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The dissertation follows up metods of assisted reproduction and its ethical aspects that are described with their particular metods of assisted reproduction. It summarizes opinions of supporters, such as doctors, but also opinions of respondents such as ethicists or theologian. Dissertation is mostly focused on moral status of embryo and their superfluous creations. It warns us to be aware that assisted reproduction can leads to violation of human dignity but also let us learn ways of assisted reproduction which are considerate to embryos and which do not jeopardize human dignity. It describes problems of legislation in Czech Republic but also in Germany and Great Britain. One part is also dedicated to opinions of catholic Church. Last chapter describes involuntary childlessness.

Submitted by Pedro Lallo (pedrolallo@hotmail.com) on 2016-04-19T21:11:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Pedro Lallo para entregar.pdf: 1738982 bytes, checksum: aef96c52bf8c63ff50dbadd8eacd653b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Felipe Augusto Arakaki (arakaki@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-04-26T17:44:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 lallo_pga_me_mar.pdf: 1738982 bytes, checksum: aef96c52bf8c63ff50dbadd8eacd653b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T17:44:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 lallo_pga_me_mar.pdf: 1738982 bytes, checksum: aef96c52bf8c63ff50dbadd8eacd653b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-16 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o processo de ampliação do estatuto moral dos animais não-humanos a partir de diferentes perspectivas teóricas. Para isso, examinamos primeiramente concepções filosóficas contemporâneas sobre a relação animais humanos/animais não-humanos de Luc Ferry, para quem a cultura afasta os seres humanos dos demais animais, e de Michael Pollan, para quem se estabeleceu uma relação simbiótica entre animais humanos e não-humanos. Em seguida, analisamos diferentes concepções do estatuto moral dos animais não-humanos no que diz respeito ao progressivo reconhecimento de sua condição de seres vivos, capazes de sentirem dor e de possuírem um self (Singer, 1994, 2004; Regan, 1983, 1999, 2006; Wise, 2002, 2011; Damásio, 2004, 2010; de Waal, 2006, 2007). A partir dessa análise inicial, discutimos a noção de expansão dos círculos morais proposta inicialmente por William E. H. Lecky (1869), segundo a qual o âmbito da consideração moral se ampliou do círculo familiar para o círculo da comunidade, depois abarcando a nação e assim sucessivamente graças ao desenvolvimento da racionalidade humana. Por fim, esboçamos uma explicação alternativa à concepção racionalista dessa dinâmica de expansão/retração dos círculos morais a partir da perspectiva sistêmica, sugerindo que tal dinâmica ocorre auto-organizadamente, no sentido proposto por Debrun (1996) de auto-organização secundária. / The objective of this study is to analyze the amplification of the moral status of nonhumans from different theoretical perspectives. First, we examine contemporary philosophical conceptions of the human animal/non-human animal relationship as proposed by Luc Ferry, for whom culture alienates humans from other animals, and as proposed by Michael Pollan, who establishes a symbiotic relationship between human animals and nonhumans. Next, we analyze different conceptions of the moral status of nonhumans with regard to the progressive recognition of their status as living beings capable of feeling pain and having a self (Singer, 1994, 2004; Regan, 1983 1999 2006; Wise, 2002, 2011; Damasio, 2004, 2010; de Waal, 2006, 2007). Based on this initial review, we discuss the notion of the expansion of the moral circle first proposed by William E. H. Lecky (1869), according to which the scope of moral consideration has expanded from the family circle to the circle of the community, then covering the nation and even wider circles, due to the development of human rationality. Finally, we outline from the systemic perspective an alternative explanation to the rationalist conception of this dynamic expansion/retraction of moral circles, suggesting that such dynamics are self-organized in the sense of secondary self-organization proposed by Debrun (1996).

