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Diatribe and Plutarch's practical ethics

This dissertation concerns two aspects of Plutarch’s ethics that have received relatively little attention: the link between his metaphysics and ethics, and Plutarch’s use of diatribe, a rhetorical style primarily associated with Stoics and Cynics, as a means of targeting a wider audience of educated elite for his philosophy. I argue that Plutarch’s De virtute morali links his ethics with his understanding of Platonic metaphysics. De virtute morali also serves as model for Plutarch’s ethical treatises on specific topics. I analyze the following works: De curiositate, De garrulitate, De vitando aere alieno, De vitioso pudore, and De superstitione. In these, Plutarch identifies a vicious behavior (κρίσις) and suggests methods of self-training to eliminate the vicious behavior (ἄσκησις). Self-training always involves the subordination of emotions to reason (μετριοπάθεια), rather than the elimination of emotions (άπάθεια) advocated by the Stoics. Plutarch uses diatribe, in which the author adopts a conversational tone and addresses the reader in second person, both in κρίσις and ἄσκησις, as well as in his arguments against Stoic άπάθεια. Since Stoicism was the most popular philosophical adherence among educated elites during the time when Plutarch began to write, I argue that Plutarch adopts rhetoric associated with the Stoics as a means of promoting Platonism, and himself as its interpreter, in a culture where intellectuals required the patronage of the educated elite for their personal livelihood and the livelihood of their schools.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:uiowa.edu/oai:ir.uiowa.edu:etd-5889
Date01 July 2015
CreatorsBurns, Aaron
ContributorsFinamore, John F., 1951-
PublisherUniversity of Iowa
Source SetsUniversity of Iowa
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typedissertation
Formatapplication/pdf
SourceTheses and Dissertations
RightsCopyright 2015 Aaron Burns

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