Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis thesis critically examines the doctrine of causation in English criminal law. The requirement of causation is of fundamental importance to our understanding of the actus reus in criminal law. This is because whenever a consequence is specified as part of the actus reus, it must be proven that the result occurred and that the defendant’s behaviour legally caused that consequence. This thesis argues that the traditional bifurcation of causation (that is, factual and legal causation) is unhelpful in ascribing causal responsibility as it fails to communicate to the jury when and why an individual may be responsible for resulting harm in criminal law. This thesis explores the resulting jurisprudence and argues that the absence of an explicit culpability-based criterion within the causation doctrines accounts for the courts’ difficulties. The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to present a normative yet practical account of how the criminal law should establish causation in criminal law. It looks to criminal law theory to develop the discourse and offer a new model of causation, ‘culpable causation’, which clearly articulates when resulting harms are attributed to individuals in criminal law.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- d_ph
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- d_ph
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Birmingham
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2020
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Bansal, Daniel James
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng