account of harm through the thesis in trying to answer the five main questions that permeate through the articles. I question whether parents-to-be have a moral obligation to engage with antenatal screening services, I do not limit the screening processes to genetics alone but include foetal anomaly and microbiological information acquired antenatally in the process. I also explore what the obligations of parents-to-be are, once a screening process reveals a certain problem or risk. I elaborate on what circumstances they may be obliged to act upon, in a way that treats or minimizes the risks posed to the foetus. I argue that even in the absence of a cure, antenatally acquired information can be vital for the welfare of the child and this should compel parents to engage with the services on offer. I also purport that if there is a cure the parents are obliged to uptake it, provided it is safe and with good clinical outcomes. Finally I question whether the State has a moral duty to increase uptake of such antenatal health programs and if so to what extent should it attempt to do so. By analyzing the moral limits of law I argue that impositions on individual liberties in the interest of the unborn may only be reasonable if our reproductive choices stand to significantly harm others. I argue that recent amendments in English and Welsh Law that prohibit the application of advanced reproductive technologies to select for disabled foetuses signify an important change in the way the State values the welfare of future children. I explore international legal cases that suggest that the foetus is increasingly afforded more legal protections and investigate possible ways in which we could objectively quantify harm caused antenatally in a manner that would help us decide if and when the State should intervene with reproductive choices of parents-to-be. Finally, I elaborate on the how State led medical paternalism can be stratified and what each stratum involves in terms of intervention. I put forth that the State ought to explore avenues of soft and moderate paternalism first but should stop short of hard paternalism for a number of reasons.

The work deals with looking at the status of the human embryo. The structure of the work is divided into several chapters that deal with a particular topic. The first chapter deals with the historical view of the adoption of a human embryo, in the second chapter is devoted to philosophical adopting the human embryo and view individual philosophers on this issue. The third chapter is devoted to the ethical acceptance of the issue. Here is discussed an ethical perspective on human embryo status and access two main streams which occur in this area. The next part is devoted to the present, both in terms of the ethical-philosophical, and in terms of health. In the medical section includes prenatal communication between mother and child, and research on embryonic stem cells, which is associated with a number of ethical issues.

What criteria can we legitimately use to judge moral worth? What morally relevant differences or similarities exist between human and nonhuman animals? Do nonhuman animals deserve a moral status identical in all relevant ways to the moral status we attribute to other human beings? In our moral deliberations should we regard the interests of nonhuman animals as being of equal importance to human interests? Historically, with a few notable exceptions, questions such as these were either not asked or were answered unjustly, in ways which reflected the strong species bias of the philosophers doing the asking. For roughly the past two thousand years our moral thinking has focused primarily on humanity, with little serious attention given to the idea that nonhuman animals may also warrant moral concern. It was not until the 1970s that the question of moral status for nonhuman animals became a focal point of our moral thinking, and that animal ethics was acknowledged as a legitimate subject of serious philosophical inquiry. This change of attitude towards animal ethics and the issues contained therein was largely inspired by the 1975 publication of Peter Singer's seminal work Animal Liberation, which revolutionized thinking about nonhuman animals both inside and outside academia. Thus, my thesis begins with an evaluation of Peter Singer's case for animal liberation. While I support Singer's overall conclusion that nonhuman animals deserve the same moral status as human beings and that we are guilty of an inconsistency if we maintain otherwise, I see his argument as too limited in some respects to be a totally satisfactory account of why nonhuman animals deserve moral status. I construct a more comprehensive argument for the moral status of nonhuman animals by examining the issue from different philosophical perspectives (specifically, philosophy of mind and phenomenology), using these perspectives where appropriate to engage more deeply with areas of controversy such as the question of killing, morally relevant criteria, differences between the human and nonhuman animal mind, and the question of varying levels of moral significance.

