University of Birmingham
The moral significance of belief as a component of intention in the criminal law
Abstract
dc:description.abstractAnalyses of intended action, in a criminal law context as elsewhere, tend to agree that it comprises a relevant desire and belief. While much attention has been paid to the element of desire, little has been paid to belief. This thesis suggests that closer attention to belief is necessary in understanding the moral differences between intention crimes and other crimes. It argues that a mental state akin to belief is a necessary component in all intention crimes, considers whether “belief'’ is the correct term and what it means in this context, and considers the moral context in which intention crimes are categorised. Having considered those matters, it seeks to identify the role that belief plays and the type of belief required. It then seeks to identify the moral role that belief plays, considers what other factors are of moral importance, and compares the moral importance of belief with those other factors. It is submitted that this analysis reveals the central moral importance of belief, and provides a clearer and more morally satisfactory distinction between intention and other mens rea than has been identified hitherto.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- other
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- other
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Birmingham
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2006
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Grist, Rupert
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng