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University of Birmingham

On the margins: personhood and moral status in marginal cases of human rights

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Most philosophical accounts of human rights accept that all persons have human rights. Typically, ‘personhood’ is understood as unitary and binary. It is unitary because there is generally supposed to be a single threshold property required for personhood (e.g. agency, rationality, etc.). It is binary because it is all-or-nothing: you are either a person or you are not. A difficulty with binary views is that there will typically be subjects, like children and those with dementia, who do not meet the threshold, and so who are not persons with human rights, on these accounts. It is consequently unclear how we ought to treat these subjects. This is the problem of marginal cases. I argue that we cannot resolve the problem of marginal cases if we accept a unitary, binary view of personhood. Instead, I develop a new non-binary personhood account of human rights, and defend two main claims. First, there are many, scalar properties, the having of which are conducive to personhood. Second, different subjects have different human rights depending on which of these properties they have, and what threats apply to them. On my view, and contra most existing accounts, most marginal cases have some degree of personhood and are entitled to some human rights.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
d_ph
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
d_ph
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Birmingham
Year dc:date.issued
2020

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Ryland, Helen
ORCID person:identifier.orcid

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Grantnumber
Grant number: AH/L50385X/1

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Birmingham
Base URL
etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Ryland, Helen. On the margins: personhood and moral status in marginal cases of human rights. d_ph thesis, University of Birmingham, 2020.