For each decision we make, we must first determine the degree of effort that we are going to exert, and this can range from no effort to full effort. To select a reasoning strategy (e.g., withholding or exerting effort), it has been proposed that we must first integrate internal and external factors to compute the degree of effort necessary and solve the problem at hand. In this dissertation, I sought to determine the mechanisms underlying selecting such reasoning strategies by leveraging electroencephalographic imaging techniques. My investigations began by exploring neural correlates of effortful contemplation and evolved to test assumptions of prediction errors as it became apparent that they were an influential factor. I then tied this mechanism to the strategy selection phase of reasoning and cost-benefit computations. From these findings, I proposed that prediction errors of decision demands function to lessen or remove the burden of cost-benefit computations. Specifically, repeated encounters of the same or similar decisions provide an opportunity to develop expectations of the prospective costs and benefits of those judgments and these expectations facilitate the reasoning process. I consider two possible explanations as to how prediction errors may influence reasoning: first, our expectations provide our cost-benefit computations with a starting point to be adjusted if necessary, and second, our expectations act as a gating mechanism for cost-benefit computations. Although more research is needed to test these hypotheses, I hope my work provides grounds for advancing this field of study. / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uvic.ca/oai:dspace.library.uvic.ca:1828/14274 |
| Date | 28 September 2022 |
| Creators | Williams, Chad |
| Contributors | Krigolson, Olave |
| Source Sets | University of Victoria |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | Available to the World Wide Web |
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