Abstract
dc:descriptionBy reading Plato's Hippias Minor in parallel with his Republic, this paper aims to clarify the relation of the philosopher to truth and lies. I interpret and connect arguments from Plato's dialogues to arrive at a coherent schema: the philosopher, as the one who knows the soul, is capable of voluntarily lying, while all others lie involuntarily out of their ignorance. As voluntary lies aim at the good, while involuntary lies do not, voluntary lies are superior. The philosopher, knowing the good, necessarily pursues it, and is thus also not at risk of misusing the ability to lie. I argue that in Plato, human life is inextricable from lies, which are ontologically embedded via the being of not-being as described in the Sophist. Plato thus appears much closer to Homer than Socrates' critiques in the Republic would initially suggest: both picture human life as unstable and propose voluntary wandering as the best way to live. Plato distinguishes himself from Homer in the form of the wandering and what kind of return it seeks.
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- FRIEDMAN ELIAS
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Rights
- Language dc:language
- English
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- uoadl:5315318