Abstract
dc:descriptionCourage was among the most esteemed virtues in ancient Greece, standing as a central symbol of their conception of the “good life”. Yet a full understanding of this virtue is far from straightforward. Aristotle’s definitions and analyses of courage in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics continue to be a matter of scholarly controversy. This paper seeks to examine and clarify three central issues. First, courage is seen by Aristotle as primarily concerned with fear in difficult circumstances, but what kind of fear does the courageous person experience? If someone does something courageous but doesn't actually feel fear, does their courage still count as a virtue of character? Second, the courageous person must confront the challenges of death, and courage necessarily involves the suffering that accompanies fear. How, then, does Aristotle explain the role of pleasure in courageous action? Third, the motivation of courage: Aristotle often describes it as being “for the sake of the noble”. But what is the relationship between the noble and the external goals of action? Moreover, what kind of tension arises between the noble and happiness, and can this tension be resolved? In addressing these questions, this paper aims to demonstrate the internal coherence and systematic completeness of Aristotle’s account of courage.
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
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- JIAO YIYANG
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Rights
- Language dc:language
- English
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- uoadl:5313963