University of Birmingham
Intrinsic naturalism: a type-F monist account of phenomenal consciousness
Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe aim of this thesis is to provide a theory of phenomenal consciousness which accords with both the science-friendly spirit of physicalism and the acknowledgement of panpsychism that phenomenal properties may be inextricably linked to entities, but with none of the problems associated with either type of model. Initially, physicalism and panpsychism are evaluated by the lights of their most serious problems, and solutions are offered to these problems from the point of view of a third kind of model: intrinsic naturalism, presented in the final chapter. This model holds consciousness to be among the battery of a functional system’s intrinsic (i.e. non-dispositional) properties. A definition is given, and defence made for the existence of these properties, and their compatibility with an otherwise physicalist ontology.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- m_ph
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- m_ph
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Birmingham
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2011
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Palmer, Luke Alexander Gordon
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng