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National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Aristotle’s Theory of Spontaneity in Relation to His Theory of Natural Teleology

Abstract

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A central and enduring challenge in Aristotle's natural philosophy is reconciling the seemingly random phenomena of chance and luck with his robust commitment to a teleological cosmos. If nature acts "always or for the most part" for the sake of an end, what ontological status can the irregular and the unexpected possibly have? Do they represent a fatal flaw in the system, or can they be integrated in it? This thesis, “Aristotle’s Theory of Causation and Chance”, argues that Aristotle not only integrates them but that his accounts of teleology and chance are fundamentally consistent and mutually reinforcing. It aims to demonstrate that Aristotle’s analysis of chance and spontaneity in Physics II.4-6 does not undermine his theory of natural teleology but, on the contrary, presupposes it and is logically dependent upon it. The journey to this conclusion begins with a meticulous reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument in Physics II.4-6. The analysis traces his move from establishing the reality of chance against its deniers, to defining it as an "accidental cause" within the taxonomy of purposeful actions, and finally to differentiating it as a specific type of spontaneity applicable only to rational agents. This close reading shows that chance is not a fifth cause rivaling nature or intellect, but a derivative cause that emerges from the intersection of two independent, teleological causal chains. Its very definition, namely chance being an unintended yet teleological outcome, is only intelligible against a background of agents acting for ends. This work then enables an intervention in the scholarly debate surrounding Physics II.8. By engaging with interpretations from Furley, Sedley, Scharle, and Charlton concerning the purpose of natural processes like rainfall, this thesis applies the logical relationship established earlier. The regularity of natural changes provides the stable, purposive background against which the rare and accidental can be identified as such. Therefore, the existence of chance does not contradict teleology; it requires it. By examining both the exception (chance) and the rule (teleology) in tandem, this thesis demonstrates their essential consistency within Aristotle’s coherent worldview, where the accidental is defined and bounded by the essential. To substantiate this claim, the thesis is structured around a tripartite analysis of Aristotle's Physics. The first chapter offers a detailed exposition of Physics II.4-6, reconstructing Aristotle's core argument that chance is an accidental cause which depends on a backdrop of teleological processes. The second chapter advances to Physics II.9, analyzing the concept of hypothetical necessity to demonstrate that a world where matter is subordinate to form inherently generates the conditions for chance as a necessary byproduct. Finally, the third chapter synthesizes these findings through a critical engagement with the scholarly debate on Physics II.8, arguing that the regularity of nature is the very foundation that makes the identification of irregular chance events possible, thereby proving their fundamental consistency.

Author and committee

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Author dc:creator
  • TSOLOMYTI FANI

Subjects

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Rights

Language dc:language
English

Identifiers

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Identifier
uoadl:5314335

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Base URL
pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/frontend/oaipmh
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

TSOLOMYTI FANI. Aristotle’s Theory of Spontaneity in Relation to His Theory of Natural Teleology. 2025. https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/5314335