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University of Birmingham

Intrinsic naturalism: a type-F monist account of phenomenal consciousness

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The aim of this thesis is to provide a theory of phenomenal consciousness which accords with both the science-friendly spirit of physicalism and the acknowledgement of panpsychism that phenomenal properties may be inextricably linked to entities, but with none of the problems associated with either type of model. Initially, physicalism and panpsychism are evaluated by the lights of their most serious problems, and solutions are offered to these problems from the point of view of a third kind of model: intrinsic naturalism, presented in the final chapter. This model holds consciousness to be among the battery of a functional system’s intrinsic (i.e. non-dispositional) properties. A definition is given, and defence made for the existence of these properties, and their compatibility with an otherwise physicalist ontology.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
m_ph
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
m_ph
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Birmingham
Year dc:date.issued
2011

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Palmer, Luke Alexander Gordon

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Birmingham
Base URL
etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Palmer, Luke Alexander Gordon. Intrinsic naturalism: a type-F monist account of phenomenal consciousness. m_ph thesis, University of Birmingham, 2011.