A universal human dignity, conceived as an inherent and inalienable value or worth in all human beings, which ought to be recognised, respected and protected by others, has become one of the most prominent and widely promoted interpretations of human dignity, especially in international human rights law. Yet, it is also one of the most difficult interpretations of human dignity to justify and ground. The fundamental problem rests on how one can justify bestowing an equal high worth to all human lives, whilst also attributing to all human life a worth that is superior to all non-human animal life. To avoid the speciesist charge it seems necessary to provide further reasons, over and above species membership, for why all humans have a unique worth and dignity. However, intrinsic capacities, such as autonomy, intelligence or language use, are too demanding for many humans (including foetuses or the severely cognitively disabled) to meet the required minimum standard, whilst also being obtainable by some non-human animals, regardless of where the level is set. This thesis offers a solution to this problem by turning instead to the significance of the relational ties between individuals or groups that transcend individual capacities and abilities, and consequently does not require that all individuals in the group need meet the minimum required capacity for full moral status. Rather, it is argued that a universal human dignity could be grounded in our social nature, the interconnectedness and interdependence of human life and the morally considerable relationships that can and do arise from it, especially in regards to our shared vulnerability and dependence, and our ability to engage in caring relationships. Care represents the antithesis to the dehumanizing effects of humiliation, and other degrading and dehumanizing acts, and as a relational concept, human dignity is often best realised through our caring relationships. The way that individuals and groups treat each other has a fundamental role in determining both an individual’s sense of self-worth and well-being, as well as their perceived public value and worth. Thus, whilst species membership is not in itself morally fundamental or basic, it often shapes the nature of our social and moral relations. These relational ties between humans, it is argued, distinguish us most clearly from other non-human animals and accord human relationships a special moral significance or dignity.

Within many communities and religions, including the LDS community, there is some controversy surrounding the use of stem cells – particularly embryonic stem cells (ESC). Much of this controversy arises from confusion and misconceptions about what stem cells actually are, where they come from , and when life begins. The theology of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has interesting implications for the last of these considerations, and it becomes less a question of “when does life begin” and more an exploration of “when does personhood begin” or “when does the spirit enter the body.” With no official Church stance, statements from Church leaders vary on this topic, and this first section of the thesis explores the philosophical and practical meaning of personhood with a biological background intended for those not familiar with the origin or uses of stem cells.The second portion of the thesis explores possible cloning technologies. Recent events and advances address the possibility of cloning endangered and extinct species. The ethics of these types of cloning have considerations uniquely different from the type of cloning commonly practiced. Cloning of cheetahs (and other endangered or vulnerable species) may be ethically appropriate, given certain constraints. However, the ethics of cloning extinct species varies; for example, cloning mammoths and Neanderthals is more ethically problematic than conservation cloning, and requires more attention. Cloning Neanderthals in particular is likely unethical and such a project should not be undertaken. It is important to discuss and plan for the constraints necessary to mitigate the harms of conservation and extinct cloning, and it is imperative that scientific and public discourse enlighten and guide actions in the sphere of cloning.