This dissertation has three aims: 1. To evaluate several ethical theories about responsibility towards future generations. 2. To construct a theory about responsibility towards future generations. 3. To carry out an ethical evaluation of different nuclear waste management methods. Five theories are evaluated with the help of evaluative criteria, primarily: A theory must provide future generations with some independent moral status. A theory should acknowledge moral pluralism. A theory should provide some normative claims about real-world problems. Derek Parfit’s theory provides future generations with full moral status. But it is incompatible with moral pluralism, and does not provide reasonable normative claims about real-world problems. Brian Barry’s theory provides such claims and a useful idea about risk management, but it does not provide an argument why future generations ought to exist. Avner de-Shalit’s theory explains why they ought to exist; however, his theory can not easily explain why we ought to care for other people than those in our own community. Emmanuel Agius’ theory gives an ontological explanation for mankind’s unity, but reduces conflicts of interests to a common good. Finally, Hans Jonas’ theory shifts the focus from the situation of future generations to the preconditions of human life generally. However, his theory presupposes a specific ontology, which might be unable to motivate people to act. The concluding chapters describe a narrative theory of responsibility. It claims that we should comprehend ourselves as parts of the common story of mankind and that we ought to provide future generations with equal opportunities. This implies that we should avoid transferring risks and focus on reducing the long-term risks associated with the nuclear waste.

Orientadora: Mariana Claudia Broens / Co-orientadora: Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez / Resumo: O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o processo de ampliação do estatuto moral dos animais não-humanos a partir de diferentes perspectivas teóricas. Para isso, examinamos primeiramente concepções filosóficas contemporâneas sobre a relação animais humanos/animais não-humanos de Luc Ferry, para quem a cultura afasta os seres humanos dos demais animais, e de Michael Pollan, para quem se estabeleceu uma relação simbiótica entre animais humanos e não-humanos. Em seguida, analisamos diferentes concepções do estatuto moral dos animais não-humanos no que diz respeito ao progressivo reconhecimento de sua condição de seres vivos, capazes de sentirem dor e de possuírem um self (Singer, 1994, 2004; Regan, 1983, 1999, 2006; Wise, 2002, 2011; Damásio, 2004, 2010; de Waal, 2006, 2007). A partir dessa análise inicial, discutimos a noção de expansão dos círculos morais proposta inicialmente por William E. H. Lecky (1869), segundo a qual o âmbito da consideração moral se ampliou do círculo familiar para o círculo da comunidade, depois abarcando a nação e assim sucessivamente graças ao desenvolvimento da racionalidade humana. Por fim, esboçamos uma explicação alternativa à concepção racionalista dessa dinâmica de expansão/retração dos círculos morais a partir da perspectiva sistêmica, sugerindo que tal dinâmica ocorre auto-organizadamente, no sentido proposto por Debrun (1996) de auto-organização secundária. / Abstract: The objective of this study is to analyze the amplification of the moral status of nonhumans from different theoretical perspectives. First, we examine contemporary philosophical conceptions of the human animal/non-human animal relationship as proposed by Luc Ferry, for whom culture alienates humans from other animals, and as proposed by Michael Pollan, who establishes a symbiotic relationship between human animals and nonhumans. Next, we analyze different conceptions of the moral status of nonhumans with regard to the progressive recognition of their status as living beings capable of feeling pain and having a self (Singer, 1994, 2004; Regan, 1983 1999 2006; Wise, 2002, 2011; Damasio, 2004, 2010; de Waal, 2006, 2007). Based on this initial review, we discuss the notion of the expansion of the moral circle first proposed by William E. H. Lecky (1869), according to which the scope of moral consideration has expanded from the family circle to the circle of the community, then covering the nation and even wider circles, due to the development of human rationality. Finally, we outline from the systemic perspective an alternative explanation to the rationalist conception of this dynamic expansion/retraction of moral circles, suggesting that such dynamics are self-organized in the sense of secondary self-organization proposed by Debrun (1996). / Mestre