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University of Birmingham

An investigation into the substance view of persons

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

According to a recent survey, a significant majority of professional philosophers support the permissibility of induced abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy. This thesis aims to defend the minority ‘pro-life’ view that abortion is immoral throughout pregnancy. To achieve this goal, the metaphysical and moral account of human beings known as the substance view of persons will be critically examined. This account maintains that all human beings deserve equal consideration in their treatment. That is, they have equal moral value; they are moral persons. Accordingly, prenatal human beings, like adults, enjoy the same ‘right to life’, and therefore, the substance view implies that abortion is prima facie impermissible. In the course of my investigation of the substance view, I argue that it can be defended against many of the objections of critics. Yet, I nonetheless find that the substance view has important shortcomings. Therefore, I recommend an alternative account I have developed as a replacement, the rational animal account. During this investigation, I also develop some critiques of important pro-choice arguments and evaluate other pro-life arguments that try to avoid the issue of moral personhood.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
d_ph
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
d_ph
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Birmingham
Year dc:date.issued
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Blackshaw, Bruce
ORCID person:identifier.orcid

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Birmingham
Base URL
etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Blackshaw, Bruce. An investigation into the substance view of persons. d_ph thesis, University of Birmingham, 2025.