La recherche visant à développer des prototypes d’utérus artificiels (UA) est motivée par le besoin d’améliorer la prise en charge de grands prématurés humains. Plusieurs sont d’avis que les UA finiront par soutenir le développement de fœtus – que nous appelons « entités en UA » – à un stade de plus en plus tôt dans la gestation, soulevant ainsi plusieurs questions éthiques. À l’aide d’une revue narrative systématisée, ce mémoire analyse les impacts possibles de l’ectogestation sur les aspects moraux ayant une incidence sur le statut légal de l’entité en UA au Canada. Il amorce également une réflexion à savoir quel peut être son statut moral et/ou légal et par extension, quelles sont les implications éthiques et juridiques liées à son traitement. Pour ce faire, différentes écoles de pensée concernant la nature de l’embryon/fœtus et de la personne sont présentées. Ensuite, certains aspects pertinents au statut légal de l’entité en UA sont analysés dont ceux de la naissance et de la viabilité. Finalement, les aspects potentiellement problématiques de ces deux concepts en contexte d’ectogestation sont expliqués, notamment par rapport au droit à l’avortement que nous reformulons comme étant l’« arrêt de l’existence de l’entité en UA » lorsqu’il est question d’ectogestation. Considérant que la valeur morale accordée au produit humain de la conception diffère largement selon les écoles de pensée, et que le droit comporte certaines lacunes pour appréhender les questions relatives au statut légal de l’entité en UA, une analyse bioéthique est nécessaire pour bien encadrer et mener cette réflexion. / The research surrounding the development of artificial womb (AW) prototypes is motivated by the need to improve the treatment for extremely premature infants. Many believe that AW will play a role in supporting the development of the fetus, which we refer to as an “entity in an artificial womb” throughout this thesis, at increasingly earlier stages of gestation, which raises many ethical and legal issues. Using a systematised narrative review, the present master’s thesis analyzes the possible impacts of ectogestation on the moral aspects affecting the legal status of entity in AW in Canada. It also addresses its possible moral and/or legal status and, by extension, the ethical and legal implications related to the treatment of such entities. To do so, it presents different schools of thought concerning the nature of embryos/fetuses and persons, and analyzes relevant aspects concerning the legal status of the entities in AW, especially those relating to birth and viability. It explains how these two concepts might be problematic in the context of ectogestation, especially with respect to abortion rights – in the context ectogestation, we refer to abortion as “termination of the entity in an artificial womb”. Considering that the moral value attached to the result of conception differs substantially from one school of thought to another, and that shortcomings in the law may hinder the understanding of issues related to the legal status of the entity in an AW, a bioethical analysis is necessary to guide and carry out this reflection.

Title The legal status of the embryo from the perspective of European human rights protection Abstract The thesis addresses the question regarding the legal status of the human embryo in European law. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate whether the embryo stands in the position of a legal object or legal subject and whether the legal status of embryo is in compliance with natural law. For this purpose the thesis firstly defines the status in the field of natural law, i.e. the moral status of embryo. Afterwards, the thesis examines the legal position of embryo in human rights protection. The thesis answers the question whether the embryo is subject of human rights documents. The legal status of embryo is analyzed in relation to the subjectivity of human rights in general as well as in relation to specific rights. The interpretation of legal terms "human being" and "everyone" contribute to a better understanding of legal status of embryo in general. The analysis of the specific rights, namely the right to life, human dignity, personal integrity and non-discrimination, shows the complexity of the potential legal subjectivity of embryo in the area of human rights. The evaluation of the legal status of human embryo in the area of human rights protection is complemented by an assessment of legal status in other...

<p>The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism (AN) and non-analogy-based nature-considerism (NN). I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former.</p><p>The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show (i) that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and (ii) that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of (i) its unique complexity, and (ii) its indispensability (to all moral agents). I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them.</p><p>Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region.</p>

The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism (AN) and non-analogy-based nature-considerism (NN). I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former. The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show (i) that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and (ii) that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of (i) its unique complexity, and (ii) its indispensability (to all moral agents). I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them. Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region.

(in English): The thesis deals with the problem of induced abortions. It focuses on, and offers an analysis of, common ways in which abortion has recently been defended in the Czech Republic. In an examination of usual lines of defence of abortion, a description of ongoing philosophical debate about morality of abortion is employed. Arguments founded on bodily integrity and drawn from general feministic positions are attacked with the aim to show that all these ways of defending abortion elude the crucial problems such as the moral status of a fetus, father rights, the nature of discourses which underlie women's choices to abort, and the consequences of the common contemporary view of abortions for women's lives. The tension between basic sexual needs and responsibility for a human life that begins is set forth as the pivotal problem. Concerning the theoretical question of the moral status of a fetus, the thesis endorses a skeptical stance. As a consequence, unassailable solution to the question of permissibility of abortions is rejected as an impossible task. Such a negative result invites a question of how, if at all,the contemporary discourse might be substantiated in which abortions are treated quite straightforwardly as permissible acts. The acquaintance with philosophical problems concerning...