The paper investigates the role of central bank communication for monetary policy implementation. Firstly, we use a multi-disciplinary approach to disentangle several problematic contingencies of central bank communication, analyzing from this perspective the role of complex phenomena such as public opinion, perceptions, beliefs, framing, subjective probability, rhetoric, persuasion, cognitive limits and distortions, psychological and cultural biases etc. The result is a comprehensive survey of theory and practice in central bank communication, from the perspective of political science, social-psychology and media studies. Secondly, we attempt to draw on more psychological realism to central bank communication in the context of financial crises, using a parallel with risk management in the case of natural disasters. Thirdly, we conceive central bank information as a public good, thereby we construct a novel schematic model of supply and demand based on two respective behavioral logistic functions, in order to derive central bank informational equilibrium. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ulb.ac.be/oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210078 |
| Date | 27 August 2010 |
| Creators | Comanescu, Anton |
| Contributors | Praet, Peter, Gassner, Marjorie, Dewatripont, Mathias, Six, Jean-Louis, Heipertz, Martin, Winkler, Bernhard |
| Publisher | Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté des sciences sociales, politiques et économiques – Sciences économiques, Bruxelles |
| Source Sets | Université libre de Bruxelles |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/openurl/vlink-dissertation |
| Format | 1 v. (240 p.), No full-text files |
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